Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach

1. Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach Aileen Cruz IR 720 Fall 2004

2. Summary Three Standard Explanations for the Proliferation of Weaponry: Superpower Manipulation Militarization in World is a consequence of major power decisions & geopolitical concerns National Security Weapons are the result of national strategic choice, Based on national objectives, perceived threats, and strategic doctrine within the constraints of technology and costs Factional Interests Reflection of competing internal interests Military is the primary group with most direct interest in weapons purchases Obligatory Action: Fundamentally shaped by social structure surrounding the behavior Actors are constituted by the social system with rules that both construct the system and charter their actions

3. Q1. Is a nation-state sovereignty defined by its military and the acquisition of weapons? �Norms�do not directly cause the acquisition of a particular weapon. Nation-states do not buy particular weapons exclusively to enhance their prestige. Rather, the creation of a military and the acquisition of the basic "tools of the trade" both confer and confirm the central cultural construct of "statehood" within the modern world system. The more a nation interacts with this larger cultural environment, the more it tends to assert and authenticate its sovereign status with the ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 15.

4. �National security - in the sense that possession of a domestic arms-making capability is thought to provide a degree of political independence and status in a world dominated by a handful of major military-industrial powers.� Klare, Michael. The Unnoticed Arms Trade: Exports of Conventional Arms-Making Technology. International Security, vol.8 no.2 (autumn 1983), 68-90: 81.

5. Q2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons shaped by institutionalized norms? ��weapons spread not because of a match between their technical capabilities and national security needs but because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry. Weapons have proliferated because of the socially constructed meanings that have become associated with them. Highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence. Thus the spread of weapons is a process both driven and shaped by institutionalized normative structures linking militaries and their advanced weapons with sovereign status as a nation, with modernization, and with social legitimacy.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 4.

6. �Military alliances such as NATO have long embraced international arms collaboration in an effort to enhance intra-alliance combat efficiency and effectiveness by eliminating wasteful duplication in arm production wile promoting battlefield rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI). In addition, many governments have pursued collaborative arms activities as a means by which to foster other types of international cooperation; the EU, for example has explicitly promoted intra-European arms collaboration as part of its quest for a common foreign and security policy.� Bitzinger, Richard. The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge, International Security vol.9 no.2 (Autumn 1994), 170-198: 174

7. Q3. Is the determination of the acquisition due to international cooperation? �From an institutional perspective, once a social object (say, a supersonic aircraft) is established as central to normative definitions of statehood (that is, once "being a nation" means, among other things, "having a high-tech military"), the critical variable in the determination of acquisition of these objects is not the nation-state's functional requirement for the object but the degree of connection of the nation-state to the world system. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 6.

8. �The same state is, in effect, many different actors in world politics, and different states behave differently toward other states based on the identities of each�.different patterns of behavior across groups of states with different identities and interests.� Hopf, Ted. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security, vol. 23 no. 1 (Summer 1998), 171-200: 193. Q3. Is the determination of the acquisition due to international cooperation?

9. Q4. Is the acquisition of conventional weapons embedded in the norms of the international system? In order to understand the "unprecedented proliferation of [high-tech aircraft] in the post-World War II period," �one must understand the cultural system that gives [it] their unique meaning for nation-states. A nation-state "acquires" a [high-tech aircraft] because it is embedded in a normative system that gives the [it] meaning. Thus�the proliferation of conventional weapons is profoundly shaped by an essentially "ritualistic" (in the sense of ritual as encapsulating meaning, not in the more common usage of habitual action devoid of meaning) belief in militaries and modern weaponry as distinguishing emblems of the modern nation-state. It follows that, if procurement results from immersion in such a normative system, then the pace of procurement should vary with the extent of the immersion.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 6.

10. �Economic realities � such as falling defense budgets and the growing need to share the costs and risks of developing and manufacturing new generations of weapons systems, as well as preserving jobs and gaining access to overseas arms markets � are increasingly driving the globalization process. As military spending around the world declines and defense industries face major contradictions in their national arms markets, [globalization of arms] has become a critical corporate and government strategy for ensuring the preservation and economic viability of national defense industrial bases.� Bitzinger, Richard. The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge, International Security vol.9 no.2 (Autumn 1994), 170-198: 171.

11. Q5. Are weapons symbolically significant? Devising a means for systematically assessing the symbolic significance of weaponry remains an important task. The level of technological sophistication involved in a weapon system is clearly one variable that contributes to symbolic value. But the visibility of a weapon may also have much to do with its symbolic value. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 12.

12. Q5. Are weapons symbolically significant? World Military Spending 2002: increased 6.5% 2003: increased 11% ($956 billion) Reason: US increased military spending Encouraging other countries to follow suit The combined military spending of these countries was slightly higher than the aggregate foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10x higher than their combined levels of official development assistance in 2001.

13. Q5. Are weapons symbolically significant?

14. Q6. Is international membership significant to conventional weapons? �Indeed, it appears that international organizational membership is significantly related not merely to those weapons that were seen as highly symbolically significant (supersonic aircraft) but also to positivweapons that were seen as of lesser symbolic significance (armored personnel carriers). That is, at least for newly independent states, possession of any of the trappings of a modern military may be of symbolic significance.�Institutional arguments point out that functional requirements are responded to in socially structured ways: modern militaries are seen as the appropriate response to war (rather than other possible responses, including target hardening, civilian- or reserve-based defense, or prayer) because of the highly institutionalized linkage between the nation-state and the military.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 12.

15. Q6. Is international membership significant to conventional weapons? Collaborative programs with the US: Taiwan South Korea Philippines Turkey Israel Brazil Argentina

16. Q1. Is a nation-state sovereignty defined by its military and the acquisition of weapons? �Norms�do not directly cause the acquisition of a particular weapon. Nation-states do not buy particular weapons exclusively to enhance their prestige. Rather, the creation of a military and the acquisition of the basic "tools of the trade" both confer and confirm the central cultural construct of "statehood" within the modern world system. The more a nation interacts with this larger cultural environment, the more it tends to assert and authenticate its sovereign status with the ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 15.

17. Q1. Is a nation-state sovereignty defined by its military and the acquisition of weapons? �Realists do not expect all states to have identical domestic structures. Rather, they expect functional similarity among the great powers but also different internal structures and external behaviors based on such things as geographic position and level of military technology. Thus, realists would not expect� any state that is not consistently a central player in global politics, to be as militarily effective as, or have similar domestic structures as, states that are central players.� Desch, Michael. Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, vol.23 no.1 (Summer 1998), 141-170:159

18. Q2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons shaped by institutionalized norms? ��weapons spread not because of a match between their technical capabilities and national security needs but because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry. Weapons have proliferated because of the socially constructed meanings that have become associated with them. Highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence. Thus the spread of weapons is a process both driven and shaped by institutionalized normative structures linking militaries and their advanced weapons with sovereign status as a nation, with modernization, and with social legitimacy.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 4.

19. Q2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons shaped by institutionalized norms?

20. Q3. Is the determination of the acquisition due to international cooperation? �From an institutional perspective, once a social object (say, a supersonic aircraft) is established as central to normative definitions of statehood (that is, once "being a nation" means, among other things, "having a high-tech military"), the critical variable in the determination of acquisition of these objects is not the nation-state's functional requirement for the object but the degree of connection of the nation-state to the world system. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 6.

21. Q3. Is the determination of the acquisition due to international cooperation? Germany and Japan: Pacifistic State ��[They] have developed beliefs and values that make them reluctant to resort to the use of force.� There are compelling international structural explanations for this change in German and Japanese political cultures: specifically, their defeat in World War II, Allied occupation and the protective umbrella of the US security guarantee.� Desch, Michael. Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, vol.23 no.1 (Summer 1998), 141-170:159

22. Q4. Is the acquisition of conventional weapons embedded in the norms of the international system? In order to understand the "unprecedented proliferation of [high-tech aircraft] in the post-World War II period," �one must understand the cultural system that gives [it] their unique meaning for nation-states. A nation-state "acquires" a [high-tech aircraft] because it is embedded in a normative system that gives the [it] meaning. Thus�the proliferation of conventional weapons is profoundly shaped by an essentially "ritualistic" (in the sense of ritual as encapsulating meaning, not in the more common usage of habitual action devoid of meaning) belief in militaries and modern weaponry as distinguishing emblems of the modern nation-state. It follows that, if procurement results from immersion in such a normative system, then the pace of procurement should vary with the extent of the immersion.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 6.

23. Q4. Is the acquisition of conventional weapons embedded in the norms of the international system? �Disarmament and development are two of the international community�s most important tools for building a world free from want and fear. By controlling or reducing the implements of armed violence and armed conflict, disarmament�can facilitate a decrease in military expenditure, defuse tensions and encourage trust�relations, improving stability and freeing resources for other activities such as economic and social development. At the same time, [generate] opportunities for people [so as to] eradicate proverty, promote economic growth and stabilize economies and States.�

24. Devising a means for systematically assessing the symbolic significance of weaponry remains an important task. The level of technological sophistication involved in a weapon system is clearly one variable that contributes to symbolic value. But the visibility of a weapon may also have much to do with its symbolic value. Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 12.

26. Q6. Is international membership significant to conventional weapons? �Indeed, it appears that international organizational membership is significantly related not merely to those weapons that were seen as highly symbolically significant (supersonic aircraft) but also to positivweapons that were seen as of lesser symbolic significance (armored personnel carriers). That is, at least for newly independent states, possession of any of the trappings of a modern military may be of symbolic significance.�Institutional arguments point out that functional requirements are responded to in socially structured ways: modern militaries are seen as the appropriate response to war (rather than other possible responses, including target hardening, civilian- or reserve-based defense, or prayer) because of the highly institutionalized linkage between the nation-state and the military.� Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996: 12.

27. Q6. Is international membership significant to conventional weapons? Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention) Zdzislaw Lachowski: �The regulation of excessively injurious conventional weapons or those that have an indiscriminate effect has gained prominence as concern has grown in the international community about the suffering of civilians and combatants�

28. Q6. Is international membership significant to conventional weapons? The 2001 Second Review Conference of the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention extended the application of the convention to domestic armed conflicts and expressed support for additional work on other issues of humanitarian concern General Trend: a focus by the international community on regional & domestic sources of conflict & relevant arms control measures

29. Thank You!

30. In the post-Cold War period 1990-2001: 57 different major armed conflicts in 45 different locations All but 3 of the major armed conflicts registered for 1990�2001 were internal�the issue concerned control over the government or territory of one state Iraq versus Kuwait India versus Pakistan and Eritrea versus Ethiopia 2001: Africa continued to be the region with the greatest number of conflicts.

31. Emergence of relatively sophisticate Third World arms industries: Israel Signapore South Africa South Korea Taiwan Third World arms exporters: Israel Brazil Bitzinger, Richard. The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge, International Security vol.9 no.2 (Autumn 1994), 170-198: 171.

32. Brazilian Air Force Minister Joelmir Campos de Araripe Macedo: �The time has come to free ourselves from the United States and countries of Europe. It is a condition of security that each nation manufacture its own armaments.� Hopf, Ted. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security, vol. 23 no. 1 (Summer 1998), 171-200: 193.

33. Supporting Theory: Neoliberalism �International institutions, whether in the form of regimes, laws, treaties, or organizations, help provide the necessary conditions for cooperation. By having rules about what constitutes a violation of a relationship, institutions help increase the confidence of each state that it will not be exploited and that its own cooperative move will be reciprocated.� Hopf, Ted. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. International Security, vol. 23 no. 1 (Summer 1998), 171-200: 189.

34. Q2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons shaped by institutionalized norms? Kenneth Waltz: �States are not forced to adopt any particular pattern of behavior by the international structure. Rather, observing that other states that conform their behavior to the structure of the international system do better in competition with other states, states will gradually learn to so as well.� Desch, Michael. Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, vol.23 no.1 (Summer 1998), 141-170:167