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The reform of long term sickness absence. an international approach to getting people back to work. Welfare to Work Convention 2011, Manchester, 1 July 2011 Hans Ouwehand, Director Calder Holding. The Netherlands pre 1990. Passive system: Generous benefits /no incentives for employers
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The reform of long term sickness absence an international approach to getting people back to work Welfare to Work Convention 2011, Manchester, 1 July 2011 Hans Ouwehand, Director Calder Holding
The Netherlands pre 1990 • Passive system: Generous benefits /no incentives for employers • Prediction that disability benefits recipients would rise to 1 million, out of a population of 16 million. Prime Minister Lubbers 1990: “the Netherlands are ill” • Employers and unions (ab)used disability legislation to enable restructures • In times of high unemployment, people with disabilities but capable of work given full disability benefits. Unemployment risk in disability regime.
Reconstruction of disability legislation • 1994 TZ/Arbo: Employers and employees responsible for health and safety policies. • 1996 Wublz: Employer assumes risk – 1 year sick pay at full salary • 1998 Pemba: Differentiation of insurance premiums based on risk • 2002 Gatekeeper legislation: Flow chart • 2003 VLZ: Employer responsibility extended to 2 years • 2004 Herbo: Re-assesssment of 450,000 disability benefit recipients • 2006 WIA: New legislation for disability
Changes • Big incentive for employers • Private Insurance companies get involved • Creation of private Occupational Health and Welfare to Work market • Occupational Health specialists and GPs brought together to agree shared standards • Moreover:mind shift in society
Forecasts Unchanged policy IWA Disability benefits costs € ,000 Year
Results • 2010: WAO/WIA 580,000 instead of predicted 800,000 or the dreaded 1 million • 2009: 65% of partialy able are sustainable at work • Gatekeeper law: on-flow fell from 100,000 to 58,000 in the years 2002-2004 (53,000 new claims and 5,000 re-opened cases) (-42%). • Extending occupational sick pay from one to two years: 25-35% reduction, i.e. 13,000 fewer claimants. • Stricter disability assessments: 12% reduction, i.e. 5,000 fewer claimants. • Together, these reforms saw a 61% reduction in benefits payments • The WIA itself led to 7,000 less benefits Surgery Succeeded, or did a few patients die along the way???
Down side • Complex system with many exceptions and fragmented interventions. • Increase of Young Disabled and disabled without an employer. • Those who are incapacitated by less than 35% ineligible for disability benefits - disability risk transfered to unemployment regime (reverse of the 80’s, same as in Germany). • Too much emphasis on retaining your current job. Decrease of mobility. “Employer and employee are condemned to each other.”
Solution Not another reconstruction but recognition of the drawbacks: • Attention for young disabled and employees without an employer. • More focus on mobility to other employers/sectors. • Integrated and early stage approach to back to work interventions.
The journey to ESA • 300,000 people claiming sickness-related benefits flow onto ESA each year (50% of total) • Majority mental health/musculoskeletal conditions • Low-skill/low paid jobs over-represented • SMEs over-represented • No significant incentive for employer • Minimum liability £81.60 per week x 28 weeks = £2,285 • SMEs don’t know how to support workers back to work – and are worried about privacy and being seen to be harassing workers
The journey to ESA • Attention for young disabled and employees without an employer. • More focus on mobility to other employers/sectors. • Integrated and early stage approach to back to work interventions.
Different starting points • Netherlands: generous, insurance–based system, linked to individual incomes • Insurers play an influential role, politically and socially. • UK: universal entitlement, limited protection • Limited contributions–based support via National Insurance • Few employees covered by voluntary income insurance
Key elements for success • More incentives for employers, employees and insurance companies helps • Employers must play a role in employee lifestyle and health • Bring together all organisations that stand to lose from sickness/disability absence – e.g., defined benefit pension schemes/NHS/health insurers • Culture shift needed – employers, individuals, medical practitioners, government.
Hypothesis 1 The UK and The Netherlands have a different socio-economic context. Being effective and successful in battling long term sickness absence in the UK presupposes a different set of incentives for employers and employees.
Hypothesis 2 Getting other stakeholders than employers on board is key to success.
Hypothesis 3 At the end of the day, the focus has shifted from curative to preventive action. A mindshift needs to be brought about with employers and employees, i.e. society.
Hypothesis 4 What the UK needs is not so much ‘Welfare to Work’ as ‘Welfare through Work’. Nothing keeps a person healthier and happier than work.