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This article discusses the collapse of disaster response during Hurricane Katrina and the lessons learned for metropolitan regions. It highlights the vulnerability of New Orleans, the failures at all levels of government, and the discrepancies between policies and practice. The article emphasizes the importance of leadership, interagency coordination, and mapping interdependencies among infrastructure and organizational systems. The challenges faced by New Orleans and the nation are also addressed, with a focus on redefining accountability and prioritizing resilient communities.
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Lessons from Katrina for Metropolitan Regions Louise K. Comfort Graduate School of Public & International Affairs University of Pittsburgh comfort@gspia.pitt.edu
Collapse of Disaster Response • Rarely does disaster destroy an entire city • Two disasters in New Orleans • Hurricane – natural event beyond human control • Flood – consequence of human action/inaction • Collapse of disaster response at all four levels • City/parish; state, federal jurisdictions • Disaster escalated beyond region, affecting 49 out of 50 states, impact on entire nation
Public Responsibility in Disaster • U.S. laws, policies for disaster management developed over last century • Current U.S. policy in disaster • National Response Plan • National Incident Management Plan • Both intended to address security needs after 9/11 • Role of government: protect citizens from harm
Initial Conditions in New Orleans • Vulnerable Setting for City • Seven feet below sea level • Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain at borders • Exposure to hurricanes from Gulf Coast • Aging infrastructure • Delayed maintenance • High incidence of poverty, lack of public education
The Emerging Threat • What did managers know and when? • 8/23:NHC reported tropical depression in Bahamas • 8/24:NHC upgrades storm to Hurricane Katrina • 8/25:Katrina makes landfall in Florida, Cat. 1 • 8/26:Katrina moves into Gulf of Mexico, Cat. 2, NHC projects landfall in Louisiana, Mississippi • 8/26: LA Gov. Blanco declares state of emergency • 8/27:NHC upgrades Katrina to Cat. 3
Imminent Disaster… • 8/27: Gov. Barbour declares disaster for MS • 8/27: Gov. Blanco requests federal declaration of disaster for Louisiana • 8/27: Mayor Nagin orders voluntary evacuation of New Orleans • 8/28: Katrina intensifies, Cat. 4, then Cat. 5 • 8/28: Nagin orders mandatory evacuation of city • 8/28: Pres. Bush declares federal disaster for Florida • 8/28: Nagin opens Superdome as “refuge of last resort”
Catastrophe! • August 29, 2005 • 6:10 a.m.: Katrina makes landfall, Cat. 4, east of New Orleans; city escapes direct hit • 10:00 a.m.: Katrina makes landfall in MS., Cat. 3 • 2:00 p.m.: 17th Street levee breaches, waters of Lake Pontchartrain flood city of New Orleans • Communications fail completely • Pres. Bush declares federal disaster for LA, MS, AL
The Aftermath… • Interdependence of engineered systems meant no public services were operable in city • City was uninhabitable; evacuation was the only course of action • Response agencies were overwhelmed with magnitude of event • Coordination, communication lacking at all levels • Situation proved unmanageable, despite planning • July 2004 federal exercise, Hurricane Pam, similar scenario
Disaster in New Orleans • Damage largely result of the flood, not storm • Not a “natural disaster” • Failure at all four levels of government to implement National Response Plan, NIMS • Revealed serious weaknesses in governmental performance • Questions competence of existing practice • Contrasts with previous strong performances of governmental response to disasters
Actual Preparedness & Response • Discrepancy between policy & practice • Reorganization of FEMA into Department of Homeland Security • Shift in focus, attention, allocation of funds to homeland security from natural disasters • Shift in personnel at all four levels • Inability to create a “common knowledge base” to facilitate coordinated response • “We can only create what we already understand.” H. Simon, 1981.
Discrepancy between Policies and Practice • Disasters reveal weaknesses in practice • Response to Katrina was first major test of DHS leadership and policies since 9/11 • Hierarchical structure of DHS contrasted with dynamic conditions of disaster operations • Policies advocated control; conditions required rapid communication, collaboration, networks of action • Discrepancies within, among jurisdictions; inability to adapt to changing conditions
Lessons from Katrina • US response system is inadequate for extreme events • Emergency response is a sociotechnical system • Interaction among failed infrastructure & capacity of emergency response organizations • Leadership is critical in uncertain conditions • Inability to identify & correct error weakened response system throughout event • Critical to map interdependencies, dependencies among infrastructure systems & organizational systems that manage and use them
Challenges for New Orleans & Nation • Redefine accountability for performance • Review national priorities: • Maintenance of infrastructure for US cities • Security from full range of threats • Integration of science into policy & practice • Public education regarding hazards in areas exposed to risk • Goal: build resilient communities that assess & mitigate risks before extreme events occur