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TOM DOUGLAS AND JULIAN SAVULESCU OXFORD UEHIRO CENTRE FOR PRACTICAL ETHICS UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD. Two concerns about synthetic biology. Cello et al. 2002 de novo synthesis of poliovirus. Venter proposal minimal bacterial chassis. competing definitions.
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TOM DOUGLAS AND JULIAN SAVULESCU OXFORD UEHIRO CENTRE FOR PRACTICAL ETHICS UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Two concerns about synthetic biology
Cello et al. 2002 de novo synthesis of poliovirus Venter proposal minimal bacterial chassis
competing definitions synthetic biology = de novo synthesis of biological organisms/components broad definition narrow definition
benefits medical applications (diagnostics and therapeutics) environmental applications (biofuels, biosensors, bioremediation) industrial applications Context Ethical issues no different to: genetic engineering, transgenesis, chimeras machine-mind interfaces artificial reproduction, eg cloning
Moral landscape: ethical concerns • synthetic biology poses a high risk of malevolent use – precautionary principle • synthetic biology will undermine or fail to respect the moral status of living things – discrimination, inequality, etc • synthetic biology will result in accidental harm • synthetic biology will lead to the enhancement of human beings – moral imperative to enhance human beings • “Playing God”/unnatural/dignity of life/commodification of life objs • Will focus on 1 and 2 as these are most serious and common obj
our claims on their most plausible interpretations, these two concerns can be understood as variants of a common concern about promoting future wrongdoing the most common strategy for dissolving this concern (scientific isolationism) fails
the first concern – possible malevolent use Cello et al. 2002 de novo synthesis of poliovirus Tumpey et al. 2005 Reconstruction of 1918 Spanish influenza virus 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
the second concern – undermining the moral status of living things Cho, Magnus, Caplan & McGee (1999): X X creation of beings between living things & machines acceptance of reductionist account of life no longer ascribe “special status” to life 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
MORAL STATUS PERSONS: human rights interests intrinsic value NON-HUMAN ANIMALS: ?? rights ? interests ? intrinsic value PRODUCTS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY ??? MACHINES: no rights or interests instrumental value only 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
a reformulation of the second concern human/animal interests sacrificed for the sake of synthetic beings synthetic beings assigned great moral status humans/animals harmed humans/animals assigned lesser moral status (on some theories) 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
two possibilities we correctly assign great moral status to synthetic beings → humans/animals get permissibly harmed we incorrectly assign great moral status to synthetic beings → humans/animals get wrongly harmed 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
unifying the two concerns CONCERN ONE: synthetic agents used in malevolent ways pursuing research in synthetic biology brings about future wrongdoing CONCERN TWO: human/animal interests get wrongly sacrificed for the sake of synthetic beings (or the reverse) 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concernsscientific isolationism
scientific isolationism – a way of dissolving the concern? ethics of research ethics of technology 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
scientific freedom the claim scientists enjoy a right to absolute freedom of enquiry but... scientists should not engage in all research that they have a right to engage in 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
argument one – the intrinsic value of knowledge the claim scientific inquiry is justified by the intrinsic value of the knowledge it produces but... this assumes that the value of knowledge trumps other moral value 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
argument two – the gunmaker’s defence the claim a scientist is not responsible for malevolent uses of her research but... wrongs for which we are not responsible can still be relevant to the ethical assessment of our conduct 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
argument three – “it’s futile” the claim individual scientists/policymakers can’t significantly affect the rate of scientific progress but... a small delay might enable better regulation and... small initial changes may have large knock-on effects 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
argument four – uncertainty the claim we can’t predict the future, so any principle which requires us to do so is unworkable but... it may well be possible to identify predictors of malevolent use – we haven’t even tried 1st concern2nd concern unifying the concerns scientific isolationism
conclusions the two concerns – about malevolent use and about undermining moral status – can be understood as variants of a moral general concern about bringing about wrongdoing the most popular way of dissolving this concern – scientific isolationism – fails
Challenges for regulators minimise the risk of malevolent use of synthetic biology for scientists get better at predicting how research will be used for philosophers ascertain the criteria for moral status determine how to weigh risk of future wrongdoing against benefits of pursuing research in synthetic biology and analyse arguments for and against synthetic biology
Way Forward • Good science – risks and benefits • Minimise existential risks - restriction of knowledge, raw materials, etc • Comprehensive evaluation of abilities, phenomenology, etc of new life forms • Appropriate ascription of moral status • Equal respect – to treat like cases alike, unless there is a relevant moral difference
acknowledgements Dominic Wilkinson, Michael Selgelid The Wellcome Trust, Christ Church College