inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources

1. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References The 10 Greatest US Intelligence Failures Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Intelligence -- both good and bad -- can influence presidential decision-making, alter U.S. foreign policy, and prevent surprises. Whatever the limits of the U.S. intelligence community, it continues to face criticism for its perceived shortcomings, most recently for not predicting the Arab Spring and totally missing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's death. While the intelligence community can claim several successes , it has also endured a number of humiliating failures. The intelligence breakdowns noted in this project have been at the heart of pivotal events that refashioned the Middle East, altered the course of the Cold War, and thrust the United States into World War II, the war on terror, and the war in Iraq. • At all levels of the military and government, decision–makers rely on intelligence estimates that are accurate, reliable and relevant. Good intelligence can save lives and protect our national security; mistakes can lead to severe consequences. Unlike national-level intelligence agencies, who depend on college graduates with degrees in topics directly related to the analytic effort, the US Army depends on young enlisted soldiers as the core of their intelligence analysis effort. Lacking the critical thinking skills that are expected to be part of a university’s academic program, these young analysts often also lack historical perspective of the impact of intelligence on decisions-making, and knowledge of the cognitive biases that contributed to these decisions. Cognitive biases are not necessarily always bad; they are mental shortcuts that help people make faster decisions. However, an intelligence analyst must be able to critically examine their own cognitive biases and avoid allowing them to influence their analysis. • This project provides learners an opportunity to explore the multiple factors that contributed to the United States’ ten greatest intelligence failures. Links to cases, themes, and perspectives give learners the means for improving their analytic skills and help mitigate cognitive bias, one of the greatest limitations of an intelligence analyst. This project can be used in a stand-alone mode or as part of an instructor-led training program. • Let’s begin: • 1. Review the link for Cognitive Bias and familiarize with the various biases that impact decision-making. Pay particular attention to those biases deemed to be of most interest to the US intelligence community and the subject of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Sirius Program. • 2. Review the Themes Defined to gain a better understanding of the factors involved in National-level decision-making. • 3. Select a case study and examine the associated themes and perspectives. Journal articles and videos are provided to gain more in-depth background. During this activity, answer the following questions: • What were key factors that contributed to this event? • What biases were displayed by the perspectives of the case study? • What biases were evident within the themes of the case study? • 4. Select an Intelligence Assessment Template and prepare it for presentation to national level decision-makers. Share your results on the collaboration page. • 5. Complete the Case/Theme Matrix. Share your results on the collaboration page. • 6. Post other comments, questions, or reflections on the collaboration page. • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

2. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Themes Defined Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Political Theme Many political scientists, focusing upon the concept of "political power," define politics as the pursuit of political power and competition for political power. John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood define politics as "the process by which political power is acquired and exercised." Politics involves the pursuit, acquisition, and exercise of political power. Political power is the ability to shape and control the political behavior of others and to lead and guide their behavior in the direction desired by the person, group, or institution wielding the political power. Political power is the capacity to influence, condition, mold, and control human behavior for the accomplishment of political objectives. That is to say, political power is the ability of one political actor--e.g., an individual citizen, a family, an interest group, a political action committee, a political party, or the government--to effect a desired change in the behavior of other political actors, persuading or forcing the latter to act in a manner they would not act in the absence of the former's impact on the situation. Actor A has political power over Actor B to the degree that he is able to motivate, inspire, incite, stimulate, or otherwise bring about some modification of B's political behavior--a modification in behavior favored by Actor A. A's political power, of course, would also include his capacity to induce B to continue doing something he is currently doing, if B would discontinue the behavior in the absence of A's inducements. Political behavior consists of human activities relating to the government and its processes of authoritative decision-making and action. Examples of political behavior, or political activity, include such actions as (1) voting in elections, (2) contributing money to political parties or to the election campaigns of candidates running for government office, (3) attending and actively participating in party caucuses, or meetings (e.g., precinct meetings and county, district, state, and national conventions), (4) serving on party and campaign committees, (5) serving as campaign workers for particular candidates, (6) working for political action committees, (7) active membership in political interest groups, (8) lobbying, (9) engaging in protest demonstrations, (10) writing to or otherwise contacting members of the legislature or other government officeholders, (11) disseminating political propaganda, (12) writing letters to newspaper and magazine editors--letters discussing politics and issues of public policy, (13) writing and publishing books, periodicals, articles, and other literature dealing with public issues, (14) running for government office, and (15) governmental activity--the government's making and enforcement of authoritative decisions, decisions that are vested with the authority of the society for and in the name of which they are made and carried out, are binding on all members of the society, and have the effect of authoritatively distributing resources and values for the society. While the term "political behavior" refers to many different types of human activity, all of these types of activity are concerned ultimately with public policy. All types of political behavior, in the final analysis, relate to authoritative decision-making and action by the government and to the resulting authoritative allocation of the benefits and costs of living in the political society. The ultimate purpose of acquiring political power is to use it to shape and control public policy--public policy in general or some aspect of public policy. Those who possess political power and utilize it to influence, shape, and control the political behavior of others--whether to influence a decision of a political party or a political action committee, to impact on the outcome of an election, to influence the decisions and actions of government offices and institutions, or to obtain for themselves election or appointment to public office and thereby gain personally the legal right to actively and officially participate in the processes of authoritative decision-making by the government--are concerned ultimately with influencing, conditioning, shaping, and controlling the content and direction of public policy. Political power is acquired and exercised in order to significantly affect the government's authoritative decisions and actions on public policy--either decision-making and action on public policy in general or decision-making and action in a particular area of public policy (let's say, public education, national health insurance, immigration, drug enforcement, civil rights, affirmative action, taxation, energy policy, environmental protection, gun control, or regulation of abortion). • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

3. Political Theme (continued) Political power may be defined as the ability to influence, condition, shape, and control the content and direction of public policy. Political power is influence or control over or participation in the making and implementation of official decisions of government offices and institutions--i.e., the authoritative, binding decisions made and carried out by the government for and in the name of the entire society. In a modern constitutional democratic political society, such as Britain or the U.S.A., do all persons who wield political power hold formal positions in the government? The answer to this question is, of course, no. One who possesses and exercises political power may or may not be an official governmental decision-maker, or an official participant in govern- mental decision-making. A political actor wielding political power may or may not hold a government office relevant to the particular policy decision or decisions he is seeking to mold and control. If he does hold such an office, he operates as a formal-legal participant in the public-policy decision-making processes carried on by the government. If he does not occupy a relevant public office, he plays the role of a private citizen who, through mobilization of political resources available to him, effectively exerts pressure on the government and thereby influences, conditions, and modifies the government's decision-making behavior in one or more areas of public policy. In the latter case, the citizen may act as an individual, as a member of a politically influential family, as one who is highly respected and strategically located in a politically influential "Old Boys" or "First Families" network, as a member or hired lobbyist of a political interest group, as a leader or active member of a political party or faction, or in two, three, four, or all five of the foregoing capacities. Two major forms of political power are political authority and political influence. Political authority is governmental power, the formal-legal authority of the public officeholders and institutions comprising the government to make and carry out decisions on public policy--to adopt and implement the authoritative decisions that have the force of law and are binding on all members of the society. Political authority is the legally established power of the government to make rules and issue commands and to compel obedience to them, making use of physical force and coercion when deemed necessary. Political authority, in short, is the legal right--the legally established power--to govern society. The political authority exercised by a government may be legitimate or illegitimate. If the political authority exercised by a government is willingly and widely accepted by the population comprising the society the government endeavors to control, that government will not have to rely entirely or almost entirely on naked force to maintain order and obtain compliance with its decisions. Under these conditions, the authority exercised by the government is legitimate, and the government itself is legitimate. Legitimate political authority is the legitimate right of the government to govern the entire society, the widely recognized right of the government to adopt and enforce public-policy decisions for and in the name of the entire political community. Legitimate political authority is governmental power derived from willing and widespread acceptance by the citizenry of the right of the organs of their government to make rules and issue commands and to expect obedience to them. Legitimate political authority, in short, is governmental power based on political legitimacy. Political legitimacy exists in a political community, or society, when most citizens (1) perceive the government as having the moral as well as legal right to make and enforce decisions binding on the whole community, (2) see the decisions themselves as being legitimate, and (3) consider it the duty of all citizens to voluntarily comply with these decisions, thereby substantially reducing the government's need to employ armed force or expend other resources to compel or induce compliance. The existing political regime, or system of government, is considered to be legitimate because, according to widespread and deep-seated feelings and beliefs among the members of the political society, those persons occupying the offices and institutions comprising the government obtained their positions by legitimate means and therefore have the moral and legal right to hold these formal governmental positions and to exercise the powers legally assigned to the positions. Absent, under normal conditions, are efforts of substantial segments of the society to employ force and violence--armed insurrection, or rebellion--in order to overthrow the political regime, to prevent effective enforcement of the government's decisions, or to secede from the existing political community and form a separate and independent community and governmental system of their own. Political influence needs to be distinguished from political authority. While political authority is the formal-legal right of the government to make and enforce official decisions on public policy, political influence is the ability of private individuals and groups to impact on the government's making and implementation of official policy decisions. Political influence is the ability of private individuals and groups to influence, condition, shape, and thereby control the authoritative decisions and actions of those who possess the formal-legal authority to take these decisions and actions. The individuals and groups exercising political influence do not hold the relevant government offices and therefore do not possess the formal-legal authority to make the official governmental decisions they seek to shape and control; but they do have and exercise the ability to shape and control the decision-making behavior of those officeholders in the government who do possess the formal-legal authority to make the relevant decisions on public policy. Such individuals and groups exercise significant influence over particular policy decisions made by particular government offices and institutions. These individuals and groups have acquired and are exercising that form of political power called "political influence." A private individual or organization possesses and exercises political influence to the extent that its interests and demands have to be taken into account by the government--or an office or institution of the government--when making and carrying out decisions on public policy. Political influence, in short, is the form of political power exercised by those who do not possess the formal-legal authority to make and enforce particular governmental decisions on public policy, but have and utilize the ability to condition, modify, and control the official decision-making behavior of those in government office who do possess the authority to make and implement the decisions. When the United States Congress enacts a law and provides for its enforcement, that public institution--or set of public institutions--is exercising political authority. When the leaders of a political interest group, a private organization, successfully persuade particular members of Congress to vote a certain way on a pending legislative bill, when the MCs were not inclined to vote that way in the absence of interest-group pressure, the leaders of the interest group are exercising political influence. Source: http://www.proconservative.net/CUNAPolSci201PartOneC.shtml

4. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Themes Defined Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Intelligence Theme The intelligence profession, already well established within government, is growing in the private sector. Intelligence is traditionally a function of government organizations serving the decision-making needs of national security authorities. But innovative private firms are increasingly adapting the national security intelligence model to the business world to aid their own strategic planning. Although business professionals may prefer the term “information” over “intelligence,” the author will use the latter term to highlight the importance of adding value to information. According to government convention, the author will use the term “customer” to refer to the intended recipient of an intelligence product — either a fellow intelligence service member, or a policy official or decision-maker. The process of converting raw information into actionable intelligence can serve government and business equally well in their respective domains. Production of intelligence follows a cyclical process, a series of repeated and interrelated steps that add value to original inputs and create a substantially transformed product. That transformation is what distinguishes intelligence from a simple cyclical activity. In government and private sector alike, analysis is the catalyst that converts information into intelligence for planners and decision-makers. Although the intelligence process is complex and dynamic, several component functions may be distinguished from the whole. In this primer, components are identified as Intelligence Needs, Collection Activities, Processing of Collected Information, Analysis and Production. To highlight the components, each is accorded a separate Part in this study. These labels should not be interpreted to mean that intelligence is a uni-dimensional and unidirectional process. “[I]n fact, the [process] is multidimensional, multidirectional, and — most importantly — interactive and iterative.” The purpose of this process is for the intelligence service to provide decision-makers with tools, or “products” that assist them in identifying key decision factors. Such intelligence products may be described both in terms of their subject content and their intended use. Any or all of these categories may be relevant to the private sector, depending upon the particular firm’s product line and objectives in a given industry, market environment, and geographic area. A nation’s power or a firm’s success results from a combination of factors, so intelligence producers and customers should examine potential adversaries and competitive situations from as many relevant viewpoints as possible. A competitor’s economic resources, political alignments, the number, education and health of its people, and apparent objectives are all important in determining the ability of a country or a business to exert influence on others. The eight subject categories of intelligence are exhaustive, but they are not mutually exclusive. Although dividing intelligence into subject areas is useful for analyzing information and administering production, it should not become a rigid formula. Some intelligence services structure production into geographic subject areas when their responsibilities warrant a broader perspective than topical divisions would allow. Similarly, characterization of intelligence by intended use applies to both government and enterprise, and the categories again are exhaustive, but not mutually exclusive. The production of basic research intelligence yields structured summaries of topics such as geographic, demographic, and political studies, presented in handbooks, charts, maps, and the like. Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events to apprise decision-makers of new developments and assess their significance. Estimative intelligence deals with what might be or what might happen; it may help policymakers fill in gaps between available facts, or assess the range and likelihood of possible outcomes in a threat or “opportunity” scenario. Operational support intelligence incorporates all types of intelligence by use, but is produced in a tailored, focused, and timely manner for planners and operators of the supported activity. Scientific and Technical intelligence typically comes to life in in-depth, focused assessments stemming from detailed physical or functional examination of objects, events, or processes, such as equipment manufacturing techniques.23 Warning intelligence sounds an alarm, connoting urgency, and implies the potential need for policy action in response. • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

5. Intelligence Theme (continued) How government and business leaders define their needs for these types of intelligence affects the intelligence services’ organization and operating procedures. Managers of this intricate process, whether in government or business, need to decide whether to make one intelligence unit responsible for all the component parts of the process or to create several specialized organizations for particular sub-processes. The national Intelligence Community comprises Executive Branch agencies that produce classified and unclassified studies on selected foreign developments as a prelude to decisions and actions by the president, military leaders, and other senior authorities. Some of this intelligence is developed from special sources to which few individuals have access except on a strictly controlled “need-to-know” basis. The four categories of special intelligence are Human Resources (HUMINT), Signals (SIGINT), Geospatial (GEOINT) and Measurement and Signatures (MASINT). The four corresponding national authorities for these categories are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA shares authority for HUMINT, being responsible for Department of Defense HUMINT management. Along with these four agencies, other members of the Intelligence Community use and produce intelligence by integrating all available and relevant collected information into reports tailored to the needs of individual customers. Private sector organizations use open-source information to produce intelligence in a fashion similar to national authorities. By mimicking the government process of translating customer needs into production requirements, and particularly by performing rigorous analysis on gathered information, private organizations can produce assessments that aid their leaders in planning and carrying out decisions to increase their competitiveness in the global economy. This primer will point out why private entities may desire to transfer into their domain some well-honed proficiencies developed in the national Intelligence Community. At the same time, the Intelligence Community self-examination conducted in these pages may allow government managers to reflect on any unique capabilities worthy of further development and protection.  Source: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dia/intel_essentials_krizan.pdf

6. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Themes Defined Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Diplomatic Theme Diplomacy is known as the art of forging a relationship without resorting to arguments or conflicts. The term is usually used in reference to foreign policies or external affairs. Foreign ambassadors or envoys are specially designated to negotiate on matters of bilateral or multilateral interests to nations, and also to discuss on laws and agreements which can affect their nation. Diplomacy defers from an aggressive approach, and uses an assertive approach in dealing with people. The goal of diplomacy on an international level is to safeguard the national interests, foster trade and promote the culture and economy between nations. The word comes from the Greek word "diploma" which literally means "folded in two." In old Greece, a diploma was a certificate for completion of a course, quite akin to the way it is used in present times too. The meaning of the word was extended to imply official travel papers like passports and passes for regal lanes in the Roman Empire. The meaning of diploma soon extended from travel documents to other official papers like treaties with foreign kingdoms. In the 1700s, the French used the word "diplomatique" for a body of officials who were assigned for negotiations with neighboring countries. It was Sir Edmund Burke who introduced the word "diplomacy" (from the French word "diplomatique") in the English language in the year 1796. Source: http://www.blurtit.com/q138614.html Additional Resources Discover Diplomacy (http://diplomacy.state.gov/discoverdiplomacy/)  Recasting Diplomacy (http://www.uky.edu/~stempel/diplomacy.html) • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

7. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Themes Defined Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Military Theme The proposition that force and threats of force are a necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy is part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft. And it is true that history as well as recent experience supports the view that efforts to deal with conflicts between states solely by means of peaceful diplomacy do not always succeed and may result in substantial damage to one's national interests. On the other hand, one finds in history many cases in which threats of force or the actual use of force were often not only costly but also ineffective. Given that historical experience supports the necessity of resorting to force and threats of force at times, but also emphasizes the risks of doing so, we are left with a central question in the theory and practice of foreign policy; that is, under what conditions and how can military force and threats of force be used effectively to accomplish different types of foreign policy objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk? Efforts to address this question have sharply divided American strategic thinkers ever since the Korean War. After the Korean War, many military and civilian strategists argued that the United States should never again fight a limited, inconclusive war. Either it should stay out of such conflicts altogether, or, if it intervened, it should use whatever military force might be required to win a decisive military victory. Those who subscribed to this lesson of the Korean War quickly came to be known as the Never-Again School. The strategic doctrine they advocated regarding American military intervention was appropriately labeled all-or-nothing--that is, either the United States should be prepared to do everything necessary to win or it should not intervene at all. A quite different lesson from the Korean War experience was drawn by other foreign policy specialists. They argued that the United States might well have to fight limited wars again. One had to expect that other regional conflicts would occur in which the United States felt obliged to intervene because important interests were at stake. Quite appropriately, those who drew this particular lesson from the Korean War came to be known as adherents of the Limited War School. The disagreement over strategy between adherents of the Never-Again and the Limited War viewpoints has persisted ever since and has had an impact on American policymaking in a number of subsequent crises which I do not have time to discuss. Let me jump ahead to the period of the early and mid-1960's. By then, the Never-Again school lacked powerful spokesmen and it was unable to prevent large-scale U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. However, the costs and unsatisfactory outcome of that war triggered a major revival of the Never-Again point of view. In President Reagan's first term, his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated a powerful and highly influential version of the old Never-Again philosophy. Weinberger and the Secretary of State George Shultz engaged in an impassioned, at times acrimonious debate over this issue. Shultz was not oblivious to the "lessons" of Vietnam but, echoing elements of the earlier Limited War school, Shultz observed that situations do arise when a "discrete assertion of power" is needed to support our limited objectives. Shultz argued that diplomatic efforts not backed by credible threats of force and, when necessary, with use of limited force will prove ineffectual, resulting in substantial damage to U.S. interests. Since the debate between Weinberger and Shultz, the use of force as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy has continued to be a difficult, often highly controversial issue. The problem has taken on new dimensions in the geopolitical context of the post-cold war era. Presidents Bush and Clinton have had to confront a striking paradox. The United States has emerged as the only superpower and it possesses overwhelmingly superior military capabilities. And yet we have repeatedly experienced great difficulty in employing the strategies of deterrence and coercive diplomacy to persuade adversaries to forgo or stop actions that impose on U.S. interests. • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

8. Military Theme (continued) Several aspects of the post-cold war era have added new wrinkles to the dilemma of whether and how to use force and threats of force to back diplomacy. The domestic consensus that undergirded American foreign policy during the cold war has been shattered. Since the end of the cold war there has been lacking anything approximating a national consensus on what the leadership role of the United States should be in international affairs. Lack of agreement on the nature and importance of our national interests in this new geopolitical setting has added new dimensions and twists to the debate as to when and how force and threats of force should be employed. Moreover, there is little prospect that a new national consensus can be forged to provide an underpinning to a coherent, consistent foreign policy. This problem has been further complicated by the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in the post-cold war era, which in recent years vastly outnumber conflicts between states. The international community has been overburdened by crisis situations that call for peace-making, peace-keeping, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance. Let me turn briefly now to the question whether any useful "decision rules" or specific guidelines can be formulated and agreed upon for using force or threats of force to deter or deal with these many challenging crises. Perhaps the best general answer to this question was given by President Bush in his "farewell address" at West Point in January 1993. President Bush stated that "there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force.... Each and every case is unique.“ Nonetheless, if not decision rules at least some guidelines of a rather general character are possible. President Bush himself proposed several, and I think it is significant that his guidelines implicitly but clearly rejected or qualified those that had been proposed by Caspar Weinberger. And indeed, the practice of the Bush administration on important occasions deviated from Weinberger's rules. First, as Bush's intervention in Somalia indicated, U.S. military forces were committed not only, as Weinberger had urged, when "vital interests" were at stake. Second, as Bush's policy in dealing with Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf crisis indicated, it is not the case that U.S. forces will be committed only when there is a minimal risk of casualties. Third, again as the Gulf War indicated, it is not the case that U.S. forces will be committed only when there is strong public support for doing so. (However, it is also true that the American public must understand and support the objective being pursued and be persuaded that the stakes warrant putting American lives on the line.) Let me summarize now the general guidelines that can be extracted from President Bush's West Point address and by the practice of his administration. The first guideline is: do not commit U.S. forces unless you believe it will make a critical difference. Second, do not commit U.S. military forces unless there is a high probability of success. Third, define the military mission carefully, and tailor and circumscribe the mission to enhance the likelihood that it will succeed. Be it noted that this third guideline implies that "winning" is not simply a matter of making sure that overwhelming force is used; rather "winning" is in the first instance a matter of choosing the objective of the intervention wisely and limiting it if necessary. Let me turn in the time remaining to the problems we have experienced in making effective use of deterrence and coercive diplomacy--two strategies that have received or will receive attention in some of your panels. Both of these strategies require the ability to make threats of force that will be sufficiently credible and sufficiently potent in the eyes of the adversary to persuade him not to act against our interests or to stop or undo what he has done. As I noted earlier, in the post-cold war era the United States has repeatedly experienced great difficulty in making threats that were credible and potent enough to deter or coerce adversaries. Two particularly striking examples will suffice to illustrate the inability of a superpower that is in possession of overwhelmingly superior military capabilities to make sufficiently credible and sufficiently potent threats, the paradox I alluded to earlier. In the Persian Gulf crisis, despite an amazing demonstration of U.S. military capabilities deployed to the Gulf and a declared willingness to use force if necessary, Saddam Hussein refused to comply with the demand to remove his troops from Kuwait and had to be expelled by force. The second example concerns the efforts of the Reagan and Bush administrations to persuade the Panamanian dictator, Manuel Noriega, to leave office by threatening to use force, if necessary. After ineffectual efforts at coercive diplomacy to gain this objective, President Bush was finally forced to send combat forces into Panama to capture Noriega. How can the failure of coercive diplomacy in these cases be understood? While it is difficult to understand Saddam Hussein's mind-set or his calculations, it would appear that he was insufficiently impressed with the credibility or the potency of U.S. threats of force. He may have been influenced more by an image he had formed of U.S. irresolution, one which attributed to the United States a peculiar reluctance and inability to sustain casualties that stemmed from its catastrophic experience in Vietnam. As for Noriega, it is clear that only a stronger variant of the strategy of coercive diplomacy coupled perhaps with "carrots" and efforts to provide him with face-saving would have been necessary to overcome his unwillingness to give up power. (This was perhaps a "lesson" learned and finally applied by the Clinton administration in its efforts to remove the Haitian dictators.) Analysis of the Bush administration's efforts to pressure Noriega reveals that it employed a weak variant of coercive diplomacy, resembling a "try-and-see" approach rather than an ultimatum. This interpretation of the Noriega case gains strong support from General Colin Powell who stated in an interview that the limited military actions taken by the U.S. in 1988 and 1989 probably reinforced Noriega's pre-existing perception that the U.S. was irresolute, and that he could possibly persevere. The authors of a recent study of these and other cases have offered the trenchant observation that "there is a generation of political leaders throughout the world whose basic perception of U.S. military power and political will is one of weakness, [leaders] who enter any situation with a fundamental belief that the United States can be defeated, can be driven away." In support of this observation, these authors cite the statement by Mohammed Farah Aidid, the leader of a key Somali faction, in a conversation with Ambassador Robert Oakley, U.N. Special Envoy to Somalia during the U.S. involvement there in 1993-1995: Aidid said, "I've studied Vietnam and Beirut. I know that all I need to do to send you home is to kill some Americans.“ Aidid was proven to be correct! The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia by the Clinton administration after U.S. soldiers died in a clash with Aidid's forces was not only a humiliating experience, it also confirmed perceptions that America lacked resolve, and it severely complicated and undermined U.S. efforts thereafter to make effective use of threats of force.

9. Military Theme (continued) It is clear that domestic public and congressional support for threats or use of force is a critical variable. Such support does not guarantee success, but without it, presidents have great difficulty making threats of sufficient credibility and of sufficient potency to back their demands on adversaries. The American public's strong aversion to the risk of suffering casualties, a legacy of Vietnam, is all the more constraining when the U.S. is confronted by intra-state conflicts that have become so prominent in the post-cold war era. Ever mindful of the public aversion to casualties, presidents have been reluctant to make threats as clear, potent, and credible as required by the situation. They have reacted cautiously or not at all to some challenges to American interests. One can acknowledge that the United States has been correct not to intervene in every one of many crises around the globe. American interests do not always clearly require us to do so, and the international community itself is overwhelmed with such crises and cannot respond to all of them. But often U.S. interests do merit some response and the response, if any, has tended to be a minimal one taken in the hope of limiting the extent of involvement and costs. As a result, the United States has often acted in ways that inadvertently support the image of American irresolution. Even in cases when firm U.S. military action was finally taken--Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia--it came only after considerable delay. Such belated responses could not be counted upon to erase the image of U.S. hesitation and irresolution held by foreign leaders who thought they could benefit from the pronounced reluctance of the American public, Congress, and the administration leaders to accept the risk of casualties. For the simple fact is that the inconclusive threats and delayed military action taken by the U.S. in many situations are likely to be perceived as others "more as signs of weakness than as potent expressions of America's true military power." As a result, foreign leaders are likely to be willing to withstand American threats--necessitating the U.S. either to resort to force to achieve American goals, or to engage in embarrassing retreats. There is much merit in General Colin Powell's observation that "threats of military force will work only when U.S. leaders have decided that they are prepared to use force." The logical and practical implication of this observation is that when presidents are not prepared to use force, threats to do so should not be made. General Powell also pointedly observes that when resorting to force, "The president must begin the action prepared to see the course through to its end.... He can only persuade an opponent of his seriousness when, indeed, he is serious...." The dilemmas regarding use of force and threats of force in American diplomacy will not yield to the imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine. It is noteworthy that not only the Bush administration but also President Clinton's has found it necessary to introduce some flexibility in applying the Weinberger Doctrine. Force has not always been used, as Weinberger argued, only when truly vital U.S. interests are at stake. Force was used by President Clinton in Haiti and again in Bosnia--as, indeed, earlier by President Bush against Saddam Hussein--with only marginal domestic political support at best, and not with the "reasonable assurance" of assured domestic support Weinberger held to be a prerequisite. And Weinberger's injunction that U.S. combat forces should be employed only "as a last resort after exhausting other means" for safeguarding U.S. interests has been subjected to considerable questioning. So, in conclusion, I note that rightly or wrongly, the press of world events has driven American policymakers inevitably toward Secretary Shultz's prescriptions for use of force in support of diplomacy. These important emendations of the Weinberger Doctrine in the direction of Shultz's position have been taken uneasily and have occasioned considerable criticism. By no means do we have a synthesis or a clear resolution of the two competing points of view. The tensions and dilemmas surrounding the use of force and threats of force remain and they can be expected to challenge American presidents, Congress, and the public into the foreseeable future.  Source: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.html

10. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References US Invasion of Iraq, 2003 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack In a February 2003 appearance before the U.N. Security Council to make the case for confronting Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that his accusations about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were based on "solid intelligence." Indeed, an October 2002 intelligence estimate had concluded that Iraq was continuing its WMD program and could make a nuclear weapon "within several months to a year" if it acquired sufficient fissile material. But the United States never found evidence for such programs after its invasion of Iraq -- an intelligence failure that President George W. Bush called his "biggest regret.“ Here too, however, it's unclear how much of the failure should be blamed on intelligence as opposed to policymakers. In 2004, the Washington Post reported that President Bush and his top advisers "ignored many of the caveats and qualifiers" in the October 2002 intelligence report as they doggedly pressed ahead with the plans for war. Analysts, for example, estimated that Saddam wouldn't use his WMD or give the weapons to terrorists unless Iraq was invaded. The New York Times also reported that senior Bush administration officials brandished tubes that they said were destined for Iraqi nuclear centrifuges despite the skepticism of nuclear experts. Above, Powell holds a vial representing a teaspoon of anthrax during his Feb. 5, 2003, U.N. address. The secretary of state declared that Saddam Hussein might have enough dry anthrax to "fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons." And, he added, "Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full of this deadly material.” • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • Iraq • Great Britain • France • Turkey • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Articles/Documents • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences • Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War • The French-American War Over Iraq • A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War • Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments • Videos • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • Colin Powell Regrets Iraq War Intelligence • Invasion of Iraq: How the UK and US got it Wrong • Ray McGovern on the Corruption of US Intelligence • Pre-War Intelligence Ignored • Iraq Pre-War Intelligence – Lawrence Wilkerson Interview • CIA Officer Speaks Out On Phony Iraq Pre-War Intelligence

11. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References US Invasion of Iraq, 2003 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Political The starting point for understanding the invasion of Iraq is the grand strategy of the US under Bush to undertake a coercive assertion of global hegemony. The Project for a New American Century frankly acknowledges this reach for hegemony. The Bush doctrine and the 2002 National Security Strategy, formulated in response to the 9/11 attacks, make explicit the coercive turn: the call for "full spectrum dominance;" the strategy of dealing with resistance to the US not simply through traditional containment, but via "preventive wars;" the resort to unilateralism, with ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing;" the view that states not with the US in the war on terrorism are against it; and the claim that only the US liberal model is legitimate, with sovereignty exempting no nation from the demand that it conform. This, of course, is all quite a change from traditional US foreign policy which was based on the containment of threats and which Viewed hegemony as being rooted in consent derived from multilateral consultation (deviation), hence necessarily limited by international law and institutions; diplomacy, too, was prioritized over military force. By contrast, the architects of the Bush administration strategy had long advocated a strategy of hegemony based on the use of American's exceptional military capabilities. Reshaping the Middle East is pivotal to the success of this project for several reasons. One of the main pillars of US global hegemony is its protectorate over the "world" oil reserves concentrated in the Persian Gulf; oil is a strategic commodity that everybody needs and is crucial to military power while assuring its flow to the world economy makes US power globally indispensable.2 The main resistance to US hegemony is also concentrated in the Muslim Middle East, for two inter-linked reasons: US support for Israel and recurring Western intervention in the Middle East to control oil supplies. Indeed, securing US hegemony in the Middle East, at least if it is not to rest on continual coercive intervention, requires that US support for Israel be balanced by alliances with Arab clients. Specifically, since support for Israel antagonizes Arabs, balancing requires US leadership in the Arab-Israeli peace process aimed at a compromise land for- peace solution to the conflict. However, this balancing act has been fund--Israel's colonization of the very occupied land that had to be the basis of a compromise peace settlement. Nevertheless, all US presidents sustained this balancing policy until Bush Jr: as he abandoned (deviation) historic balancing for an overtly pro-Israeli policy, the invasion of Iraq was seen as an alternative to balancing and a key to a military version of hegemony in the Middle East that would dispense with one based on accommodation of Arab interests. Intelligence The Bush administration's overall rationale for the invasion of Iraq was presented in detail by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003. In summary, he stated, “We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression... given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post–September 11 world.” • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • Iraq • Great Britain • France • Turkey • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Articles/Documents • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences • Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War • The French-American War Over Iraq • A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War • Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments • Videos • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • Colin Powell Regrets Iraq War Intelligence • Invasion of Iraq: How the UK and US got it Wrong • Ray McGovern on the Corruption of US Intelligence • Pre-War Intelligence Ignored • Iraq Pre-War Intelligence – Lawrence Wilkerson Interview • CIA Officer Speaks Out On Phony Iraq Pre-War Intelligence

12. Diplomatic As the United States, Britain, and Spain met at an emergency summit in the Azores Islands on March 16, and signaled to the UN and the rest of the world that the deadline for diplomatic actions had ended, France, along with Russia and Germany stuck to their anti-war stance. Jacques Chirac, who still believed that there was merit in diplomacy and weapons inspections, called for more time. However, it did seem that the French leader was softening his position. Mindful of anti-French sentiments in the US, Chirac tried to soften the US public’s opinion of France and himself by being interviewed by CBS and CNN. The French President even suggested a compromise during the two television interviews, saying he was willing to reduce a UN weapons inspections deadline from an earlier proposed 120 days to 50 days. US President Bush dismissed the offer. It seemed as if diplomacy was no longer an option for Washington. Military The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 was passed by congress with Republicans voting 98% in favor in the Senate, and 97% in favor in the House. Democrats supported the joint resolution 58% and 39% in the Senate and House respectively. The resolution asserts the authorization by the Constitution of the United States and the Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism. Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a democratic replacement. The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by President George W. Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.“ The legality of the invasion of Iraq has been challenged since its inception on a number of fronts, and several prominent supporters of the invasion in all the invading nations have publicly and privately cast doubt on its legality. It is argued that the invasion was fully legal because authorization was implied by the United Nations Security Council. International legal experts, including the International Commission of Jurists, a group of 31 leading Canadian law professors, and the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, have denounced both of these rationales. On Thursday 20 November 2003, an article published in the Guardian alleged that Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, conceded that the invasion was illegal but still justified. The United Nations Security Council has passed nearly 60 resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The most relevant to this issue is Resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990. It authorizes "member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait... to use all necessary means" to (1) implement Security Council Resolution 660 and other resolutions calling for the end of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory and (2) "restore international peace and security in the area." Resolution 678 has not been rescinded or nullified by succeeding resolutions and Iraq was not alleged after 1991 to invade Kuwait or to threaten do so. Resolution 1441 was most prominent during the run up to the war and formed the main backdrop for Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the Security Council one month before the invasion. According to an independent commission of inquiry set up by the government of the Netherlands, UN resolution 1441 "cannot reasonably be interpreted (as the Dutch government did) as authorizing individual member states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions." Accordingly, the Dutch commission concluded that the 2003 invasion violated international law.

13. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References US Invasion of Iraq, 2003 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives United States In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the support of allies before the United States launched a war against Iraq. The polls shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with a majority coming to favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.6 Polls shifted further in the Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s February 5 presentation to the Security Council. Although subsequent polls showed some slippage in support for a war, President Bush’s speech on the evening of March 17 rallied public support once again. A Washington Post-ABC News poll taken just afterward, showed that 71% supported war with Iraq and that 66% supported the President’s decision not to seek a U.N. Security Council vote. With the fighting underway, polls showed that more than seven in ten Americans continued to support the war, and Washington Post-ABC News polling found that 69% felt that the right decision had been made even if no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. Nonetheless, many Americans opposed the war, and large anti-war demonstrations took place in several cities on the weekend of March 15-16, followed by sharp protests in San Francisco and a large demonstration in New York after the fighting began. Major anti-war demonstrations had also occurred on the weekends of January 19-20 and February 15-16, and there were demonstrations in support of Administration policy as well. Many reports have noted that U.S. policy on Iraq has led to a rise in anti- Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls showed strong opposition to the war, and in the Middle East. Demonstrations against the war in European cities on February 15-16 were widely described as “massive,” and, as in the United States, large demonstrations also took place on March 15-16. Large demonstrations were reported in many cities worldwide after the fighting began, and efforts to launch boycotts of U.S. products were launched in some countries. Some observers dismiss foreign protests as of little lasting significance, but others argue that rising anti-Americanism could complicate U.S. diplomacy in the years ahead. Secretary of State Powell has said in an interview that the United States will seek to change foreign perceptions of U.S. policy by supporting a significant role for the United Nations in post-war Iraq, “aggressively” restarting the Arab-Israeli peace process, and reaching out to “friends with whom we may have been having some difficulty.” Some reports suggest that European opposition to the war is moderating in light of the successful overthrow of the Iraqi dictator, and the welcome given to coalition troops in some places. At the same time, many Europeans are concerned by images of disorder in Iraq, and large anti-war demonstrations occurred again on April 12. Iraq Saddam seriously miscalculated probable coalition military strategy. In large part, he was unwilling to believe that US troops would expose themselves to possible casualties, or that the coalition would engage in a ground campaign without a lengthy prior air campaign. Saddam kept grip on Iraq through a merciless police state and was always on the watch for conspiracies. He was particularly concerned about Jewish conspiracies, ranging from his theories that Jews manipulated United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to cause Iraq problems with the UN during the 1990s to his theories that Jews were responsible for the Mongols' decision to sack Baghdad and that the cartoon character Pokémon was part of a plot by international Zionism to undermine Iraq. Iraqi military forces had been conditioned to fight and anticipate wars similar to that fought against Iran - slow tempo, bloody, lengthy campaigns. Iraqi military planners, and Saddam in particular, did not appear to understand or anticipate the speed and technological sophistication of the coalition forces. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • Iraq • Great Britain • France • Turkey • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Articles/Documents • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences • Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War • The French-American War Over Iraq • A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War • Iraq War: Background and Issues Overview Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments • Videos • Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq • Colin Powell Regrets Iraq War Intelligence • Invasion of Iraq: How the UK and US got it Wrong • Ray McGovern on the Corruption of US Intelligence • Pre-War Intelligence Ignored • Iraq Pre-War Intelligence – Lawrence Wilkerson Interview • CIA Officer Speaks Out On Phony Iraq Pre-War Intelligence

14. Prior to the war, Iraq's long term goal was to use its oil revenues to influence the UN (particularly France and Russia) and lift sanctions. However, Saddam also believed that for diplomatic purposes, he had to convince numerous competitors that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, particularly since the belief in his WMD increased his status in the Arab world. (Study, pages 91–93). For example, Chemical Ali reported that while he personally believed that Iraq did not have WMD, "Saddam was asked about the weapons during a meeting with members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He replied that Iraq did not have WMD but flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack.“ Saddam's deceptions on the issue of WMD were sufficiently successful that even months after the 2003 war, senior Iraqi officials continued to believe it possible "that Iraq still possessed a WMD capacity hidden away somewhere." Ironically, these officials' belief were based on a combination of Saddam's deceptions, the secrecy and compartmentalization of the Iraqi government, and on the Iraqi officials' faith in reports of CIA assessments of the Iraqi government's WMD programs. The study also cites documents demonstrating that key evidence presented by Colin Powell to the United Nations in February 2003 had been misinterpreted by the U.S. government. According to the study, Saddam decided in 2002 to attempt to persuade the UN that Iraq was free of WMD. However, Western intelligence services interpreted Iraqi instructions to ensure compliance with UN regulations as attempts to conceal WMD. One example is a message between two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders discussing the removal of the words "nerve agents" from "the wireless instructions," or to "search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and [the unit] for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it". According to the study, "What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it." There is additional evidence of failure to cooperate on the part of the Iraqis. For example, a December 15, 2002 memo from an undercover Iraqi Intelligence escort for a UN inspection team wrote: "Inside Bader WMD inspection site, there are Russian and Turkish scientists. When we visited the site, they were forced to hide from inspectors' eyes." The study authors concluded that "even when viewed through a post-war lens, documentary evidence of messages are consistent with the Iraqi Survey Group's conclusion that Saddam was at least keeping a WMD program primed for a quick re-start the moment the UN Security Council lifted sanctions. Great Britain Throughout the conflict, the United Kingdom's government remained the strongest supporter of the U.S. plan to invade Iraq albeit originally seeking a UN Mandate. Prime Minister Tony Blair frequently expressed support for the United States in this matter, while Members of Parliament (MPs) were divided. Blair experienced a significant rebellion from many Labour MPs and in a debate in the House of Commons, he achieved a parliamentary majority with the support of most Conservative MPs and Ulster Unionists. Although the Conservatives were supportive of the Government's stance as a whole, a significant minority of their MPs rebelled against the party line, including figures such as Kenneth Clarke. The Liberal Democrats opposed the war, and their MPs were visibly unanimous on the issue. One former cabinet minister delivered a stinging personal attack on the Prime Minister, calling his behavior 'reckless'. Robin Cook MP and a few other government ministers resigned to the backbenches over the issue. Clare Short MP threatened to resign from the cabinet, but then remained for two months before finally resigning on May 12, 2003. Cook, a former Foreign Secretary and at the time Leader of the House of Commons, delivered a resignation speech, which was received with a standing ovation. Cook indicated that while he agreed with most of Blair's policies, he could not support the war. Before the invasion, the then UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, advised that the war would be in breach of international law for six reasons, ranging from the lack of a second United Nations resolution to UN inspector Hans Blix's continuing search for weapons. Ten days later on 7 March 2003, as UK troops were massing in Kuwait, Lord Goldsmith changed his mind, saying: I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorize the use of force.... Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorization in 678 without a further resolution. He concluded his revised analysis by saying that "regime change cannot be the objective of military action.“ The United Kingdom sent 45,000 personnel from the British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force, including the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal to the Gulf region. The ground component included 100 Challenger tanks. The First Armored Division's 7th Armored Brigade and 4th Armored Brigade took part in the war. Before the war, public opinion polls showed that the majority of British people would have supported the war with a clear UN mandate for war, but were strongly opposed to war without another resolution in addition to Resolution 1441, which indicated that Saddam Hussein would face serious consequences if he failed to comply with the resolution. France Though Bush and Blair were optimistic that the 9 out of 15 votes of approval necessary to pass a UN resolution would have been reached, France's threatened veto would have immediately squashed the resolution, as any one of the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, the PRC, and France, had (and has) the unilateral power to veto any resolution, even if the vote is 11-1 in favor. Russia and China expressed that they likely would have supported the UN resolution if some more diplomatic channels had been exercised first, but Bush and Blair stopped trying to appease those two nations once France voiced its unconditional opposition to the resolution. Amid US anger at what they considered France's reckless use of its veto power, the French government pointed to example after example of times when the USA had vetoed such resolutions that otherwise had an 11-1 margin. This controversial abuse of power that France, Britain, China, Russia, and USA could, and often do, make use of prompted harsh international criticism of the UN resolution process, with many calling to reform it, as it gives unfair emphasis to those five nations over all others and just one of the five's dissent could, and often does, have drastic effects on international affairs.

15. On 20 January 2003, Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin said, "We think that military intervention would be the worst possible solution," although France believed that Iraq may have had an ongoing chemical and nuclear weapons program. Villepin went on to say that he believed the presence of UN weapons inspectors had frozen Iraq's weapons programs. France also suggested that it would veto any resolution allowing military intervention offered by the US or Britain. The most important French speech during the crisis was made by De Villepin at the Security Council on the 14 February 2003, after Hans Blix presented his detailed report (see below). De Villepin detailed the three major risks of a "premature recourse to the military option", especially the "incalculable consequences for the stability of this scarred and fragile region". He said that "the option of war might seem a priori to be the swiftest, but let us not forget that having won the war, one has to build peace", words which proved to be very prescient. He emphasized that "real progress is beginning to be apparent" through the inspections, and that, "given the present state of our research and intelligence, in liaison with our allies", the alleged links between al-Qaeda and the regime in Baghdad explained by Colin Powell were not established. He concluded by referring to the dramatic experience of "old Europe" during World War II. This "impassioned" speech "against war on Iraq, or immediate war on Iraq", won "an unprecedented applause", reported the BBC's Sir David Frost (BBC News). The complete text is available at the Embassy of France in the United States. Britain and the US sharply criticized France for this position in March 2003. Turkey Turkey has fought an insurgent war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish guerrilla group (recognized as a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union) seeking Kurdish independence, in which more than 37,000 people have lost their lives. This has led Ankara to pressure the U.S. into clamping down on guerrilla training camps in northern Iraq, though the U.S. remains reluctant due to northern Iraq's relative stability compared to the rest of the country. Ankara was particularly cautious about an independent Kurdish state arising from a destabilized Iraq. In late January 2003, Turkey invited at least five other regional countries to a "'last-chance' meeting to avert a US-led war against Iraq. The group urged neighboring Iraq to continue cooperating with the UN inspections, and publicly stated that "military strikes on Iraq might further destabilize the Middle East region". On 1 March 2003 the Turkish parliament failed narrowly to approve a government motion to permit the deployment in Turkey for six months of 62,000 US troops, 255 jet aircraft, and 65 helicopters. The final tally was 264 votes for and 250 against. This led to a brief period of cooling in relations, particularly following the "hood event", which was perceived as an act of hostility in Turkey.

16. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References 9-11 Attacks, 2001 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack In its report on the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission noted that the intelligence community, assailed by "an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries," had failed to pin down the big-picture threat posed by "transnational terrorism" throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11. In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, Congress created a national intelligence director and the National Counterterrorism Center to pool intelligence. Intelligence officials missed the 9/11 attacks but didn't miss the threat posed by al Qaeda. The CIA created a unit focusing solely on Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s and President Bill Clinton launched covert operations against al Qaeda. The intelligence community's February 2001 briefing on worldwide threats branded bin Laden's terrorist network as "the most immediate and serious threat" to the United States, capable of "planning multiple attacks with little or no warning." • Themes • Intelligence • Military • Perspectives • Al Qaeda • United States • Articles/Documents • Journal of 9/11 Studies • 9/11 in the Academic Community • Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later • Resources on the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks • History Commons – 9/11 Timeline • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • 9/11 Timeline Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

17. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References 9-11 Attacks, 2001 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Intelligence The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that “a group presently in the United States” was planning a terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that Qaeda strikes could be “imminent,” although intelligence suggested the time frame was flexible. But some in the administration considered the warning to be just bluster. An intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration both told me in interviews that the neoconservative leaders who had recently assumed power at the Pentagon were warning the White House that the C.I.A. had been fooled; according to this theory, Bin Laden was merely pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein, whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat.Intelligence officials, these sources said, protested that the idea of Bin Laden, an Islamic fundamentalist, conspiring with Mr. Hussein, an Iraqi secularist, was ridiculous, but the neoconservatives’ suspicions were nevertheless carrying the day. In response, the C.I.A. prepared an analysis that all but pleaded with the White House to accept that the danger from Bin Laden was real. “The U.S. is not the target of a disinformation campaign by Usama Bin Laden,” the daily brief of June 29 read, using the government’s transliteration of Bin Laden’s first name. Going on for more than a page, the document recited much of the evidence, including an interview that month with a Middle Eastern journalist in which Bin Laden aides warned of a coming attack, as well as competitive pressures that the terrorist leader was feeling, given the number of Islamists being recruited for the separatist Russian region of Chechnya. And the C.I.A. repeated the warnings in the briefs that followed. Operatives connected to Bin Laden, one reported on June 29, expected the planned near-term attacks to have “dramatic consequences,” including major casualties. On July 1, the brief stated that the operation had been delayed, but “will occur soon.” Some of the briefs again reminded Mr. Bush that the attack timing was flexible, and that, despite any perceived delay, the planned assault was on track. Yet, the White House failed to take significant action. Officials at the Counterterrorism Center of the C.I.A. grew apoplectic. On July 9, at a meeting of the counterterrorism group, one official suggested that the staff put in for a transfer so that somebody else would be responsible when the attack took place, two people who were there told me in interviews. The suggestion was batted down, they said, because there would be no time to train anyone else. That same day in Chechnya, according to intelligence I reviewed, Ibn Al-Khattab, an extremist who was known for his brutality and his links to Al Qaeda, told his followers that there would soon be very big news. Within 48 hours, an intelligence official told me, that information was conveyed to the White House, providing more data supporting the C.I.A.’s warnings. Still, the alarm bells didn’t sound. On July 24, Mr. Bush was notified that the attack was still being readied, but that it had been postponed, perhaps by a few months. But the president did not feel the briefings on potential attacks were sufficient, one intelligence official told me, and instead asked for a broader analysis on Al Qaeda, its aspirations and its history. In response, the C.I.A. set to work on the Aug. 6 brief. In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush officials attempted to deflect criticism that they had ignored C.I.A. warnings by saying they had not been told when and where the attack would occur. That is true, as far as it goes, but it misses the point. Throughout that summer, there were events that might have exposed the plans, had the government been on high alert. Indeed, even as the Aug. 6 brief was being prepared, Mohamed al-Kahtani, a Saudi believed to have been assigned a role in the 9/11 attacks, was stopped at an airport in Orlando, Fla., by a suspicious customs agent and sent back overseas on Aug. 4. Two weeks later, another co-conspirator, ZacariasMoussaoui, was arrested on immigration charges in Minnesota after arousing suspicions at a flight school. But the dots were not connected, and Washington did not react. • Themes • Intelligence • Military • Perspectives • Al Qaeda • United States • Articles/Documents • Journal of 9/11 Studies • 9/11 in the Academic Community • Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later • Resources on the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks • History Commons – 9/11 Timeline • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • 9/11 Timeline Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

18. Themes (continued) Military At the time, a group called the Taliban were in charge of Afghanistan, and they allowed al-Qaeda to operate there. People thought the network's leader Osama bin Laden was sheltering there, as well. In October 2001, the US and the UK invaded Afghanistan to try and destroy al-Qaeda and bring down the government which sheltered its leaders. Troops from other countries became involved too. The Taliban were quickly driven out of the capital city, Kabul, but even today Afghanistan remains a dangerous place. British troops and forces from other countries are still there, trying to help the Afghan government build a stable nation - but Taliban fighters continue to carry out surprise attacks, and soldiers and Afghan civilians are still dying. The British government has said that UK troops will have pulled out of Afghanistan by 2015, and earlier if possible, provided the Afghan forces are able to keep the country safe. It was in 2011, ten years after the war in Afghanistan began that Osama bin Laden was eventually found by American soldiers in Pakistan, where he was shot and killed.

19. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References 9-11 Attacks, 2001 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives Al Qaeda Osama bin Laden's declaration of a holy war against the United States, and a fatwā signed by bin Laden and others calling for the killing of American civilians in 1998, are seen by investigators as evidence of his motivation. In various pronouncements before and after the attacks, al-Qaeda explicitly cited three motives for its activities against Western countries: the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, U.S. support of Israel, and sanctions against Iraq. After the attacks, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri released additional video tapes and audio tapes, some of which repeated those reasons for the attacks. Two particularly important publications were bin Laden's 2002 "Letter to America",and a 2004 video tape by bin Laden. Bin Laden interpreted the Prophet Muhammad as having banned the "permanent presence of infidels in Arabia". In 1996, bin Laden issued a fatwā calling for American troops to leave Saudi Arabia. In 1998, al-Qaeda wrote, "for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.” In a December 1999, interview, bin Laden said he felt that Americans were "too near to Mecca", and considered this a provocation to the entire Muslim world. One analysis of suicide terrorism suggested that without U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, al-Qaeda likely would not have been able to get people to commit suicide in this way. In his November 2002 "Letter to America", bin Laden cited the United States' support of Israel as a motivation: "The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals. And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American support for Israel. The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. Each and every person whose hands have become polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price, and pay for it heavily.” In 2004 and 2010, bin Laden again connected the September 11 attacks with U.S. support of Israel. Bin Laden claimed in 2004 that the idea of destroying the towers had first occurred to him in 1982, when he witnessed Israel's bombardment of high-rise apartment buildings during the invasion of Lebanon. Several analysts, including Mearsheimer and Walt, also say one motivation for the attacks was U.S. support of Israel. In the 1998 fatwā, al-Qaeda identified the Iraq sanctions as a reason to kill Americans, condemning the "protracted blockade" among other actions constituting a declaration of war against "Allah, his messenger, and Muslims.“ In addition to those cited by bin Laden and al-Qaeda, analysts have suggested other motives, including western support of non-Islamist authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and northern Africa, and western troops in some of these countries. Other authors suggest that humiliation resulting from the Islamic world falling behind the Western world – this discrepancy made especially visible by recent globalization– and a desire to provoke the U.S. into a broader war against the Islamic world, in the hope of motivating more allies to support al-Qaeda. Others have argued that 9/11 was a strategic way to provoke America into a war that incites a pan-Islamic revolution. • Themes • Intelligence • Military • Perspectives • Al Qaeda • United States • Articles/Documents • Journal of 9/11 Studies • 9/11 in the Academic Community • Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later • Resources on the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks • History Commons – 9/11 Timeline • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • 9/11 Timeline Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

20. Perspectives (continued) United States Congress passed and President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, creating the Department of Homeland Security, representing the largest restructuring of the U.S. government in contemporary history. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, stating that it would help detect and prosecute terrorism and other crimes. Civil liberties groups have criticized the PATRIOT Act, saying that it allows law enforcement to invade the privacy of citizens and eliminates judicial oversight of law-enforcement and domestic intelligence gathering. The Bush Administration also invoked 9/11 as the reason to have the National Security Agency initiate a secret operation, "to eavesdrop on telephone and e-mail communications between the United States and people overseas without a warrant.“ On June 6, 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft proposed regulations that would create a special registration program that required males aged 16 to 64 who were citizens of designated foreign nations resident in the U.S. to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have their identity verified, and be interviewed, photographed and fingerprinted. Called the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), it comprised two programs, the tracking of arrivals and departures on the one hand, and voluntary registrations of those already in the U.S., known as the "call-in" program. The DOJ acted under the authority of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which had authorized a registration system but was allowed to lapse in the 1980s because of budget concerns. Ashcroft identified those required to register as "individuals of elevated national security concern who stay in the country for more than 30 days.“ The processing of arrivals as part of their customs screening began in October 2002. It first focused on arrivals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. It handled 127,694 people before being phased out as universal screening processes were put in place. The "call-in" registrations began in December. It initially applied to nationals of five countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Sudan, who were required to register by December 16. On November 6, the Department of Justice set a deadline of January 10 for those from another 13 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. On December 16, it set a deadline of February 21 for those from Armenia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It later included those from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. It eventually included citizens of 23 nations with majority Muslim populations, as well as Eritrea, which has a large Muslim population, and North Korea. Failure to register at an INS office resulted in deportation. Those found in violation of their visa were allowed to post bail while processed for deportation. The program registered 82,880 people, of whom 13,434 were found in violation of their visas. Because nationality and Muslim affiliation are only approximations for one another, the program extended to such non-Muslims as Iranian Jews.The program was phased out beginning in May 2003.

21. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Indian Nuclear Test, 1998 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic In May 1998, the CIA didn't get wind of India's intention to set off several underground nuclear blasts, in what Richard Shelby, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called a "colossal failure of our nation's intelligence gathering." The intelligence agency saved some face a couple weeks later when it warned that Pakistan was preparing to conduct its own nuclear tests, which it did on May 28, 1998. At the time, the Washington Post reported that a U.S. spy satellite had picked up clear evidence of India's nuclear test preparations six hours before the blasts, but the U.S. intelligence analysts responsible for tracking India's nuclear program hadn't been on duty. Instead, they discovered the images when they arrived at work the next morning, after the tests had already taken place. • Perspectives • India • Pakistan • United States • Articles/Documents • The Indian Nuclear Tests – Summary Paper • Operation Shakti: 1998 • International Nuclear Relations • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Nuclear Testing in India Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

22. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Indian Nuclear Test, 1998 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Political Ten years ago, the governments of India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices, prompting a global uproar, a united front by the five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council, and stiff sanctions directed at New Delhi and Islamabad. Although the timing of the tests came as a surprise to the U.S. intelligence community, New Delhi had foreshadowed its decision to test two years earlier by withdrawing from the negotiating endgame for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a goal that was ardently championed from 1954 onward by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, and his successors. New Delhi's stated reason for its reversal was the failure by states possessing nuclear weapons to accept a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament along with the CTBT. New Delhi also took issue with a complex entry-into-force (EIF) provision that would make the treaty contingent on India's deposit of its instrument of ratification, along with no less than 43 other states that then possessed nuclear power or research reactors. This provision, which was widely perceived at home as an affront to India's strategic autonomy, bore the fingerprints of China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, which wished to prolong taking the treaty's bitter medicine as long as possible by forcing others to take it as well. The real reasons behind the Indian government's sudden reversal on the CTBT were not the EIF clause, despite its aggravating features, nor the absence of a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament, an agenda item that was not part of the negotiations. What truly rankled New Delhi was that the walls of the global nonproliferation system appeared to be closing in from all sides. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had been indefinitely extended in 1995, with the promise of a CTBT to follow-a promise that the P-5 could condition but from which they could not back away. India's nuclear enclave believed that negotiations on a treaty ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would be next in line. Global export controls also seemed to be closing in on India's nuclear options, while the screw-tighteners seemed to put blinders on when China helped Pakistan. Intelligence India's May 18, 1974, test settled conclusively the questions of whether and when, but also required the U.S. to venture into new areas. One new task was to produce an independent assessment of India's technical claims concerning the test (particularly its yield). Intelligence analysts also needed to explain why India chose to test, assess the immediate impact of the test, and look ahead in an effort to answer the question, "what next?" It was also vital to examine not only what had happened and was going to happen in India, but to explore why, despite the Intelligence Community's awareness of Indian nuclear capabilities and the incentives to test, it had not been able to provide senior U.S. officials with advanced warning of the test. By the 1980s, the 1974 test was well in the past and there had not been another. The documents from this period thus continued to explore Indian capabilities for building a bomb - particularly the July 1988 CIA assessment, India's Potential to Build A Nuclear Weapon, and the factors - both technical and political (domestic and foreign) - that helped shape India's nuclear policies. By the beginning of 1998 India had come close to conducting its second test on several occasions but had pulled back - in 1995 due to American pressure that followed the discovery of test preparations by U.S. spy satellites. That may have helped convince U.S. analysts that despite the pledge by the newly-elected Hindu nationalist BJP-led administration to "induct" nuclear weapons into the Indian arsenal, no nuclear test would actually take place. Thus, an early assessment of BJP policy suggests that a change in Indian nuclear policy was not imminent. Once the test did occur, without warning from the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Community was left, as in 1974, to assess the details of the test and explore its implications. As in 1974, it was also necessary for the Community to probe the causes of the failure and determine what steps should be taken to reduce the chances of a similar failure in the future. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Perspectives • India • Pakistan • United States • Articles/Documents • The Indian Nuclear Tests – Summary Paper • Operation Shakti: 1998 • International Nuclear Relations • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Nuclear Testing in India Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

23. Themes (continued) Diplomatic Immediately after New Delhi inaugurated this round of testing, the Clinton administration made an intense effort to threaten international isolation unless the governments of India and Pakistan signed the CTBT and took other steps to reduce nuclear dangers. The point man for the Clinton administration was Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. His opposite number was Jaswant Singh, a confidant of Vajpayee who was later appointed external affairs minister in December 1998. Talbott quickly came to the conclusion that little would result from his dialogue with Pakistan unless he could first gain traction in India. Drawing from a P-5 joint communiqué issued in June 1998, Talbott and his negotiating team initially laid down five conditions for India and Pakistan to meet in order to be freed of sanctions and to break their diplomatic isolation. The topmost condition was signing the CTBT. Next was cooperation in negotiating a permanent ban on the production of fissile material and, pending this negotiation, a freeze on further production of bomb-making material. Third, the United States wanted both countries to accept a "strategic restraint regime" that would limit ballistic missile inventories to versions that had already been tested. Other parts of the strategic restraint regime included pledges by India and Pakistan not to deploy missiles close to each other's borders and also not to maintain warheads atop missiles or stored nearby. Fourth, the United States demanded that both countries adopt "world class" export controls. The fifth condition called on India and Pakistan to "resume dialogue to address the root causes of tension between them, including Kashmir.“ Beijing's imprint on the P-5's conditions was difficult to miss, as the proposed strategic restraint regime and a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) would not just curtail New Delhi's options against Pakistan, but would also significantly constrain India from countering China's strategic modernization programs. The reference to Kashmir as the "root cause of tensions" on the subcontinent, without mentioning Pakistan's support for crossings of the Kashmir divide by Islamic extremists to initiate acts of violence, was akin to waving a red flag in front of a very disgruntled Brahma bull. Nonetheless, India swallowed its resentments over the P-5's agenda. New Delhi's top priority after May 1998 was to chip away at its diplomatic isolation, and the best interlocutor to accomplish this objective was the United States. The talks began in June 1998. Singh asserts in his memoirs that, at the outset, he told Talbott, "I was not there to negotiate, either to give or to ask for anything. I was really there much more to engage in a dialogue.... [W]e could endeavor to harmonize our views so that the first requirement-a restoration of confidence-is achieved, even if only in part.“ This was a deft gambit, one that Talbott could hardly refuse. U.S.-Indian bilateral relations were in desperate need of repair, and the upside potential of a serious dialogue could yield important dividends downstream. Neither could Talbott wave away the Clinton administration's stipulations for concrete measures to reduce nuclear dangers, specially the need for India to sign the CTBT. The extended dialogue between Talbott and Singh might be likened to the diplomatic equivalent of a handicap match in professional wrestling, with the world's sole superpower shouldering the handicap. The most crucial factor in the Talbott-Singh strategic dialogue was the passage of time because the Clinton administration had less than three years to accomplish any of its objectives. As Talbott wrote, "India's strategy was to play for the day when the United States would get over its huffing and puffing, and with a sign of exhaustion or a shrug of resignation, accept a nuclear-armed India as a fully responsible and fully entitled member of the international community.“ For a nation such as India, which waited 24 years between tests of nuclear devices, three years was not a very long time to outwait Washington. The primary reason why New Delhi backed away from previous internal deliberations to test was the threat of economic sanctions imposed by foreign governments on an overly centralized, underperforming national economy. According to a well-sourced Indian account, an internal assessment done prior to the 1998 tests estimated that if sanctions lasted more than six months, the Indian economy could be seriously stressed. Members of the U.S. Congress from farming states began chipping away at the sanctions well before then, in search of export earnings. Commercial interests in Paris and Moscow also began to erode the P-5's united front, as might be expected. One by one, the concrete measures demanded of India by the Clinton administration slipped off the negotiating table.

24. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Indian Nuclear Test, 1998 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives India In 1967, after Indira Gandhi became the prime minister, the work on nuclear program resumed with a new attitude and goals. HomiSethna, a chemical engineer, played a significant role in the development of weapon-grade plutonium while Ramanna designed and manufactured the whole nuclear device. Because of the sensitivity, the first nuclear bomb project did not employ more than 75 scientists. India continued to harbor ambivalent feelings about nuclear weapons and accord low priority to their production until the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In the same month of December 1971, when Richard Nixon sent a carrier battle group led by the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) into the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to intimidate India, the Soviet Union responded by sending a submarine armed with nuclear missiles from Vladivostok to trail the US task force. The Soviet response demonstrated the deterrent value and significance of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile submarines to Indira Gandhi. On 7 September 1972, Indira Gandhi authorized the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to manufacture a nuclear device and prepare it for a test. Throughout its development, the device was formally called the "Peaceful Nuclear Explosive", but it was usually referred to as the Smiling Buddha. Detonation occurred on 18 May 1974, Buddha Jayanti (a festival day in India marking the birth of Gautama Buddha). Pakistan Pakistan did not view the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion", and canceled talks scheduled for 10 June on normalization of relations. Pakistan's Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vowed in June 1974 that he would never succumb to "nuclear blackmail" or accept "Indian hegemony or domination over the subcontinent". The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan said that the test would force Pakistan to test its own nuclear bomb. Pakistan's leading nuclear physicist, Pervez Hoodbhoy, stated in 2011 that he believes the test "pushed [Pakistan] further into the nuclear arena". United States The plutonium used in the test was created at the CIRUS reactor supplied by Canada and using heavy water supplied by the United States. Both countries reacted negatively, especially in light of then ongoing negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the economic aid both countries provided to India. Canada concluded that the test violated a 1971 understanding between the two states, and froze nuclear energy assistance for the two heavy water reactors then under construction. The United States concluded that the test did not violate any agreement and proceeded with a June 1974 shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Perspectives • India • Pakistan • United States • Articles/Documents • The Indian Nuclear Tests – Summary Paper • Operation Shakti: 1998 • International Nuclear Relations • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Nuclear Testing in India Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

25. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. intelligence community failed to predict the Soviet Union's demise in 1991, presaged as it was by President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, the deteriorating Soviet economy, the collapse of communism in east-central Europe, and the moves toward independence by several Soviet republics. As the BBC recently noted, "the Soviet example illustrates the problem that intelligence gatherers are great counters: they can look at missiles, estimate the output of weapons factories, and so on. But the underlying political and social dynamics in a society are much harder to read." Indeed, in Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990, David Arbel and Ran Edelist argue that the intelligence community often catered to the preconceived notions officials in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had of the Soviet threat, producing a "rigid conceptual conformity between the analysts and the decision-makers." But former CIA official Douglas MacEachin adds that while the CIA did not forecast the breakup of the Soviet Union, it did "predict that the failing economy and stultifying societal conditions it had described in so many of its studies would ultimately provoke some kind of political confrontation within the USSR ... What actually did happen depended on people and decisions that were not inevitable." • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Perspectives • Soviet Union • United States • Articles/Documents • US Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Union Collapse: Reality and Perception • Russia’s Imperial Agony • Fall of the Soviet Union • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • Why did we get the Collapse of the Soviet Union so Wrong? • Collapse of the Soviet Union Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

26. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Political East-West tensions increased during the first term of U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981–1985), reaching levels not seen since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as Reagan increased US military spending to 7% of the GDP. To match the USA's military buildup, the Soviet Union increased its own military spending to 27% of its GDP and froze production of civilian goods at 1980 levels, causing a sharp economic decline in the already failing Soviet economy. However, it is not clear where the number 27% of the GDP came from. This thesis is not confirmed by the extensive study on the causes of the dissolution of the Soviet Union by two prominent economists from the World Bank—William Easterly and Stanley Fisher from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “… the study concludes that the increased Soviet defense spending provoked by Mr. Reagan's policies was not the straw that broke the back of the Empire. The Afghan war and the Soviet response to Mr. Reagan's Star Wars program caused only a relatively small rise in defense costs. And the defense effort throughout the period from 1960 to 1987 contributed only marginally to economic decline.“ Moreover, according to this thesis, a major motivational factor for Gorbachev was his realization that the Soviet Union could not compete economically with the USA. However, if economic premises are taken into account, it is not clear why the Soviet leaders did not adopt the Chinese option—economic liberalization with preservation of political system. Instead Gorbachev chose political liberalization during the years leading to the collapse of the USSR, while not implementing any significant economic reforms. US Financed the training for the Mujahideen warlords such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani eventually culminated to the fall of the Soviet satellite the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. While the CIA and MI6 and the People's Liberation Army of China financed the operation along with the Pakistan government against the Soviet Union. Eventually the Soviet Union began looking for a withdrawal route and in 1988 Geneva Accords were signed between Communist-Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; under the terms Soviet troops were to withdraw. Once the withdrawal was complete the Pakistan ISI continued to support the Mujahideen against the Communist Government, by 1992 the government collapsed. US President Reagan also actively hindered the Soviet Union's ability to sell natural gas to Europe whilst simultaneously actively working to keep gas prices low, which kept the price of Soviet oil low and further starved the Soviet Union of foreign capital. This "long-term strategic offensive," which "contrasts with the essentially reactive and defensive strategy of "containment", accelerated the fall of the Soviet Union by encouraging it to overextend its economic base. The proposition that special operations by the CIA in Saudi Arabia affected the prices of Soviet oil was refuted by Marshall Goldman—one of the leading experts on the economy of the Soviet Union—in his latest book. He pointed out that the Saudis decreased their production of oil in 1985 (it reached a 16-year low), whereas the peak of oil production was reached in 1980. They increased the production of oil in 1986, reduced it in 1987 with a subsequent increase in 1988, but not to the levels of 1980 when production reached its highest level. The real increase happened in 1990, by which time the Cold War was almost over. In his book he asked why, if Saudi Arabia had such an effect on Soviet oil prices, did prices not fall in 1980 when the production of oil by Saudi Arabia reached its highest level—three times as much oil as in the mid-eighties—and why did the Saudis wait till 1990 to increase their production, five years after the CIA's supposed intervention? Why didn't the Soviet Union collapse in 1980 then? However this theory ignores the fact that the Soviet Union had already suffered several important setbacks during “reactive and defensive strategy” of “containment”. In 1972, Nixon normalized American relationship with China, thus creating pressure on the Soviet Union. Egyptian president Sadat in 1979 after signing of Camp David peace accord severed military and economic relations with the USSR (by that time the USSR provided a lot of assistance to Egypt and supported it in all its military operations against Israel). By the time Gorbachev ushered in the process that would lead to the dismantling of the Soviet administrative command economy through his programs of glasnost (political openness), uskoreniye (speed-up of economic development) and perestroika (political and economic restructuring) announced in 1986, the Soviet economy suffered from both hidden inflation and pervasive supply shortages aggravated by an increasingly open black market that undermined the official economy. Additionally, the costs of superpower status—the military, space program, subsidies to client states—were out of proportion to the Soviet economy. The new wave of industrialization based upon information technology had left the Soviet Union desperate for Western technology and credits in order to counter its increasing backwardness.[ • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Perspectives • Soviet Union • United States • Articles/Documents • US Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Union Collapse: Reality and Perception • Russia’s Imperial Agony • Fall of the Soviet Union • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • Why did we get the Collapse of the Soviet Union so Wrong? • Collapse of the Soviet Union Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

27. Themes Intelligence A commonly belief is that the United States Intelligence Community (IC) failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed, many of the U.S. officials who received intelligence about the Soviet Union, its decline in the late 1970s and 1980s, and its final crises in the 1989–1991 period, believe to this day that they were not warned—that they were, in effect, ‘‘blindsided.’’ This is odd, because the documented record shows that the Intelligence Community performed much better than most people seem to think. Indeed, this record suggests that U.S. intelligence provided about as good a product as one could reasonably expect. It detected the slowdown in the Soviet economy; it noted that the Soviet leadership was running out of options to save the country; it stipulated a set of conditions that might signal the crisis had reached a tipping point; and it notified top U.S. leaders when these conditions were met. The record of CIA analytic products illustrates one of the points made in the report of the HPSCI Review Committee--that some of the criticisms levied at CIA stem from public misconceptions and from critics' distortions of what, in fact, happened. The CIA did not, for example, describe a sudden economic "collapse" that was roughly synonymous or coincident with a breakup of the Soviet Union itself. Those who believe that is what happened will disagree with CIA's analysis, but they also should be required to show the case for their "collapse" interpretation. The CIA did not forecast the breakup, either in timing or form, with the same sense of inevitability that is touted in many of the retrospectives critical of CIA's assessments. The Agency did predict that the failing economy and stultifying societal conditions it had described in so many of its studies would ultimately provoke some kind of political confrontation within the USSR. The timing of this confrontation, however, depended on the emergence of a leadership to initiate it, and its form depended on the specific actions of that leadership. After that leadership finally appeared in the form of Gorbachev, the consequences of its actions--well intentioned but flawed--were dependent on diverse political variables and decisions that could be and were postulated but could not be predicted even by the principal actors themselves. Many of the critical events were precipitated and shaped by decisions made by Gorbachev that even he--at the time he assumed power--could not have predicted that he would make. When, for example, did he decide to undertake his September 1988 "housecleaning," and what would have been the outcome had he not done it? It was by no means inevitable that the new leadership would appear when it did or follow the particular course that it did. It was not inevitable that Chernyenko would die when he did. And if he had not, how much longer would the Soviet Union have muddled along? It was not inevitable that Gorbachev would succeed Chernyenko. Indeed, the effort among Soviet political apparachiki to head off his apparent succession was of sufficient prominence that US Embassy reporting shortly before the death of Chernyenko speculated that Moscow Party boss Grishin had become the leading contender. This same view was carried back from Moscow by a prominent US academic who had been there just before Chernyenko's death. Had Grishin succeeded Gorbachev, would the Soviet Union have broken up in 1991? The timing and outcome of the coup attempt clearly were not susceptible to econometric forecasts of inevitable outcomes as seems to be implied in some of the criticism. Would the outcome have been the same if the Russian elections--made possible by Gorbachev's political actions--had not put Boris Yel'tsin in the position to take the stand that he did? Were the actions of the military--of PavelGrachev--inevitable? The economic and societal conditions made it inevitable that something would happen. That was clearly reported by the CIA. What actually did happen depended on people and decisions that were not inevitable. The CIA's record in tracking this process and describing longer term implications is available for review. Diplomatic To restructure the Soviet administrative command system and implement a transition to a market-based economy, Yeltsin's shock program was employed within days of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The subsidies to money-losing farms and industries were cut, price controls abolished, and the ruble moved towards convertibility. New opportunities for Yeltsin's circle and other entrepreneurs to seize former state property were created, thus restructuring the old state-owned economy within a few months. After obtaining power, the vast majority of "idealistic" reformers gained huge possessions of state property using their positions in the government and became business oligarchs in a manner that appeared antithetical to an emerging democracy. Existing institutions were conspicuously abandoned prior to the establishment of new legal structures of the market economy such as those governing private property, overseeing financial markets, and enforcing taxation. Market economists believed that the dismantling of the administrative command system in Russia would raise GDP and living standards by allocating resources more efficiently. They also thought the collapse would create new production possibilities by eliminating central planning, substituting a decentralized market system, eliminating huge macroeconomic and structural distortions through liberalization, and providing incentives through privatization. Since the USSR's collapse, Russia faced many problems that free market proponents in 1992 did not expect. Among other things, 25% of the population lived below the poverty line, life expectancy had fallen, birthrates were low, and the GDP was halved. These problems led to a series of crises in the 1990s, which nearly led to the election of Yeltsin's Communist challenger, Gennady Zyuganov, in the 1996 presidential election. In recent years, the economy of Russia has begun to improve greatly, due to major investments and business development and also due to high prices of natural resources.

28. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1991 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives Soviet Union Gorbachev's efforts to streamline the Communist system offered promise, but ultimately proved uncontrollable and resulted in a cascade of events that eventually concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially intended as tools to bolster the Soviet economy, the policies of perestroika and glasnost soon led to unintended consequences. Relaxation under glasnost resulted in the Communist Party losing its absolute grip on the media. Before long, and much to the embarrassment of the authorities, the media began to expose severe social and economic problems the Soviet government had long denied and actively concealed. Problems receiving increased attention included poor housing, alcoholism, drug abuse, pollution, outdated Stalin-era factories, and petty to large−scale corruption, all of which the official media had ignored. Media reports also exposed crimes committed by Joseph Stalin and the Soviet regime, such as the gulags, his treaty with Adolf Hitler, and the Great Purges, which had been ignored by the official media. Moreover, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and the mishandling of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, which Gorbachev tried to cover up, further damaged the credibility of the Soviet government at a time when dissatisfaction was increasing. In all, the positive view of Soviet life long presented to the public by the official media was rapidly fading, and the negative aspects of life in the Soviet Union were brought into the spotlight. This undermined the faith of the public in the Soviet system and eroded the Communist Party's social power base, threatening the identity and integrity of the Soviet Union itself. Fraying amongst the members of the Warsaw Pact nations and instability of its western allies, first indicated by Lech Wałęsa's 1980 rise to leadership of the trade union Solidarity, accelerated, leaving the Soviet Union unable to depend upon its Eastern European satellite states for protection as a buffer zone. By 1989, Moscow had repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine in favor of non−intervention in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies. Gradually, each of the Warsaw Pact nations saw their communist governments fall to popular elections and, in the case of Romania, a violent uprising. By 1991 the communist governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, all of which had been imposed after World War II, were brought down as revolution swept Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union also began experiencing upheaval as the political consequences of glasnost reverberated throughout the country. Despite efforts at containment, the upheaval in Eastern Europe inevitably spread to nationalities within the USSR. In elections to the regional assemblies of the Soviet Union's constituent republics, nationalists as well as radical reformers swept the board. As Gorbachev had weakened the system of internal political repression, the ability of the USSR's central Moscow government to impose its will on the USSR's constituent republics had been largely undermined. Massive peaceful protests in the Baltic Republics such as The Baltic Way and the Singing Revolution drew international attention and bolstered independence movements in various other regions. The rise of nationalism under freedom of speech soon reawakened simmering ethnic tensions in various Soviet republics, further discrediting the ideal of a unified Soviet people. One instance occurred in February 1988, when the government in Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian region in the Azerbaijan SSR, passed a resolution calling for unification with the Armenian SSR. Violence against local Azerbaijanis was reported on Soviet television, provoking massacres of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait. Emboldened by the liberalized atmosphere of glasnost, public dissatisfaction with economic conditions was much more overt than ever before in the Soviet period. Although perestroika was considered bold in the context of Soviet history, Gorbachev's attempts at economic reform were not radical enough to restart the country's chronically sluggish economy in the late 1980s. The reforms made some inroads in decentralization, but Gorbachev and his team left intact most of the fundamental elements of the Stalinist system, including price controls, inconvertibility of the ruble, exclusion of private property ownership, and the government monopoly over most means of production. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Perspectives • Soviet Union • United States • Articles/Documents • US Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Union Collapse: Reality and Perception • Russia’s Imperial Agony • Fall of the Soviet Union • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Videos • Why did we get the Collapse of the Soviet Union so Wrong? • Collapse of the Soviet Union Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

29. Perspectives (continued) Soviet Union (continued) By 1990 the Soviet government had lost control over economic conditions. Government spending increased sharply as an increasing number of unprofitable enterprises required state support and consumer price subsidies to continue. Tax revenues declined as republic and local governments withheld tax revenues from the central government under the growing spirit of regional autonomy. The anti−alcohol campaign reduced tax revenues as well, which in 1982 accounted for about 12% of all state revenue. The elimination of central control over production decisions, especially in the consumer goods sector, led to the breakdown in traditional supplier−producer relationships without contributing to the formation of new ones. Thus, instead of streamlining the system, Gorbachev's decentralization caused new production bottlenecks. United States From the outset, Reagan moved against détente and beyond containment, substituting the objective of encouraging “long-term political and military changes within the Soviet empire that will facilitate a more secure and peaceful world order”, according to an early 1981 Pentagon defense guide. Harvard’s Richard Pipes, who joined the National Security Council, advocated a new aggressive policy by which “the United States takes the long-term strategic offensive. This approach therefore contrasts with the essentially reactive and defensive strategy of containment”. Pipes’s report was endorsed in a 1982 National Security Decision Directive that formulated the policy objective of promoting “the process of change in the Soviet Union towards a more pluralistic political and economic system”. [The quotes from Peter Schweizer, Reagan's War.] A central instrument for putting pressure on the Soviet Union was Reagan’s massive defense build-up, which raised defense spending from $134 billion in 1980 to $253 billion in 1989. This raised American defense spending to 7 percent of GDP, dramatically increasing the federal deficit. Yet in its efforts to keep up with the American defense build-up, the Soviet Union was compelled in the first half of the 1980s to raise the share of its defense spending from 22 percent to 27 percent of GDP, while it froze the production of civilian goods at 1980 levels. Reagan’s most controversial defense initiative was SDI, the visionary project to create an anti-missile defense system that would remove the nuclear sword of Damocles from America’s homeland. Experts still disagree about the long-term feasibility of missile defense, some comparing it in substance to the Hollywood sci-fi blockbuster Star Wars. But the SDI’s main effect was to demonstrate U. S. technological superiority over the Soviet Union and its ability to expand the arms race into space. This helped convince the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev to throw in the towel and bid for a de-escalation of the arms race. Particularly effective, though with unintended long-term side effects, was the Reagan administration’s support for the mujahideen (holy warriors) that were fighting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Reagan was determined to make Afghanistan the Soviet Vietnam. Therefore in 1986 he decided to provide the mujahideen with portable surface-to-air Stinger missiles, which proved devastatingly effective in increasing Soviet air losses (particularly helicopters). The war in Afghanistan cost the United States about $1 billion per annum in aid to the mujahideen; it cost the Soviet Union eight times as much, helping bankrupt its economy. Apart from his defense policies, Reagan also weakened the Soviet Union through economic moves. His supporters’ claims that he brought about the fall of the Soviet Union are somewhat weakened by the fact that he ended Carter’s grain embargo, which had produced alarming food shortages in the Soviet Union. On the other hand Reagan was able to reduce the flow of Western technology to the Soviet Union, as well to limit Soviet natural gas exports to Western Europe. One of the most effective ways in which his economic policies weakened the Soviet Union was by helping bring about a drastic fall in the price of oil in the 1980s, thereby denying the Soviet Union large inflows of hard currency".

30. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military The Soviet Union's military incursion into Afghanistan, which began in December 1979 and devolved into a bloody, nine-year occupation, took the Carter administration by surprise. The U.S. intelligence community had assumed that the specter of a costly quagmire would deter the Soviets from invading Afghanistan. Former CIA official Douglas MacEachin recalls that in the days after the invasion, a dark joke began circulating around the agency that "the analysts got it right, and it was the Soviets who got it wrong." It's not entirely clear, however, whether intelligence or policy is primarily to blame for America's lack of foresight about the invasion. In The CIA and the Culture of Failure, John Diamond concedes that the agency failed to predict the invasion until shortly before it happened. But he adds that the CIA's warnings about Soviet military preparations and movements throughout 1979 gave the Carter administration "all the information it needed to issue a stern warning to Moscow," and that the administration instead chose to "downplay its warnings." A Georgetown study adds that the White House was distracted by the SALT II treaty negotiations and the Iranian hostage crisis. • Perspectives • Afghanistan • Soviet Union • Articles/Documents • Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record • The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979: Failure of Intelligence or of the Policy Process? • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Soviet War in Afghanistan • 9th Battalion Film About the War in Afghanistan Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

31. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 Themes Political King Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Zahir's cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan, served as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1963. The Marxist PDPA's strength grew considerably in these years. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival factions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham (Flag) faction led by Babrak Karmal. Former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973, after allegations of corruption and poor economic conditions against the King's government. Daoud put an end to the monarchy and his time in power was widely popular amongst the general populace, but unpopular amongst PDPA supporters. Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber. The mysterious circumstances of Khyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders. On April 27, 1978, the Afghan Army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family. Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. After the revolution, Taraki assumed the Presidency, Prime Ministership and General Secretary of the PDPA. The government was divided along factional lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, purges and executions of Parcham members. During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam. Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly by the powerful land owners who were harmed economically by the abolition of usury (though usury is prohibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. By mid-1978, a rebellion started with rebels attacking the local military garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power after a palace shootout that resulted in the death of President Taraki. Over two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion Intelligence Pre-invasion intelligence erred by giving only “glancing attention” to the possibility that the Soviets would try to oust Afghan communist party leader Amin, despite intelligence showing Moscow was seeking alternatives to Amin, including reports that the Soviets had sanctioned, if not outright proposed, a plot to assassinate Amin. Thus the prospect of a Soviet military intervention for the purpose of removing rather than reinforcing the existing regime did not feature prominently in the US assessments of the Soviet military preparations being observed. Such a scenario, given the unpredictable state of the Afghan army, would have required a bigger force than the graduated augmentation option touted in most US intelligence assessments, because Moscow would need to be at least prepared for the contingency that rather than supporting the Afghan army, they might be fighting some factions of it. Diplomatic The Afghan government, having secured a treaty in December 1978 that allowed them to call on Soviet forces, repeatedly requested the introduction of troops in Afghanistan in the spring and summer of 1979. They requested Soviet troops to provide security and to assist in the fight against the mujahideen rebels. On April 14, 1979, the Afghan government requested that the USSR send 15 to 20 helicopters with their crews to Afghanistan, and on June 16, the Soviet government responded and sent a detachment of tanks, BMPs, and crews to guard the government in Kabul and to secure the Bagram and Shindand airfields. In response to this request, an airborne battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Lomakin, arrived at the Bagram Air Base on July 7. They arrived without their combat gear, disguised as technical specialists. They were the personal bodyguards for President Taraki. The paratroopers were directly subordinate to the senior Soviet military advisor and did not interfere in Afghan politics. Several leading politicians at the time such as Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko were against intervention. Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Afghanistan • Soviet Union • Articles/Documents • Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record • The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979: Failure of Intelligence or of the Policy Process? • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Soviet War in Afghanistan • 9th Battalion Film About the War in Afghanistan Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

32. Themes (continued) Diplomatic (continued) After a month, the Afghan requests were no longer for individual crews and subunits, but for regiments and larger units. In July, the Afghan government requested that two motorized rifle divisions be sent to Afghanistan. The following day, they requested an airborne division in addition to the earlier requests. They repeated these requests and variants to these requests over the following months right up to December 1979. However, the Soviet government was in no hurry to grant them. Based on information from the KGB, Soviet leaders felt that Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin's actions had destabilized the situation in Afghanistan. Following his initial coup against and killing of President Taraki, the KGB station in Kabul warned Moscow that Amin's leadership would lead to "harsh repressions, and as a result, the activation and consolidation of the opposition.“ The Soviets established a special commission on Afghanistan, comprising KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, Boris Ponomarev from the Central Committee and Dmitriy Ustinov, the Minister of Defence. In late April 1978, the committee reported that Amin was purging his opponents, including Soviet loyalists, that his loyalty to Moscow was in question and that he was seeking diplomatic links with Pakistan and possibly the People's Republic of China (which at the time had poor relations with the Soviet Union). Of specific concern were Amin's secret meetings with the U.S. chargé d'affaires, J. Bruce Amstutz, which, while never amounting to any agreement between Amin and the United States, sowed suspicion in the Kremlin. Information obtained by the KGB from its agents in Kabul provided the last arguments to eliminate Amin. Supposedly, two of Amin's guards killed the former president Nur Muhammad Taraki with a pillow, and Amin was suspected to be a CIA agent. The latter, however, is still disputed: Amin repeatedly demonstrated official friendliness to the Soviet Union. Soviet General VasilyZaplatin, a political advisor at that time, claimed that four of President Taraki's ministers were responsible for the destabilization. However, Zaplatin failed to emphasize this enough. Also during the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached the peak of its political influence in comparison to the U.S.as the SALT I treaty was created to cooperate in matters of nuclear weapons and technology between the two nations. A second round of talks between Soviet premier Brezhnev and President Carter yielded the SALT II treaty in June 1979. (The United States Senate failed to ratify the treaty). This process would eventually culminate and lead up to the buildup and intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 to preserve, stabilize and militarily intervene on behalf of the communist regime there.[ci Military On October 31, 1979 Soviet informants to the Afghan Armed Forces who were under orders from the inner circle of advisors under Soviet premier Brezhnev, relayed information for them to undergo maintenance cycles for their tanks and other crucial equipment. Meanwhile, telecommunications links to areas outside of Kabul were severed, isolating the capital. With a deteriorating security situation, large numbers of Soviet Airborne Forces joined stationed ground troops and began to land in Kabul on December 25. Simultaneously, Amin moved the offices of the president to the Tajbeg Palace, believing this location to be more secure from possible threats. According to Colonel General Tukharinov and Merimsky, Amin was fully informed of the military movements, having requested Soviet military assistance to northern Afghanistan on December 17. His brother and General Dmitry Chiangov met with the commander of the 40th Army before Soviet troops entered the country, to work out initial routes and locations for Soviet troops. On December 27, 1979, 700 Soviet troops dressed in Afghan uniforms, including KGB and GRU special forces officers from the Alpha Group and Zenith Group, occupied major governmental, military and media buildings in Kabul, including their primary target – the Tajbeg Presidential Palace. That operation began at 19:00 hr., when the KGB-led Soviet Zenith Group destroyed Kabul's communications hub, paralyzing Afghan military command. At 19:15, the assault on Tajbeg Palace began; as planned, president Hafizullah Amin was killed. Simultaneously, other objectives were occupied (e.g. the Ministry of Interior at 19:15). The operation was fully complete by the morning of December 28, 1979. The Soviet military command at Termez, Uzbek SSR, announced on Radio Kabul that Afghanistan had been liberated from Amin's rule. According to the Soviet Politburo they were complying with the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness and Amin had been "executed by a tribunal for his crimes" by the Afghan Revolutionary Central Committee. That committee then elected as head of government former Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, who had been demoted to the relatively insignificant post of ambassador to Czechoslovakia following the Khalq takeover, and that it had requested Soviet military assistance. Soviet ground forces, under the command of Marshal Sergei Sokolov, entered Afghanistan from the north on December 27. In the morning, the 103rd Guards 'Vitebsk' Airborne Division landed at the airport at Bagram and the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was underway. The force that entered Afghanistan, in addition to the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, was under command of the 40th Army and consisted of the 108th and 5th Guards Motor Rifle Divisions, the 860th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment, the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, the 36th Mixed Air Corps. Later on the 201st and 58th Motor Rifle Divisions also entered the country, along with other smaller units. In all, the initial Soviet force was around 1,800 tanks, 80,000 soldiers and 2,000 AFVs. In the second week alone, Soviet aircraft had made a total of 4,000 flights into Kabul.With the arrival of the two later divisions, the total Soviet force rose to over 100,000 personnel.

33. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives Afghanistan King Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Zahir's cousin, Mohammad Daoud Khan, served as Prime Minister from 1954 to 1963. The Marxist PDPA's strength grew considerably in these years. In 1967, the PDPA split into two rival factions, the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and the Parcham (Flag) faction led by Babrak Karmal. Former Prime Minister Daoud seized power in a military coup on July 17, 1973, after allegations of corruption and poor economic conditions against the King's government. Daoud put an end to the monarchy and his time in power was widely popular amongst the general populace, but unpopular amongst PDPA supporters. Intense opposition from factions of the PDPA was sparked by the repression imposed on them by Daoud's regime and the death of a leading PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber. The mysterious circumstances of Khyber's death sparked massive anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which resulted in the arrest of several prominent PDPA leaders. On April 27, 1978, the Afghan Army, which had been sympathetic to the PDPA cause, overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family. Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. After the revolution, Taraki assumed the Presidency, Prime Ministership and General Secretary of the PDPA. The government was divided along factional lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah. Within the PDPA, conflicts resulted in exiles, purges and executions of Parcham members. During its first 18 months of rule, the PDPA applied a Soviet-style program of modernizing reforms, many of which were viewed by conservatives as opposing Islam. Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam, particularly by the powerful land owners who were harmed economically by the abolition of usury (though usury is prohibited in Islam) and the cancellation of farmers' debts. By mid-1978, a rebellion started with rebels attacking the local military garrison in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and soon civil war spread throughout the country. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin seized power after a palace shootout that resulted in the death of President Taraki. Over two months of instability overwhelmed Amin's regime as he moved against his opponents in the PDPA and the growing rebellion Soviet Union The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had been a major power broker and influential mentor in Afghan politics, ranging from civil-military infrastructure to Afghan society. In the 1980s, many Afghans were Russian language proficient. Since 1947, Afghanistan had been under the influence of the Russian government and received large amounts of aid, economical assistance, military equipment training and military hardware from the Soviet Union. The economical assistance and aide had been provided to Afghanistan as early as 1919, shortly after the Russian Revolution and when the regime was facing the Russian Civil War. Provisions were given in the form of small arms, ammunition, a few aircraft, and (according to debated Soviet sources) a million gold rubles to support the resistance during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. In 1942, the USSR again moved to strengthen the Afghan Armed Forces, by providing small arms and aircraft, and establishing training centers in Tashkent (Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic). Soviet-Afghan military cooperation began on a regular basis in 1956, and further agreements were made in the 1970s, which saw the USSR send advisers and specialists. The Soviet Union built an extensive amount of infrastructure, notably giving assistance building the Kabul University, Polytechnical institutes, hospitals, civilian infrastructure, power plants, and local schools. During the 1980s, Soviets established the universities in Blakhe, Herate, Takhar, Nangarhar and Fariyab provinces. The Russian faculty soon joined the universities, teaching Afghan students in proficient Russian languages. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Afghanistan • Soviet Union • Articles/Documents • Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record • The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979: Failure of Intelligence or of the Policy Process? • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Soviet War in Afghanistan • 9th Battalion Film About the War in Afghanistan Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

34. Perspectives (continued) Soviet Union (continued) In 1978, President Daud Khan began to take initiatives for building the massive military after witnessing the India's nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, to counter Pakistan's armed forces and Iranian military influence in Afghanistan's politics. A final pre-war treaty, signed in December 1978, allowed the PDPA to call upon the Soviet Union for military support. In 2009, the BBC republished a Soviet booklet on Afghanistan first published in 1987, giving vital tips to Internationalist soldiers and officers. Following the Herat uprising, President Taraki contacted Alexei Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and asked for "practical and technical assistance with men and armament". Kosygin was unfavorable to the proposal on the basis of the negative political repercussions such an action would have for his country, and he rejected all further attempts by Taraki to solicit Soviet military aid in Afghanistan. Following Kosygin's rejection Taraki requested aid from Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Soviet head of state, who warned Taraki that full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies – both yours and ours". Brezhnev also advised Taraki to ease up on the drastic social reforms and to seek broader support for his regime. In 1979, Taraki attended a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba. On his way back, he stopped in Moscow on March 20 and met with Brezhnev, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and other Soviet officials. It was rumoured that Karmal was present at the meeting in an attempt to reconcile Taraki's Khalq faction and the Parcham against Amin and his followers. At the meeting, Taraki was successful in negotiating some Soviet support, including the redeployment of two Soviet armed divisions at the Soviet-Afghan border, the sending of 500 military and civilian advisers and specialists and the immediate delivery of Soviet armed equipment sold at 25 percent below the original price; however, the Soviets were not pleased about the developments in Afghanistan and Brezhnev impressed upon Taraki the need for party unity. Despite reaching this agreement with Taraki, the Soviets continued to be reluctant to intervene further in Afghanistan and repeatedly refused Soviet military intervention within Afghan borders during Taraki's rule as well as later during Amin's short rule.

35. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Iranian Revolution, 1978 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military In August 1978, six months before the U.S-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fled Iran, the CIA infamously concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." As we all now know, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, opening up a rift between Iran and the United States that persists to this day. According to Gary Sick, a member of Jimmy Carter's National Security Council, the United Stated had scaled back its intelligence gathering inside Iran in the lead-up to the revolution in deference to the Shah, which helped contribute to U.S. officials overlooking widespread Iranian resentment against the Shah and the United States and underestimating the ability of the religious opposition to overthrow the Shah. Still, a 2004 Georgetown University report points out that the intelligence community did issue warnings about the Shah's eroding power and the religious opposition's growing clout, and that political infighting and the Carter administration's preoccupation with Egyptian-Israeli peace talks contributed to American myopia on Iran. • Perspectives • Iran • United States • Articles/Documents • Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution • The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian revolution • Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution • Concession, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • History of the 1979 Iranian Revolution • Iran and the West • Iranian Revolution 1979: Fall of a Shah Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

36. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Iranian Revolution, 1978 Themes Political In 1921 Reza Khan, commander of an Iranian cossack force, overthrew the decadent Kajar dynasty, and, as Reza Shah Pahlevi, established the Pahlevi dynasty in 1925. During his reign, transportation and communication systems were improved, and a program of Westernization was begun. In 1941 Britain and the Soviet Union occupied areas of the country to protect the oil fields from German seizure. Because of this Allied presence, Reza Shah Pahlevi, who had been friendly to the Axis powers, abdicated. His son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi, succeeded to the throne and adopted a pro-Allied policy. In 1945 the Iranian government requested the withdrawal of occupying troops, concerned that Soviet forces were encouraging separatist movements in the northern provinces. All troops were withdrawn by 1946. In the 1950s, a major political crisis developed over control of the oil industry. In 1951 Muhammad Mossadegh, a militant nationalist, became prime minister. When parliament approved a law nationalizing the property of foreign oil companies with widespread popular support, Mossadegh pressed the shah for extraordinary powers. The dissension between pro- and anti-Mossadegh forces reached a climax during 1953 when the shah dismissed the prime minister. Mossadegh refused to yield, and the shah fled to Rome. After three days of riots, the royalists won back control of Teheran, the shah returned, and Mossadegh was sentenced to prison. The shah then opened negotiations with an eight-company oil consortium that guaranteed Iran a margin of profit greater than anywhere else in the Middle East. Throughout the 1960s, the Shah began to exercise increasing control over the government after dissolving parliament in 1961. Programs of agricultural and economic modernization were pursued, but the shah's Plan Organization took charge of economic development, leaving very few benefits to reach the ordinary citizen. Despite growing prosperity, opposition to the shah was widespread, fanned mainly by conservative Shiite Muslims, who wanted the nation governed by Islamic law. They were directed, from France, by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Ruhollahibn Mustafa Musawi Khomeini Hindi), a Muslim clergyman who had been exiled in 1963. As the Shah's regime, supported by the U.S., became increasingly repressive, riots in 1978 developed into a state of virtual civil war. In early 1979 popular opposition forced the shah to leave the country. Hundreds of the shah's supporters were tried and executed, others fled the country, and the westernization of Iran was reversed. Khomeini, who had returned to Iran in triumph in February 1979, presided over the establishment of an Islamic republic. On 4 November 1979, after the shah had been allowed entry into the United States for medical care, militant Iranians stormed the US embassy in Teheran, taking 66 Americans hostage. The militants demanded that the shah be turned over to face trial and that billions of dollars he had allegedly took abroad be returned. Thirteen of the hostages were soon released, but another 53 were held until an agreement was negotiated that freed the hostages on 20 January 1981. Unable to persuade Iran to release them, President Carter ordered a military rescue mission, which failed, resulting in the deaths of eight American servicemen when their aircraft collided in the Iranian desert. Intelligence At the beginning of1977, foreign observers were of the opinions that “the monarchy does appear to have the support, albeit passive, of the bulk of the people.” As of mid-1977, virtually no expert, in or out of the country, saw any possibility of the Shah’s fall from power, Even some intelligence operatives – subsequently showered with plaudits for having detected the explosiveness of the situation in advance of others – did not reach this conclusion until early 1978. A quasi-academic study in 1977 devoted to the subject, and highly critical of the Shah’s priorities and policies, did not venture to suggest, let alone predict, the regime’s eventual collapse. One experiences foreign observer, in the midst of Iran’s growing turmoil, was still arguing that “oil revenues are creating a whole ne middle class that has every reason for supporting the status quo.” A late as December 1977, the US Embassy in Tehran was of the opinion that: “the prospects for sustained growth are excellent, given Iran’s low debt, strong financial reserves, reliable future income from oil, increasing industrial capacity, and political stability.” As of April and May 1978, American newspaper correspondents in Tehran were arguing that the Shah had “firm control” over the ongoing political turbulence; that he had ample resources to crush any serious challenge to his regime; and that even the dissidents thought their early victory to be rather unlikely. Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Iran • United States • Articles/Documents • Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution • The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian revolution • Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution • Concession, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • History of the 1979 Iranian Revolution • Iran and the West • Iranian Revolution 1979: Fall of a Shah Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

37. Themes (continued) Intelligence (continued) In late August-September of 1978, the US Intelligence establishment was still relatively confident that the opposition did not pose a real threat to the regime. The US State Department, for the most part (with the notable exception of the anti-Shah group in Washington), believed that while the monarch might be forced to make political concessions to the democratic secularists, he was in no serious danger. It was as late as November 1978 – only two months before the Shah was forces to leave – that Ambassador William Sullivan concluded that the “end of the regime” had come and that a “revolution” was taking place. A seasoned American analyst with extensive knowledge of Iranian politics and history late summed up the situation by telling a US Congressional committee in 1980 that “most observers would have thought that the actual events of the last twenty-four months were highly unlikely, if not inconceivable.” Diplomatic The revolution of Iran can be seen as part of a series of such transformations that had overturned regimes in three continents in the previous two centuries: France (1789), Russia (1917), China (1949), Cuba (1959). What happened in Iran shares six broad points of comparison with these earlier moments. First, a broad coalition of opposition forces came together to overthrow a dictatorial regime, building on longstanding social grievances but also energising nationalist sentiment against a state and ruler seen as too compliant to foreign interests. The coalition mobilised under Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership ranged from liberal and Marxist to conservative and religious forces: in effect a classic populist alliance. Second, the victory of the revolution both required and was facilitated by the state's weakness of leadership and internal divisions. The Shah was ill, his advisers and generals were uncertain. The resemblance to other figures and regimes in a time of crisis - Louis XVI and Czar Nicholas II, as well as Charles I of England - is evident. Third, the revolution possessed the quality that distinguishes mere coups d'etat or rebellions from major revolutions: namely, it was not just political (in the sense of changing the political elite and the constitution or legitimating system of the country) but had profound and ongoing social and economic consequences. Because of it, Iran today has a new social order and a new set of social values - even as a new revolutionary elite, an Islamic nomenklatura,united by ties of power, business and marriage, controls state revenues. Fourth, the revolution's core ideology may have propounded the need for a new, radical and egalitarian order; but it was supplemented by pre-existing ideas that were crucial to sustaining domestic support (above all nationalism and a sense of the country's historic standing and mission). Ayatollah Khomeini at first refused to use the word mihan(fatherland), and denounced secular nationalism as an insult to Islam. But with the invasion by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1980 all this changed, and he and other leaders adopted the Iranian version of the term used by French revolutionaries in the 1790s, la grande nation - in Persian, millatibozorg. Fifth, the explosion of revolution at the centre of a multi-ethnic country - and driven especially from within its dominant ethnic component - had profound reverberations on the relations between the Iran's different national components. In particular, it led not to the era of fraternal cooperation and solidarity anticipated in much of the political rhetoric of the time, but to conflict and war. Here again, the pattern - a revolt at the heart of a plural country and the consolidation of a new authoritarian regime provoking contrary forces in the periphery - has rich historical precedents. The Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 are prime examples; their echo in Iran concerned, above all, the Kurds. The hopes of this significant part of the population, of an autonomous Kurdistan within a democratic Iran (and they knew the first was impossible without the second) were to be dashed. Sixth, the revolution in Iran had explosive international consequences. There were persistent attempts to export the revolution to neighboring countries, which intensified regional rivalries and fostered conditions that led to inter-state war. The Iranian revolution's efforts to promote its state interests and extend itself soon acquired resemblances to a reviving empire - with traces of France and Russia in particular, not least the contradictory trends whereby some forces in the region were inspired by the revolution while others drew on older antagonisms (such as Saddam Hussein's excoriation of Khomeini as a magus [Zoroastrian priest] and more recent concerns about a powerful new Shi'a "crescent"). Military Iran’s post-revolutionary chaos and internal weakness facilitated the Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan in December 1979; this led to the US-backed Mujahideen’s jihad, the eventual defeat of the USSR, the Afghan civil war, the rise of the Taliban, 9/11, and the Western quagmire there. • Iran’s domestic turmoil encouraged an invasion by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, leading to one of the 20th century’s longest interstate wars (1980-88); this strengthened Saddam at home and led to a substantial militarisation of Iraq, and ultimately the two Iraq Wars. • The revolution inspired a major uprising in Mecca in late 1979, which was subsequently crushed with the assistance of French commandos; this gave the impression that the West would never allow a revolution against the monarchy in Saudi Arabia. • The 444-day hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran from November 1979 dealt a fatal blow to Jimmy Carter’s presidency; this led to the election of Ronald Reagan, and the adoption of a much more aggressive strategic posture by the US after a decade of reversals. • In response to the US’ weakened position, Carter promulgated a new doctrine in 1980, paving the way for the creation of Central Command (CENTCOM) and much greater direct military involvement in the Middle East. • The revolution provided a massive boost to the forces of radical Islam, with Tehran providing assistance to such forces in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories; the overthrow of the Shah remains a template for some of the Islamist political forces seeking power in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other countries. The revolution also provided a number of surprises to Western governments and policymakers: • A popular uprising was able to overthrow the Shah, despite his possession of one of the most powerful militaries in the world, backed by all Western powers. • The Shah’s 400,000-strong military crumbled, with top generals fleeing, and the junior ranks siding with the revolutionaries.

38. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Iranian Revolution, 1978 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives Iran Among the reasons advanced for why the revolution happened and why it had a populist, nationalist and later Shi'a Islamic character include a conservative backlash against the Westernizing and secularizing efforts of the Western-backed Shah, and a liberal backlash to social injustice and other shortcomings of the ancien régime. The combination of a rise in expectations created by the 1973 oil revenue windfall and an overly ambitious economic program, and anger over a short, sharp economic contraction in 1977-78. The Shah's regime seemingly became oppressive, brutal, corrupt, and extravagant; it also suffered from basic functional failures – an over-ambitious economic program that brought economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation. The Shah was perceived by many as beholden to — if not a puppet of — a non-Muslim Western power (the United States) whose culture was affecting that of Iran. At the same time, support for the Shah may have waned among Western politicians and media—especially under the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter—as a result of the Shah's support for OPEC petroleum price increases earlier in the decade. That the revolution replaced the monarchy and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi with Islamism and Khomeini, rather than another leader and ideology, is credited in part to the spread of the Shia version of the Islamic revival that opposed Westernization, saw Ayatollah Khomeini as following in the footsteps of the beloved Shi'a Imam Husayn ibn Ali, and the Shah in those of Husayn's foe, the hated tyrant Yazid I. Also thought responsible was the underestimation of Khomeini's Islamist movement by both the Shah's reign – who considered them a minor threat compared to the Marxists and Islamic socialists – and by the secularist opponents of the government – who thought the Khomeinists could be sidelined. United States Facing a revolution, the Shah appealed to the United States for support. Because of Iran's history and strategic location, it was important to the United States. Iran shared a long border with America's Cold War rival, the Soviet Union, and was the largest, most powerful country in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The Shah had long been pro-American, but the Pahlavi monarchy had also recently garnered unfavorable publicity in the West for its human rights record. In the United States, Iran was not considered in danger of revolution. A CIA analysis in August 1978, just six months before the Shah fled Iran, had concluded that the country "is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." According to historian Nikki Keddie, the administration of then President Carter followed "no clear policy" on Iran. The U.S. ambassador to Iran, William H. Sullivan, recalls that the U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski “repeatedly assured Pahlavi that the U.S. backed him fully." On November 4, 1978, Brzezinski called the Shah to tell him that the United States would "back him to the hilt." But at the same time, certain high-level officials in the State Department and the White House staff believed the revolution was unstoppable but largely went unheard until Ambassador Sullivan issued the "Thinking the Unthinkable" telegram, which formally discussed policy options if the Shah were to fail to quell the fervor. After visiting the Shah in the autumn of 1978, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal complained of the Shah's emotional collapse, reporting, "You've got a zombie out there." Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James Schlesinger were adamant in their assurances that the Shah would receive military support. Sociologist Charles Kurzman argues that rather than being indecisive, or sympathetic to the revolution, the Carter administration was consistently supportive of the Shah and urged the Iranian military to stage a "last-resort coup d'etat" even after the government's cause was hopeless. Many Iranians believe the lack of intervention and the sympathetic remarks about the revolution by high-level American officials indicate the U.S. "was responsible for Khomeini's victory." Another position asserts that the Shah's overthrow was the result of a "sinister plot to topple a nationalist, progressive, and independent-minded monarch." • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Iran • United States • Articles/Documents • Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution • The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian revolution • Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution • Concession, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • History of the 1979 Iranian Revolution • Iran and the West • Iranian Revolution 1979: Fall of a Shah Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

39. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Yom Kippur War, 1973 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military While the CIA accurately analyzed the Six-Day War between Israel and neighboring Arab states in 1967, it was caught flat-footed only six years later when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched coordinated attacks on Israeli forces in the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The conflict, which ended with a ceasefire in October 1973, tested U.S.-Soviet relations and pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of Washington's foreign-policy agenda. Documents collected by George Washington University's National Security Archive reveal that the Israeli intelligence community believed that the country's superior military power would deter its Arab neighbors from initiating a war, and U.S. intelligence officials bought into this line of reasoning. On the day the war began, a National Security Council memo noted that Soviet advisers had been evacuated from Egypt and that Israel was anticipating an attack because of Egyptian and Syrian military movements, but added that U.S. intelligence services "continue to downplay the likelihood of an Arab attack on Israel" and "favor the alternative explanation of a crisis in Arab-Soviet relations." • Perspectives • Israel • Egypt • Articles/Documents • Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War • The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise • Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973 • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Yom Kippur War – Israel Fights for her Life and Wins • Documentary Video: The Yom Kippur War Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

40. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Yom Kippur War, 1973 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Political Israel's stunning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 left the Jewish nation in control of territory four times its previous size. Egypt lost the 23,500-square-mile Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights. When Anwar el-Sadat (1918-81) became president of Egypt in 1970, he found himself leader of an economically troubled nation that could ill afford to continue its endless crusade against Israel. He wanted to make peace and thereby achieve stability and recovery of the Sinai, but after Israel's 1967 victory it was unlikely that Israel's peace terms would be favorable to Egypt. So Sadat conceived of a daring plan to attack Israel again, which, even if unsuccessful, might convince the Israelis that peace with Egypt was necessary. Intelligence By mid-1973 Israeli military intelligence was almost completely aware of Arab war plans. They knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal to a depth of about ten kilometers inside the Israeli side of Sinai. Following the infantry assault, Egyptian armored divisions would then attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance all the way to the Mitla and Gidi Passes - strategic crossing-points for any army in the Sinai. Naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern end of the Sinai. Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan. But Israeli analysts did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war. Even when all the signs indicated that the Arabs were prepared for war, Israeli analysts continued to believe they would not - almost until the day the war broke out. Diplomatic In 1972, Sadat expelled 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt and opened new diplomatic channels with Washington, D.C., which, as Israel's key ally, would be an essential mediator in any future peace talks. He formed a new alliance with Syria, and a concerted attack on Israel was planned. Military When the fourth Arab-Israeli war began on October 6, 1973, many of Israel's soldiers were away from their posts observing Yom Kippur (or Day of Atonement), and the Arab armies made impressive advances with their up-to-date Soviet weaponry. Iraqi forces soon joined the war, and Syria received support from Jordan. After several days, Israel was fully mobilized, and the Israel Defense Forces began beating back the Arab gains at a heavy cost to soldiers and equipment. A U.S. airlift of arms aided Israel's cause, but President Richard Nixon (1913-94) delayed the emergency military aid for a week as a tacit signal of U.S. sympathy for Egypt. On October 25, an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was secured by the United Nations. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Israel • Egypt • Articles/Documents • Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War • The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise • Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973 • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Yom Kippur War – Israel Fights for her Life and Wins • Documentary Video: The Yom Kippur War Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

41. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Yom Kippur War, 1973 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives Israel Israel was created from what was formerly called Palestine after its 1948 War of Independence. Surrounded by enemies, it has borders with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Approximately 20%t of its population are Sunni Muslims. Its existence, its military victories, its political and economic policies, and its possession of land deemed holy by Muslims have made it the object of Arab enmity.Israel’s armed forces were quite literally "born in battle," as they had to quickly transition from a collection of underground militia groups to a battlefield-capable force during the 1948 Israeli War of Independence. That war proved very costly, with 6,000 Israelis killed. (This number seems relatively small, given the casualties of other wars, but it was proportionally very large. If the United States had suffered the same losses proportionate to its population at the time, there would have been 2.5 million deaths.)Under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, Israel immediately began preparing for the next war, and the raw amateurism of the war for independence was replaced by military professionalism of the highest order. The appointment of the charismatic Moshe Dayan as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in 1953 was an important step toward achieving Israeli military dominance in the Middle East.The unwillingness of the Arab nations to recognize or make peace with Israel made the Israeli buildup urgent. This urgency was intensified as President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt saw to it that his armed forces were supplied with massive amounts of Soviet aid, especially heavy weapons. Israel was determined to make a preemptive attack and was encouraged to enter into an agreement with Britain and France for a joint invasion of Egypt. Britain and France, infuriated by Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, sought local support from Israel rather than launching a separate expedition. The Israeli portion of the venture was wholly successful, thanks largely to Ben-Gurion's drive. Israeli strategy and tactics were based on surprise, flexibility, and innovation. Their Arab counterparts were lacking in those three essential areas. In addition, there was continual bickering, and in some cases even armed hostility, between the Arab nations. Young Israeli officers who distinguished themselves and were destined for great careers included Mordechai Gur, Rafael Eitan, and Ariel Sharon. By seizing the initiative, Israeli forces could determine the order of battle for regional conflicts, force enemies to react to Israeli attacks, and disrupt overly complicated Arab plans. This also allowed the IDF to utilize its interior lines, rushing forces to different fronts to meet the most imminent threats.The Six-Day War brought these and other Israeli leaders to prominence in one of the most stunning victories in military history. The absolute nature of its victory allowed Israel to establish defensible borders for the first time in its history. The actions of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) under Major General Mordechai Hod were particularly courageous and proficient. The preemptive attack on Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi forces allowed the IAF almost unchallenged air supremacy, which then allowed ground forces to attack with impunity. Likewise, Israeli aircraft could wreak devastation from the air, with little worry about Arab retaliations or air defenses.The most crucial war for Israel came in 1973, when a combination of hubris, bad intelligence, and underestimation of Anwar Sadat brought Israel within a few hours of defeat. Most of these same men were held accountable for the near disaster after the war, and Golda Meir lost her seat as prime minister. The Israeli chief of staff, Major General David Elazar, was forced to resign and died shortly afterward. The head of Israeli intelligence, General Eli Zeira, was faulted for his conduct of intelligence proceedings and dismissed.During these many years of warfare at one level or another, Israel managed to arm itself from many sources. Initially it took arms from a wide range of nations, then shifted to reliance on France, but after a French embargo turned to the United States and to the creation of its own indigenous resources. It charted a political course in which the United States was the only partner upon whom it could count for certain, yet it maintained a dignified defiance of the United States on issues with which it disagreed. It charted a course that made it an atomic power in the 1960s, while steadfastly denying its possession of nuclear weapons. Israel also achieved a reputation that made its adversaries absolutely certain that Israel would in fact use its atomic weapons if threatened. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Israel • Egypt • Articles/Documents • Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War • The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise • Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973 • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Yom Kippur War – Israel Fights for her Life and Wins • Documentary Video: The Yom Kippur War Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

42. Egypt Egypt was vital to the British during World War II, but anti-British feeling continued to grow. On July 22, 1952, a group called the Free Officers, led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, overthrew corrupt King Farouk, who was generally blamed for the poor performance of the Egyptian Army in the Israeli War of Independence in 1948. Nasser emerged as the most charismatic Arab leader to date and was initially immensely popular among Arabs within and without Egypt. He espoused Arab socialism and sought to improve the Egyptian military by reform and example.Nasser was perceived as important beyond the Arab world after he established the Non-aligned Movement among with India, Yugoslavia, and other developing countries in 1961. His natural affinity for socialism and the offer of arms sales from Soviet satellite states moved him closer to the Soviet Union in policy.Unfortunately for Egypt, Nasser overestimated Egyptian capabilities, particularly in the area of military intelligence, and thus was humiliated by the results of both the 1956 Sinai Campaign and the 1967 Six-Day War. His attempts at resignation were refused, and he led Egypt until his death from a heart attack in 1970.Nasser was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who was widely underestimated inside and outside of Egypt and who had a particularly difficult time in making the Egyptian military subordinate to him. In the midst of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when events were at their most crucial stage, Sadat fought bitterly with his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly, and with his minister of war, General Ahmed Ismail Ali. Events later proved that Sadat's instructions to advance toward the key passes into Israel were incorrect, but at the time it seemed that civil war might erupt in Egypt.Sadat had better luck with the chief of the Egyptian Air Force, General Hosni Mubarak, who was very satisfied with the initial attack, as it repaid in part what Israel had done to Egypt in 1967. Israeli missile defense sites were destroyed and more than 450 sorties were flown in cooperation with the initial, brilliant crossing of the Suez Canal. Egyptian artillery proved to be especially effective. The massive supply of antitank missiles gave ground forces incentive to keep going against Israeli counterattacks, and the equally massive surface-to-air missile (SAM) supply negated Israeli air superiority.While Egyptian forces could provide air protection for ground forces via SAM sites and sophisticated radar systems, this protection could not be easily advanced in concert with the movement of field forces. When ground units left the umbrella of the air defense network, they remained outclassed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and vulnerable to the attacks of the Israeli Air Force. Sadat had proven that Egypt could defend itself from Israeli attack, but could not project sufficient power to overwhelm the Jewish state.The difficulty, as in all previous Arab-Israeli wars, was that there was insufficient coordination within the armed forces of each nation and, more importantly, among the armed forces of allied nations. Sadat's insistence on secrecy, while beneficial in surprising the Israelis, had a counterproductive effect on Egypt's alliance with Syria, Jordan, and the Soviet Union. Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin's career was doomed by his inability to sway, or even understand, Sadat during a personal visit to Cairo.During the Yom Kippur War, through a series of egregious political errors, both the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to nuclear war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Miscalculations and misunderstandings resulted in a situation in which both superpowers escalated their defense alerts and signaled to each other that nuclear war was imminent. These signals distracted both superpowers from the events unfolding in the Middle East, and demonstrated that peace within the volatile region would be in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union.In the end, the Egyptian military did all that Sadat asked of it and more. If he had been consistent, it might have achieved his aims. In any event, it more than recouped its honor and its pride.

43. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Tet Offensive, 1968 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack On Jan. 31, 1968, during the Tet holiday in Vietnam, North Vietnam's communist forces stunned the United States by launching a massive, coordinated assault against South Vietnam. While the communist military gains proved fleeting, the Tet Offensive was arguably the most decisive battle of Vietnam. Americans grew disillusioned with the war, prompting U.S. policymakers to shift gears and focus on reducing America's footprint in Vietnam. A government inquiry shortly after the Tet Offensive concluded that U.S. and South Vietnamese military officers and intelligence analysts had failed to fully anticipate the "intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack" -- despite multiple warnings. Navy librarian Glenn E. Helm notes that disregard for intelligence collection, language barriers, and a misunderstanding of enemy strategy played particularly prominent roles in the intelligence debacle. Still, James J. Wirtz points out in The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War that the "Americans almost succeeded in anticipating their opponents' moves in time to avoid the military consequences of surprise." • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • North Vietnam • Articles/Documents • Deception and the Tet Offensive • Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 • Decision-making Leading to the Tet Offensive – The Vietnamese Communist Perspective • The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite • Tet Offensive part 1 • Tet Offensive part 2 • Tet Offensive part 3 • Tet Offensive part 4 Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

44. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Tet Offensive, 1968 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Themes Political By the beginning of January 1968, the U.S had deployed 331,098 Army personnel and 78,013 Marines in nine divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, and two separate brigades to South Vietnam. They were joined there by the 1st Australian Task Force, a Royal Thai Army regiment, two South Korean infantry divisions, and a Republic of Korea Marine Corps brigade. South Vietnamese strength totaled 350,000 regulars in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. They were in turn supported by the 151,000-man South Vietnamese Regional Forces and 149,000-man South Vietnamese Popular Forces, which were the equivalent of regional and local militias. In the days immediately preceding the offensive, the preparedness of allied forces was relatively relaxed. Hanoi had announced in October that it would observe a seven-day truce from 27 January to 3 February for the Tet holiday, and the South Vietnamese military made plans to allow recreational leave for approximately half of its forces. General Westmoreland, who had already cancelled the truce in I Corps, requested that its ally cancel the upcoming cease-fire, but President Thieu (who had already reduced the cease-fire to 36 hours), refused to do so, claiming that it would damage troop morale and only benefit communist propagandists. Intelligence Signs of impending communist action did not go unnoticed among the allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of a major communist military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13, for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected the communists "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time.“ Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in the allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions. “ The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from the U.S. perspective was best summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us.“ Diplomatic The operations are referred to as the Tet Offensive because there was a prior agreement to "cease fire" during the Tet Lunar New Year celebrations. Both North and South Vietnam announced on national radio broadcasts that there would be a two-day cease-fire during the holiday. Nonetheless, the Viet Cong launched an attack that began during the early morning hours of 30 January 1968. • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • North Vietnam • Articles/Documents • Deception and the Tet Offensive • Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 • Decision-making Leading to the Tet Offensive – The Vietnamese Communist Perspective • The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite • Tet Offensive part 1 • Tet Offensive part 2 • Tet Offensive part 3 • Tet Offensive part 4 Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

45. Themes (continued) Military The Viet Cong launched a wave of attacks on the morning of 30 January in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack did not lead to widespread defensive measures. When the main NLF operation began the next morning the offensive was countrywide and well coordinated, eventually more than 80,000 NLF and People's Army of Vietnam communist troops striking more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. The initial attacks stunned the US and South Vietnamese armies and took them by surprise, but most were quickly contained and beaten back, inflicting massive casualties on communist forces. During the Battle of Huế intense fighting lasted for a month resulting in the destruction of the city by US forces while the NLF executed thousands of residents in the Massacre at Huế. Around the US combat base at Khe Sanh fighting continued for two more months. Although the offensive was a military defeat for the communists, it had a profound effect on the US government and shocked the US public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the communists were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive effort.

46. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Tet Offensive, 1968 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack Perspectives United States During the fall of 1967, the question of whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced, the Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) order of battle estimates concerning the strength of communist guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration as a gauge of U.S. success in the conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City, the CIA members of the group believed that the number of communist guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate, since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph McChristian, the new figures "would create a political bombshell," since they were positive proof that the communists "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition.” In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that Viet Cong militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low level fifth columnists used for information collection. The agency responded that such a notion was ridiculous, since the militias were directly responsible for half of the casualties inflicted on U.S. forces. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA deputy director for Vietnamese affairs, was asked to mediate the dispute. In September, Carver devised a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem...[Helms] didn't want the agency...contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win - or get out." This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "Success Offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification, was fed to the press and to the Congress. "We are beginning to win this struggle" asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC's "Today Show" in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, to Washington, D.C., for what was billed as a "high level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the "pacification" program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of the Vietcong. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to trying to survive in the mountains." • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • United States • North Vietnam • Articles/Documents • Deception and the Tet Offensive • Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961-1971 • Decision-making Leading to the Tet Offensive – The Vietnamese Communist Perspective • The War Politburo: North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite • Tet Offensive part 1 • Tet Offensive part 2 • Tet Offensive part 3 • Tet Offensive part 4 Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

47. Perspectives (continued) United States (continued) Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive...I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.” By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing...adopted a 'wait and see' attitude.” During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland defied the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something, because we are looking for a fight.” North Vietnam Planning in Hanoi for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the General Offensive General Uprising, even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch Tet Mau Than was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against the North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the Party leadership between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and who generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theoretician Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ NguyênGiáp. The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. From the early-to-mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), communist headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. Strangely, the followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the US and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong. By 1966-1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing, there was a dawning realization that, if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in error.The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking." During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that LêDuẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counterattack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh, LêÐứcThọ, and Foreign Minister NguyễnDuy Trinh, who called for negotiations.From October 1966 through April 1967, a very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating the past. “ The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element as well, because North Vietnam was totally dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of its military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw them in as it had in the Korean War. They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy, therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas.“ To "break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies" hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair. All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed General Offensive. This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: The rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December.

48. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Bay of Pigs, 1961 Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military In April 1961, a CIA-planned effort by Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime and replace it with a non-communist, U.S.-friendly government went horribly awry when an aerial attack on Cuba's air force flopped and the 1,400-strong "Assault Brigade 2506" came under heavy fire from the Cuban military after landing off the country's southern coast. The botched invasion poisoned U.S.-Cuban relations. CIA files later revealed that the agency, assuming President John F. Kennedy would commit American troops to the assault if all else failed, never showed the newly minted president an assessment expressing doubt about whether the brigade could succeed without open support from the U.S. military -- support Kennedy never intended to provide. (The historian PieroGleijeses has compared the CIA and Kennedy to ships passing in the night.) The CIA didn't do itself any favors a year later by concluding that the Soviets were unlikely to establish offensive missiles in Cuba in a report issued a month before the Cuban Missile Crisis, though the agency redeemed itself a bit by later snapping U-2 photographs of the missile sites. • Perspectives • Cuba • United States • Articles/Documents • The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair • Anatomy of Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs • Groupthink, Bay of Pigs, and Watergate Reconsidered • Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Bay of Pigs Invasion – A “Perfect Failure” • Bay of Pigs Invasion: Apr 20, 1961 • Bay of Pigs Invasion Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

49. inteltrain Intelligence Analysis Training Resources Intelligence Failures Cognitive Bias References Bay of Pigs, 1961 Themes Political In the United States presidential election, 1960, both main candidates, Richard Nixon of the Republican Party and John F. Kennedy of the Democratic Party, campaigned on the issue of Cuba, both taking a hardline stance on Castro. Nixon – who was then Vice President – sent a military aide to Dulles to ask how the planned invasion was progressing; he believed that it was taking too long, considering the swift preparation of the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'etat. Nixon insisted that Kennedy should not be informed of the military plans, which Dulles conceded to. On 28 January 1961, President Kennedy was briefed, together with all the major departments, on the latest plan (code-named Operation Pluto) that involved 1,000 men to be landed in a ship-borne invasion at Trinidad, Cuba, about 270 km (170 mi) south-east of Havana, at the foothills of the Escambray Mountains in Sancti Spiritus province. Kennedy authorized the active departments to continue, and to report progress. Trinidad had good port facilities, it was closer to many existing counter-revolutionary activities, it had an easily defensible beachhead, and it offered an escape route into the Escambray Mountains. When that scheme was subsequently rejected by the State Department, the CIA went on to propose an alternative plan. On 4 April 1961, President Kennedy then approved the Bay of Pigs plan (also known as Operation Zapata), because it had an airfield that would not need to be extended to handle bomber operations, it was farther away from large groups of civilians than the Trinidad plan, and it was less "noisy" militarily, which would make any future denial of direct US involvement more plausible. The invasion landing area was changed to beaches bordering the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) in Las Villas Province, 150 km south-east of Havana, and east of the Zapata peninsula. The landings were to take place at Playa Girón (code-named Blue Beach), Playa Larga (code-named Red Beach), and Caleta Buena Inlet (code-named Green Beach). In March 1961, the CIA helped Cuban exiles in Miami to create the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), chaired by José Miró Cardona, former Prime Minister of Cuba in January 1959. Cardona became the de facto leader-in-waiting of the intended post-invasion Cuban government. Intelligence The idea of overthrowing Castro's administration first emerged within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an independent civilian intelligence agency of the United States government, in early 1960. Founded in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA was "a product of the Cold War", having been designed to counter the espionage activities of the Soviet Union's own national security agency, the KGB. As the perceived threat of "international communism" grew larger, the CIA expanded its activities to undertake covert economic, political and military activities that would advance causes favorable to U.S. interests. The CIA's Director at the time, Allen Dulles, was responsible for overseeing clandestine operations across the world, and although widely considered an ineffectual administrator, he was popular among his employees, whom he had protected from the accusations of McCarthyism. The man overseeing plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion was Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the CIA's Deputy Director. Putting together a "Special Group" known as the 5412 Committee, he assembled a number of other agents to aid him in the plot, many of whom had worked on the 1954 Guatemalan coup six years before; these included David Philips, Gerald Drecher and E. Howard Hunt. Bissell placed Drecher in charge of liasing with the anti-Castro segments of the Cuban American community living in the United States, and asked Hunt to fashion a government-in-exile which the CIA would effectively control. Hunt proceeded to travel to Havana, the capital city of Cuba, where he spoke with Cubans from various different backgrounds and discovered a brothel through the Mercedes-Benz agency. Returning to the U.S., he informed the Cuban-Americans whom he was liasing with that they would have to move their base of operations from Florida to Mexico City, because the State Department refused to permit the training of a militia on U.S. soil. Although unhappy with the news, they conceded to the order. The Cuban security apparatus knew the invasion was coming, via their secret intelligence network, as well as loose talk by members of the brigade, some of which was heard in Miami, and was repeated in US and foreign newspaper reports. Nevertheless, days before the invasion, multiple acts of sabotage were carried out, such as the El Encanto fire, an arson attack in a department store in Havana on 13 April, that killed one shop worker. The Cuban government also had been warned by senior KGB agents OsvaldoSánchez Cabrera and 'Aragon', who died violently before and after the invasion, respectively. The general Cuban population was not well informed, except for CIA-funded Radio Swan. As of May 1960, almost all means of public communication were in the government's hands. Cases 2003: US Invasion of Iraq 2001: 9/11 Attacks 1998: Indian Nuclear Test 1991: Collapse of the Soviet Union 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1978: Iranian Revolution 1973: Yom Kippur War 1968: Tet Offensive 1961: Bay of Pigs Invasion 1941: Pearl Harbor Attack • Themes • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military • Perspectives • Cuba • United States • Articles/Documents • The CIA’s Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair • Anatomy of Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs • Groupthink, Bay of Pigs, and Watergate Reconsidered • Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs • Themes Defined • Political • Intelligence • Diplomatic • Military Intelligence Assessment Templates Intelligence Estimate – Defense Joint Intelligence Estimate Intelligence Requirements – DOJ • Videos • Bay of Pigs Invasion – A “Perfect Failure” • Bay of Pigs Invasion: Apr 20, 1961 • Bay of Pigs Invasion Collaboration Page Intelligence Assessment Case-Theme Matrix Questions/Comments

50. Themes (continued) Diplomatic Castro's Cuban government ordered the country's oil refineries – then controlled by the U.S. corporations Shell, Esso and Standard Oil – to process crude oil purchased from the Soviet Union, but under pressure from the U.S. government, these companies refused. Castro responded by expropriating the refineries and nationalizing them under state control. In retaliation, the U.S. cancelled its import of Cuban sugar, provoking Castro to nationalize most U.S.-owned assets on the island, including banks and sugar mills. Relations between Cuba and the U.S. were further strained following the explosion and sinking of a French vessel, the Le Coubre, in Havana harbor in March 1960. Carrying weapons purchased from Belgium, the cause of the explosion was never determined, but Castro publicly insinuated that the U.S. government were guilty of sabotage. On 13 October 1960, the U.S. government then prohibited the majority of exports to Cuba – the exceptions being medicines and certain foodstuffs – marking the start of an economic embargo. In retaliation, the Cuban National Institute for Agrarian Reform took control of 383 private-run businesses on 14 October, and on 25 October a further 166 U.S. companies operating in Cuba had their premises seized and nationalized, including Coca-Cola and Sears Roebuck. On 16 December, the U.S. then ended its import quota of Cuban sugar, the country's primary export. Military On April 17, 1961 about 1300 exiles, armed with U.S. weapons, landed at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba. Hoping to find support from the local population, they intended to cross the island to Havana. It was evident from the first hours of fighting, however, that the exiles were likely to lose. President Kennedy had the option of using the U.S. Air Force against the Cubans but decided against it. Consequently, the invasion was stopped by Castro's army. By the time the fighting ended on April 19, 90 exiles had been killed and the rest had been taken as prisoners.