Russia and the Post-2012 Climate Regime: Foreign rather than Environmental Policy

1. Russia and the Post-2012 Climate Regime:Foreign rather than Environmental Policy Dr Anna Korppoo The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 24 November 2008

2. Contents • Background • Russian submission for Poznan • Economic argument against post-2012 commitments • Political arguments • Conclusion

3. 1) Background

4. Russia and the Kyoto Deal • Collapse of GHG emissions due to the economic recession in the early-1990s • Kyoto base year 1990 – target to limit emissions to 1990 level  Surplus allowances i.e. ’hot air’ • Kyoto seemed like a good deal for Russia BUT dissappointment when the US withdrew • Kyoto mechanisms seem bureaucratic • Since Kyoto economic situation changed a lot as large revenues from fossil fuel exports – Kyoto money seems insignificant • Russian climate politics so far driven rather by economic gains than environmental concerns

5. Impacts of climate change: not just doom and gloom? • Belief that not only negative – also IPCC predicts some positive impacts in the Russian territory: decreased heating, improving agricultural potential, opening sea routes, new oil and gas reserves uncovering • Also negative impacts already at sight: forest fires, spreading diseases, floods, trouble for forestry industries • Changes in the North may be less relevant as less population • Official line to support the findings of the IPCC • No public pressure and ’climate hype’ – low awareness and the lack of democracy and a civil society • Sceptical views and engineering solutions by Russian scientists

6. 2) Russian submission for Poznan

7. Position for Poznan: Russia is reluctant to commit to binding targets • G8 -50% by 2050 – ’aspirational’, NOT basis for distribution of emitting rights • Collective reduction target of 25-40% from 1990 level by 2020 ’unreasonable’ • Effectiveness and fairness • national conditions and real capabilities of countries • ’Legally binding’ commitments acceptable if: • NOT enforceable and sanctioned • Possible to adjust on the course of implementation • Effective incentives to fulfill • Market approach: may lead to speculation • Grouping of countries need updating • economic and social indicators to guide

8. 3) Economic argument against post-2012 commitments

9. Russian economy and GHG emissions are growing – in tandem? • Emissions 27% below 1990 in 2006 • Emissions grown by some 15% by 2006 since the lowest point in 1998 • GHG growth 2.6% in 2006 – GDP growth 6.7%

10. Economic growth and emissions • Why emissions are growing? • Standard of living improving – power consumption up • Reintroduction of inefficient old capacity • Switch from gas to coal which price is seen as more stabile • Efficiency of economy improved due to modernisation less than expected • Putin’s goal doubling GDP 2000-2010 – cutting emissions could hinder achieving • Illarionov’s original argument during ratification which was disagreed by many, but now more support as emissions are growing • 45% of public do not think that public money should be spent on emission reductions • Stage of development of economies -thinking

11. Criticism of the economic growth argument • Recent GDP growth fuelled by the high oil price – not directly leading to higher emissions • Potential to improve energy efficiency – positive impact on the economy in general • Development towards post-industrialised economy • Recent global economic trends slowing down Russian economic growth? • Russian position could be challenged: not so difficult or costly to reduce emissions – even beneficial for the economy? • Already existing policies which can cut emissions BUT Western scientific views unlikely to be taken seriously in the Russian debate

12. 4) Political arguments

13. Participation of other countries • The Kyoto Protocol is not regarded as effective in Russia due to its small impact on global emissions • Large emitters wanted to join, also developing countries • The role of the US is important, seen as an equal partner for Russia • G8 key actor to encourage Russia to join post-2012 pact - Russia could support views opposing binding targets inside G8 but difficult to break concensus • G8 goal to cut 50% of emissions by 2050 labelled as ’aspirational’ • Envy of the CDM early start compared to JI: Russia been unfairly treated

14. Russia as a Global Player • Prestige of Russia – leadership seeking to regain status as a world power like the Soviet Union – showing muscle and independent decisions for instance with Georgia • Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was a good example – Russia wanted attention and got it • Important that Russian decisions well backed by analysis as bad experiences in the early 1990s when the Soviet structures could not respond international requirements very competent way • Russia’s aim to gain a role as a world power could be a way to encourage Russia to join post-2012 regime

15. 5) Conclusion

16. Conclusion • Post-2012 regime very different for Russia than Kyoto: unlikely to be allocated benefits only • No incentive to join: Reluctant negotiation partner as no public pressure or environmental concern • Likely to expect space to grow emissions, limiting economic growth politically unacceptable • BUT - the Russian economic growth argumentation could be challenged – for instance BAU policies can cut emissions significantly • Unlikely to disagree with the G8 but likely to team up with the other reluctant members of the group - external political pressure important • Focus on Russian role as a world power and modernisation of economy rather than the environment

17. Thank you! Contact: anna.korppoo@upi-fiia.fi