6. ARGUMENTS

1. 6. ARGUMENTS Argumentative reasoning (or argumentation, or simply arguments) is an inference whose very premises and/or whose very inferential process is subject to criticism. For this reason the conclusion of an argumentative reasoning is not necessary, but open to rational discussion. • More specifically, we may have: • rigorously developed reasonings that move from questionable or controversial premises: these are deductive arguments; • non-deductive reasonings that move from either true or controversial premises by inferential processes that are themselves questionable or controversial: these are quasi-deductive, a priori, a posteriori, structural and pragmatic arguments.

2. ARGUMENTS Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises

3. Pseudo-identity ARGUMENTS Incompatibility Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Pseudo-contradiction Retaliation Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Dilemma Autophagia Pseudo-transitivity The whole and the part Ad humanitatem Compensation

4. Essence ARGUMENTS Direction Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Propagation Overcoming Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Rule of justice A fortiori A priori appealing to the reality behind experience Complementarity Reduction to superior Etymology Ease

5. ARGUMENTS Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Induction(s) Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Causal arguments A contrario A priori appealing to the reality behind experience Ad consequentiam Waste A posteriori appealing to the reality beyond experience Superfluous Consolidation

6. Structural appealing to comparisonsand resemblances ARGUMENTS Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Analogy Comparison Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Double hierarchy A priori appealing to the reality behind experience A posteriori appealing to the reality beyond experience

7. Structural appealing to comparisonsand resemblances ARGUMENTS Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Pragmatic appealing to the consequences of what is stated Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Ad hominem Exemplar A priori appealing to the reality behind experience Example Illustration Authority A posteriori appealing to the reality beyond experience Sacrifice Ridiculous

8. 1. DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS All demonstrative reasonings can be classified as arguments, if their premises are not unquestionably true. Accordingly, all Aristotelian-mediaeval inferential processes (immediate inferences, mediate inferences (syllogisms), reductio ad absurdum, etc.), just as Fregean inferences, can be applied further than the demonstrative context, that is, in the argumentative one. Since in both instances – demonstrative and argumentative cases – the inferences are necessary, the difference lies in the premises. Premises are non susceptible of mathematical proof, but can be discussed in a deductive argument.

9. ARGUMENTS Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises

10. 2. PSEUDO-DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS Pseudo-deductive arguments are similar, in their structure, to deductive ones: - they appeal to the principles of logic (such as the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle) - they make use of connectives very similar to those of logic (“and”, “or”, “if… then…”, “if and only if…”, etc.) But their use of such principles and connectives is not as rigorous as it is in logic, nor does it apply to all the steps of the inferential process. Therefore, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the inference is not necessary.

11. Pseudo-identity ARGUMENTS Incompatibility Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Pseudo-contradiction Retaliation Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Dilemma Autophagia Pseudo-transitivity The whole and the part Ad humanitatem Compensation

12. 2a. Pseudo-identity This argument introduces a definition and develops an argument aimed at linking what is to be defined (definiendum) with what defines (definiens), as if they were one and the same thing. Such an identity between the definiens and the definiendum, however, is not totally questionable. EXAMPLEHuman beings are rational animals: wherever there is the mark of rationality, there (and only there) is it possible to establish the mark of humanity.

13. It is a pseudo-identity, for not all humans are rational (such as mentally ill ones, or new-born babies). By contrast, proper identity principle would always apply, allowing for the switch of the two terms of the identity (e.g., “all not-married men are bachelors”).

14. 2b. Incompatibility Incompatibility is an argument that induces to think that, given two statements, we must either choose one of them or reject them both. In other words, an inclusive alternative (A vel non-A) is presented as exclusive (A aut non-A), and the law of the excluded middle is applied. EXAMPLEYou have always declared to be progressive, but then you oppose any reform proposal we advance.

15. It is not always true that advancing a proposal is enough to be progressive, for what is proposed may restore the status quo or worsen the situation. This argument may be contrasted by saying that the choice is not always among logically incompatible propositions. It may not be possible, nor necessary, to appeal to the law of the excluded middle: the alternative may be inclusive and not exclusive.

16. 2c. Pseudo-contradiction We face a pseudo-contradiction when we allege that our opponent’s thesis violates the law of non-contradiction, even though such a contradiction is far from certain. EXAMPLEYou say you do not know this woman, but we found your phone number in her personal address book. Clearly, it is perfectly possible that B includes A’s address and phone number in her address book, without A knowing B necessarily.

17. 2d. Retaliation This argument shows that sometimes he who claims respect for a rule is the one who violates it, or does not apply it properly. By highlighting the inconsistency of such a behaviour, that upholds a rule and at the same time breaks it, we weaken our opponent’s position by reversing his own claim against him.

18. EXAMPLEIn a French theatre at the time of the Nazi occupation, the audience sings the national anthem. A policeman breaks on the stage shouting that it is forbidden to represent what is not in the programme. Someone from the audience then asks: “Are you in the programme?” Addressing directly the interlocutor, this argument closely resembles ad personam arguments (which are para-arguments, as we shall see). In our example, the policeman might retort that ordaining something is not the same thing as producing something on stage. But this, someone might remark, holds for singing the French national anthem as well.

19. 2e. Dilemma This is a variant of the incompatibility argument: it shows that the opponent, by upholding his position, faces two consequences, both of which are not acceptable. Hence, his own position is to be rejected. EXAMPLEJohn is Paul’s teacher of argumentation theory. They agreed that Paul would pay John’s lectures as soon as he won his first dispute. John never got his money, so took legal action against Paul.

20. Here’s the structure of the argument (dilemma): - one major premise (M) in which the alternative (A1aut A2) is stated - two minor premises (m1, m2) that follow from A1 and A2: “from A1 follows C” (m1), “from A2 follows C” (m2) - a conclusion (C), that necessarily follows from the conjunction of M both with m1 and with m2

21. Here’s John’s dilemma argument, advanced in order to show that Paul must pay him: M Paul either wins or looses the case m1 if Paul wins the case, he must pay me (because of our agreement) m2 if Paul looses the case, he must pay me (because the judge says so) C whatever happens, Paul must pay me And here’s Paul opposite dilemma: M I either win or loose the case m1 if I win the case, I do not have to pay John (because the judge says so) m2 if I loose the case, I do not have to pay John (because of our agreement) C whatever happens, I do not have to pay John

22. This reasoning is argumentative, and therefore we can question it. In order to counteract it, we may follow two strategies: • follow a middle way, in between the two horns of the dilemma: that is, show that the alternative stated in M is false, or that the alternative is not exclusive (aut… aut…) but inclusive (vel… vel…), or else show that there are more alternatives, and therefore the choice is not so radical • show that either m1 or m2 (or both of them) is not correct

23. Let us follow the first strategy: Assume that the first case against Paul is, indeed, his teacher’s. If this is true, than Paul has not broken any agreement: he did not pay John because there was no case. Therefore, there is no reason for a clash. In both John’s and Paul’s dilemmas m1 and m2 are not based on any fact.

24. Let us follow the second strategy: Assume that Paul actually fought a case and won it, without paying John. Hence, John brought him to court. On the one hand, John is right to pursue Paul, but he did so in the wrong way: for, his m1 is false (it refers to this very case, the one sued by John, whereas the agreement referred to the first one). On the other hand, however, Paul’s m2 is false either, and for the very same reason.

25. 2f. Autophagia This argument, too, is a variant of the incompatibility argument: by applying a rule without exceptions, we end up destroying it because its consequences contradict it. EXAMPLE (from Aristotle)He who denies the principle of non-contradiction, if he wishes to be understood, must speak without contradicting himself. In so doing, however, he is forced to admit the validity of the principle of non-contradiction.

26. In this example, denying something (the principle of non-contradiction) equals to affirming it. Other examples of autophagia include are expressions such as: “It is forbidden to forbid” “Be spontaneous” in which what is asked contradicts what the very statement requires. We might counteract this argument by considering the field of applicability of the rule and examining the relationship between language and metalanguage.

27. 2g. Pseudo-transitivity It has the same structure as the transitivity argument: “If A relates to B and B relates to C, A relates to C” In this case, however, the transitivity is only supposed, but not justified. Its applicability should be assessed and argued for: in fact, if A relates to B and B relates to C, we cannot always conclude that A and C relate to one another.

28. EXAMPLESHenry is John’s father; John is Peter’s father. The friends of my friends are my friends. If Jane is Leslie’s friend, and Joseph is Leslie’s friend, too, this does not mean that Jane and Joseph are friends. Of course, friendship can be broadly, or metaphorically understood (facebook style), but then we might question its definition, that is, the definition of the property (“to be friend of”) upon which the pseudo-transitivity is based.

29. 2h. The whole and the part This argument appeals to inclusion: what holds for a whole set of things must hold for a part of it as well. EXAMPLESince man belongs to nature, he cannot destroy it, because he would act against himself. The relationship of inclusion here taken for granted is true within the natural sciences (where man is classified as an animal, a vertebrate, a mammal, etc.), but has no factual counterpart if man is understood as a “political animal” (Aristotle). In fact, man makes use and destroys nature because he does not regard himself as a part of nature but, rather, sees nature as something which is subdued to him.

30. 2i. Ad humanitatem This argument refers to a sort of “universal audience” by appealing to the universal quantifier (“every…”, “each…”, “no…”) EXAMPLEEach man aims at happiness: however differently felt, understood or defined, happiness is the aim of human action. The (alleged) general tendency here described is, in fact, only apparently universal: for, by admitting various conceptions of happiness, we risk affirming any sort of thing (such as, for instance, that suicide is a kind of happiness). We may counteract this argument by assessing the actual applicability of the universal quantifier and the meaning of the terms employed.

31. 2j. Compensation This argument is grounded upon a balance – a balance that is, once again, taken for granted: it is not derived from experience, and its necessity would require a proof. We generalize the assumption that, by adding equal things to equal things, we get equal things: given an equation between two quantities, a and b, in order to keep the equation between them, whenever we add (or subtract) x from any of them, we must add (or subtract) the same quantity x from the other as well.

32. EXAMPLEAccording to Montesquieu (1689-1755), a parliamentary system must have two chambers: the institution of a High Chamber is justified by the necessity to compensate the smaller number of people who are superior by birth, richness and honours (The Spirit of Laws, 1748). The balance, in this case, is that of the conservation of the differences between nobles and plebeians. We might object that, in so doing, we would make the innovation introduced by the parliamentary system pointless – but, in fact, Montesquieu’s aim is to keep a balance, not to introduce novelties. Generally speaking, we answer this argument by verifying the validity or legitimacy of the balance that is taken for granted.

33. 3. A PRIORI ARGUMENTS A priori arguments refer to the very structure of reality – as it really is, or as it is thought to be. From this, they derive hierarchies, value judgements and universally valid postulates. What is at stake is the very “structure of reality”, which different interlocutors understand differently and describe differently. In a sense, this kind of arguments portray a speaker’s worldview, or metaphysics. In a priori arguments the structure of reality is described without appealing to experience: generally speaking, they refer to an order (structure) lying behind experience, or that existed before it (a priori).

34. Essence ARGUMENTS Direction Deductive logical inferences with questionable premises Propagation Overcoming Pseudo-deductive appealing to principles and operators that are only prima facie logical Rule of justice A fortiori A priori appealing to the reality behind experience Complementarity Reduction to superior Etymology Ease

35. 3a. Essence This kind of arguments appeal to something that intrinsically belongs, or pertains, to an object – man, a given historical period, a people, an economic or political system, and so on. A sort of persistent and essential “substrate” becomes a stable feature of the subject of the statement. EXAMPLEMan can change latitude, historical period, customs and religion, but as far as he relates to other fellow men, he will always be a wolf (Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679: homo homini lupus = man is a wolf to man)

36. The argument holds if we admit that something has an essence, and if that essence can be known – in this case, man’s “wolfness”. The argument is questionable because it is based on the individuation of an essence that is the very issue of philosophical discussion. Any appeal to terms such as “abuse” or “misuse” refers to this kind of argument. For example: “We should not plead the misuse of corrective methods to criticize their use”. Normal use complies with the essence, which prevents the possibility of any modification, given the “stable” nature of essence. Analogously, appeals to “lack”, “deformation”, “alteration”, etc. refer to the very same argument: there is a stable essence and anything that moves away from it depends on the limits of its realizability.

37. 3b. Direction This argument is similar to the previous one (Essence). It requires to carefully assess whether the accumulation of a set of partial compromises does not involve the risk of loosing sight of the main target. As a consequence, it highlights the importance of keeping that target firm and the necessity to judge the weight of changes in function of that very target.

38. EXAMPLEYesterday the unions allowed for the repeal of the cost of living index; today, they accept to set the increases of wages according to the scheduled inflation; tomorrow they will be ready to adopt a total liberalization of wages. In so doing, they deprive labour unions from their very responsibilities. It is an argument that is very often used in many sort of dealings, as opposed to the argument by overcoming (which we shall see in a minute). We might counteract this argument by asking whether the state of affairs allows for the achievement of the main target, or there is the need to revise it, or even to change it altogether.

39. 3c. Propagation This argument is a variant of the direction argument. Propagation warns the audience about the evolution of some phenomena that, by their own functioning, tend to spread – and this is taken to be a negative fact. EXAMPLEIf we grant Italian citizenship to foreigners who have been living in our country for at least ten years today, we establish the premises for foreigners to be more numerous – and therefore weight more – than Italians in the future.

40. The convincing power of this argument grows from forcing the propagation mechanism, highlighting the effects deriving from the initial choice. This argument is often false: in our case, for the percentage of Italian citizens born outside Italy to be significant, their number should be far higher than the actual one, and the day in which this may happen is definitely not tomorrow. Whereas it is sensible to argue that the number of naturalized citizens is growing, it is a fallacy (the fallacy of appealing to negative consequences – which we shall see later on) to argue that they will be more numerous than the Italian citizens actually born in Italy. The argument is usually counteracted by analyzing the import of the stated propagation mechanism.

41. 3d. Overcoming Contrary to the direction argument, it argues for the possibility of always continuing with a process, accepting stops and compromises that may turn out to be functional to the achievement of our aim. EXAMPLEAt first sight, this armistice may be seen as a concession to our enemy. In fact, in so doing, we have at our disposal a period of cease-fire and truce that would allow us to prepare a new offensive, from which we will eventually win the war.

42. With this argument we postpone the assessment of the on-going process, since every act is but the starting point of the next one. The final aim becomes more or less absolute: in view of it, the present is diminished and, if negative, reduced to a sad and unpleasant stage – but a necessary stage nonetheless. We counteract this argument by considering all possible scenarios, both positive and negative, outlined by the deliberated action, which is taken to be happily overcome.

43. 3e. Rule of justice With this argument we appeal to a rule generally regarded as valid: in particular, we argue that what holds in one case, has to be applied in all similar instances as well. EXAMPLEIf I do you a favour by keeping the office open beyond the scheduled opening hour, I will have to do the same for all other customers as well. This often-used argument is counteracted by remarking that the firm application of a rule is not always and not necessarily an act of justice (the Latins said: summum ius, summa iniuria). If the person that asks for a dispensation has been queuing for hours and he/she is the last in the line, he/she deserves the clerk’s sympathy and understanding.

44. 3f. A fortiori This argument is often appealed to in order to show that some particular cases belong to a set of hierarchically ordered elements (generalization), and that, a fortiori (= all the more so), the very same properties characterizing the entire set hold for them as well. EXAMPLESIf a distant relative takes care of you, a fortiori your brother should take care of you, too. “If God so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall He not much more clothe you, Oh ye of little faith?” (Matthew 6, 30).

45. In the second example, the generalized set is formed by God’s creatures. Within this set a hierarchy is assumed, in which man is granted a higher level than plants. Therefore, if God cares for the grass of the field, a fortiori he will take care of man, who hierarchically superior. We might question this very hierarchy: from the point of view of age, for instance, an oak is superior to any man. Generally speaking, in order for this argument to be valid, we should verify that the feature (or property) ascribed to the entire set is also relevant in a particular instance, and that the hierarchy is to be ascribed to that very feature, and not to some other one.

46. 3g. Complementarity Whenever we state something, we might accompany such a statement with a negation that plays the role of complementary notion. For, each term requires its opposite in order to be determined. This turns out to be an argument by complementarity. EXAMPLEEvery true faith grows out of doubt.

47. Faith assumes doubt, just as knowledge presupposes ignorance – but in a dynamic perspective: faith is not gained once and for all, nor such a gain is without effort. We may object that complementarity is not contradictory only if the temporal distance between faith and doubt is taken into consideration. In general, such an argument is counteracted by circumscribing the field of definition of both the stated element and its complement, highlighting their differences.

48. 3h. Reduction to superior “Each thing ordered to another is of a lesser value than that to which it is ordered” (Augustine, The Teacher, 9, 27). This principle defines a general rule: whenever a system is reducible to another one, and if this does not happen reciprocally, the one to which something is reduced is on a higher level than what gets reduced to it. EXAMPLENatural language can express the contents of any artificial language, whereas no artificial language is so powerful as to play all the functions of natural language. As a consequence, natural language is the most important system of signs available to man.

49. This example portrays natural language as superior to other languages, on the grounds that any statements expressed in a conventional language – with mathematical symbols, for instance – can be expressed with the words of natural language as well. But it is also true that – as to precision – the language of mathematics is superior to natural language. We may counteract this argument by specifying what is to be understood by “superior”, from what point of view something is supposed to be so, and verifying the applicability of such superiority, so defined.

50. 3i. Etymology The etymological argument has been widely deployed throughout the history of (modern and contemporary) philosophy, with reference to the studies of language. It consists in enhancing a given thesis by appealing to the etymology of the term that characterizes the meaning of the concept expressed by that term. EXAMPLE“From the beginnings to the age of Plato the word techne accompanies the word episteme. Both refer to knowledge in the widest sense of the word. They mean ‘to know something of’, ‘to be expert of’. Knowing opens up new horizons – it is disclosure. Technique is a way of disclosing. Technique displays its being in the same sphere in which disclosure takes place, the same sphere in which truth (aletheia) takes place” (Martin Heidegger).