Licensing Procedures for NPPs and its Impact on Nuclear Technology Transfer - Korean Experience -

1. Licensing Procedures for NPPs and its Impact on Nuclear Technology Transfer - Korean Experience - April 2007, Ho-Kee Kim

2. Table of Contents • Introduction • Regulatory Framework and Licensing Procedures • Regulatory Development History • Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety and its International Cooperation • Lessons Learned from History • Conclusion

3. Introduction

4. Nuclear safety • Risk level secured lower than social expectation, due to nuclear utilization • Safety regulation • Legal and government enforcement to reduce or maintain the level of risk • Characteristics of safety regulation • Technical knowledge based enforcement through the process of licensing • Responsible for the establishment of rules and regulations, and authorization, review, inspection and enforcement • International consensus on the role and mission • Regulatory leadership toward safety enhancement as a worldwide topic

5. Licensing and nuclear technology transfer • Licensing expedites, inherently, to achieve technical capability of applicant for safety and performance • Reactor technology of the existing designs is almost fully developed and nuclear safety achievement is a global goal • International cooperation is an effective tool for regulatory development • Various types of international cooperation are implemented in the way of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and through international organizations • Training and/or orientation, joint safety review, design peer review, joint regulation development for future reactors, etc. • Regulation and its leading role are practically utilized to secure nuclear technology in developing countries

6. Regulatory Framework and Licensing Procedures

7. President Prime Minister Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) Atomic Energy Bureau Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) Nuclear Safety Office Resident Inspectors Office KINS Framework of Nuclear Safety Regulation • Regulatory body MOST • Regulatory enforcement authority NSC • 9 members and supported by 5 sub-committees • Decision-making on major nuclear issues KINS (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety) • Quasi-government agency, entirely dedicated to nuclear safety regulation

8. NSC MOST Issue Permit or License Request Technical Review Apply for Permit or License Submit Technical Evaluation Results Technical Discussion & Inspection KINS Nuclear Industries Correction of Inspection Findings & Improvement • General working mechanism

9. Regulatory Policy Atomic Energy Act Safety Charter Legal Enforcement Decree of the Act (Presidential Decree) Safety Policy Statement Comprehensive Program for Safety Regulation (5 year intervals) Enforcement Regulation of the Act (Ministerial Ordinance) Annual Policy Directives for Safety Regulation Notice of the MOST Implementation Plan of Annual Policy Directives KINS Safety Review & Inspection Guidelines over the entire safety regulation Industrial Codes and Standards (KEPIC, ASME, IEEE, ACI, etc.) • Legal and regulatory policy system

10. Licensing procedure for NPPs • Purpose of licensing • To ensure that all activities affecting safety of nuclear power plant are planned and performed in accordance with regulatory requirements • Covers design, manufacturing, construction, operation, test, training, and emergency preparedness • Consequently, to protect employees, residents, and surrounding environments against potential hazard

11. Grant ESA Regulatory activities Early Site Approval (ESA) Review Applicant activities Start foundation work Application Issue CP Review Pre-Operational (PO) Inspection Construction Permit (CP) Start construction Start-up test Application Issue OL Review PO Inspection Operating License (OL) Application Inspection in 18 M. intervals Load fuel Commercial Operation (CO) Commence CO • General sequence: review and inspection

12. Safety review for NPPs

13. Construction Permit (CP) • To ensure the adequacy of plant location and design, and construction approaches in accordance with Rules and Regulations, prior to the commencement of construction • Major application documents • Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), Quality Assurance Program (QAP) for design and construction, Environmental Report (ER), etc. • Early Site Approval (ESA) • To allow the applicant to perform a limited civil engineering work of site preparation and power block excavation, before CP • Application documents: Site Survey Report, Detailed Geological Survey Report, etc.

14. Operating License (OL) • To confirm the final adequacy of plant design and operational approaches • Performs safety review in the same manner as that for CP, but with some additional reviews of the operating capability and accident response ability of applicant • Major application documents • Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), QAP for operation, Technical Specifications for Operation, Radiological Emergency Plan, etc. • Nuclear fuel loading and commissioning tests upon the issuance of OL

15. Continued operation after plant design life • Extension of plant operating period after the design life • Applied, as necessary, 2 to 5 years before the end of design life for additional 10 years of operation • Periodic safety evaluation report, aging evaluation report of major equipment, radiological environmental report, etc. • Amendment of Permit or License • Modification of the contents of approved documents after permit or license • Supplementary documents to verify the adequacy • Approval of Standard Design • Prior authorization of a standard NPP design for the repeated construction; effective for 10 years • Safety analysis report on the standard design, preparation plan of emergency operating procedures

16. Approval of topical report • Avoidance of repetitive review on a specific technology during licensing and enhancement of licensibility of the technology • Detailed technical background on the application topic • Implementation of Severe Accident Policy • Secure of severe accident prevention and/or mitigation features, and enhancement of the capability to cope with the severe accidents • Pre & final PSA results during CP & OL review periods, respectively, and implementation of the Severe Accident Management Program prior to the commercial operation • Periodic Safety Review (PSR) • Comprehensive and systematic review for the safety of each operating NPP in 10 year intervals after the OL • Physical conditions, safety analysis, equipment verification, aged deterioration, safety performance, experience feedback, operating procedures, etc.

17. Safety inspection for NPPs

18. Quality Assurance inspection • To confirm the quality achievement of organizations involved in the design, manufacturing, construction, and operation of facilities • To verify the effectiveness of QA Program (QAP) and the appropriateness of applicant’s QA activities • Performed in reference to the QAP approved by the regulatory body, in a programmatic manner, annually planned for each organization • Pre-operational inspection • To confirm the adequacy of materials, components, systems and structures, as well as construction related activities, processes, procedures and personnel competence • Performed in compliance with safety assessment results and Safety Analysis Reports, and in reference to the project milestones

19. Periodic inspection • To ensure that the performance of reactor facility is maintained in the state of the pre-operational inspection, for re-criticality after plant overhaul • Performed during the plant outage period • Resident inspection • To monitor daily construction and operation status, and identify and respond to any activities adverse to nuclear safety • Operate, both the MOST and KINS, resident inspection office at each plant site • Special inspection • Initiated in response to unexpected, unplanned or unusual situation or event, as necessary

20. Regulatory Development History

21. 1958 1980 Initial • Formed basic regulation infrastructure • Introduced the first 3 NPPs of proven technology per turnkey contract • 1 step licensing by government per vendor country requirements 1989 Transitional • Established current legal hierarchy and a subsidiary safety expert organization • Constructed 6 more NPPs with non-turnkey project, and commenced NPP & fuel localization • Developed domestic regulatory requirements and cultivated regulatory staff Present Current • Secured regulatory independence and competence with KINS & NSC, • Achieved high level of safety and performance for 20 operating NPPs, including 8 OPR-1000 NPPs, and 6 NPPs (4 OPR-1000 & 2 APR-1400) are under construction • KINS accumulated ample experience and commenced international contribution History summary

22. Changes of legal & organizational framework • Initial stage from 1958 through 1980 • Legislation of the Atomic Energy Act in 1958, and establishment of the Office of Atomic Energy under the direct control of the President in 1959 • To promote peaceful use and development of nuclear energy • Incorporation into the Act the 1 step licensing and inspection requirements for nuclear facilities in 1969 • Applied to Kori and Wolsong unit 1 plants • Adoption of the 2 step licensing processes and designation of KAERI as the expert organization in 1978 • TMI unit 2 accident in 1979 • Formation of a basic regulatory infrastructure, and change of the government direct regulation to the involvement of an expert organization

23. Transitional stage from 1981 through 1989 • Establishment of Nuclear Safety Center as the subsidiary expert organization of KAERI in 1981, to be an independent branch in 1987 • Substantial amendment of the Rules & Regulations in 1982 • Establishment of AEC, the current legal hierarchy of the Act-Decrees-Regulations and licensing process for nuclear facilities, and entrust of technical regulations to the expert • Re-organization of the Rules and Regulations into the current legal system, and establishment of a safety expert organization

24. Current stage from 1990 through present • Foundation of Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) as the regulatory agency by the special KINS Act in 1990 • Stipulation for the creation of comprehensive nuclear promotion plan in 5 year intervals in 1994 • Establishment of Nuclear Safety Commission separating the functions from the existing AEC, and nuclear R&D fund utilizing levy on the NPP operator in 1996 • Adoption of the Periodic Safety Review in 10 year intervals for operating plants, and the application of continued operation after plant design life in 2001 and 2005, respectively • Enhancement of regulatory independence, legislation of the development of national nuclear utilization plan, and strengthening of the safety for the operating NPPs

25. Changes of nuclear safety regulations • Initial stage from 1958 through 1980 • Legal foundation of the fundamentals for the development of nuclear energy and its safety control • Safety regulations together with promotion by the Office of Atomic Energy of the government • Introduction of the first 3, Kori unit 1&2 PWR and Wolsong unit 1 PHWR, NPPs • Safety achievement strategy of “the initial NPPs of the proven technology” and turnkey projects • Vendors were responsible for schedule, inspection, startup and performance of the plants • Safety evaluation by the Safety Review Committee with the advisory support of the IAEA, in accordance with the vendor countries’ regulatory requirements

26. Transitional stage from 1981 through 1989 • Strengthening of legal foundation and establishment of a regulatory expert organization, incorporating the enlarged nuclear use and international movement emphasizing safety after the TMI accident • Construction of six (6) more NPPs with non-turnkey projects and multipurpose research reactor, and commencement of NPP and fuel localization • NPP licensing by the government with the safety review report by the expert • Launch forth developing domestic regulatory requirements and guidelines, cultivating regulatory staff, dispatching resident inspector, and establishing emergency preparedness plan

27. Current stage from 1990 through present • Highly strengthening of independence and competence of safety regulation with KINS and NSC establishments • Achievement of significant progress in developing regulatory expertise and infrastructure, necessary in self-performance of all the safety regulations • Construction of 17 additional NPPs • 11 plants under operation and 6 plants under construction • Accumulation of ample regulatory experience with 19 new plants, including 2 KEDO plants for the DPRK in 2001 under the Agreement with KEDO • 14 OPR-1000, 2 APR-1400, 3 PHWR plants • Achievement of high level of nuclear safety for a total of 20 operating NPPs • Commencement of international contributions, including the orientation for 25 DPRK regulatory staff in 2002 • Moving toward further deepening of regulatory capability

28. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) and its International Cooperation

29. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) • Established in February 1990 • Quasi-government agency, independent and stand-alone, by the special KINS Act • Mission of protecting the public health and environment from potential radiation hazards • Safety review and inspection, R&D for standards, policy development, radiation protection, safety information and licensing examination management • Human resources • Approx. 400 staff members, and more than 80% has Ph.D and Masters degree • Approx. 45 years old (average age), having ample experience for nuclear safety regulation • Regulatory agency having expertise and entirely dedicated to nuclear safety regulation in Korea

30. President Auditor Policy Development Division Radioactive Waste Safety Assessment Division Radiation Safety Regulation Division Safety Preparedness Division Regulatory Research Division Administration Division Nuclear Regulation Division Planning Division Technical Expert Pool • Organization of KINS

31. Nuclear Safety School R & D Center Headquarters Temporary Orphan Source Storage Emergency Center Central Monitoring Station • Facilities of KINS

32. Nuclear facilities subject to KINS regulation

33. International cooperation and KINS • International cooperation in safety regulation • Emphasized by international standards and society toward the safety of facilities and activities • Expedited to establish bilateral or multilateral arrangements with neighboring countries, others or intergovernmental organizations • Utilized in fulfilling national obligations under international conventions, information exchange, mutual assistance in activities, staff training, and meetings • New movements of cooperation • Expansion of the extent from unilateral technology transfer of the past, to international policy making and joint works for safety review and regulation development • International Nuclear Regulators’ Association (INRA), Western Europe Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA), Multilateral Design Evaluation Program (MDEP) toward common standards for Gen. 4 reactor

34. KINS policy and implementation • Positive policy in mutual cooperation and contribution toward global safety achievement • Cooperation with the IAEA and the OECD/NEA • Participation in committees and meetings: IAEA CSS and its subcommittees, OECD/NEA committees, international conventions, SRMs, and MDEP • Cooperation with the regulatory organizations • 15 Agreements or MOUs with organizations in 11 countries: CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, INDONESIA, JAPAN, ROMANIA, SWEDEN, UK, US and VIETNAM • Received 21 trainees from 7 countries and many visitors in 2006, and dispatched approx. 340 of 400 staff members to participate in various international activities

35. Lessons Learned from the History

36. Nuclear development of Korea • Secured Korean OPR-1000 and its advanced APR-1400 NPP designs by stepwise approach of NPP construction • Turnkey contract, non-turnkey project and design localization • Nuclear development program of Korea was started at the early stage of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world • Consistent policy and implementation of the government for development over a long period was essential • Currently, 4 OPR and 2 APR units are under construction, and SMART, medium size reactor (660 Mwt), is under development • Relatively short period of nuclear technology transfer for developing countries is possible in consideration of technical maturity of the existing designs and international competition • Government policy and public acceptance become major factors, and favorable environment due to climate change and instability of natural energy resources is created

37. Licensing development • Accumulated, gradually, regulatory capability in parallel to the nuclear development program • From licensing of NPPs in reference to vendor country requirements and practices, to the development of inherent system and requirements • Secured, KINS, regulatory leadership in terms of safety technology development and enlarges international contribution toward global safety • Utilized, regulatory leadership, as the tool for nuclear technology transfer for developing countries • International consensus toward nuclear safety, regulatory cooperation environment and apparatus, and the nature of nuclear licensing coupled with technology

38. Conclusion

39. Imperativeness of technical knowledge for licensing of NPPs toward nuclear safety and plant performance, for both applicant and regulator • Positive function of regulatory leadership and competence necessary for nuclear licensing, in technology transfer • Effectiveness and efficiency of the simultaneous and parallel development of nuclear program and regulation • Utilization of international cooperation and its new movements of regulatory policymaking and joint works

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