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Afghanistan : Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities

Afghanistan : Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities. University of Kent in Brussels - European Geopolitical Forum October 12, 2011 Emmanuel Dupuy , Political Advisor (POLAD) of french Task Force Lafayette ( Febuary -July 2011).

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Afghanistan : Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities

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  1. Afghanistan : Longer term strategies vs Short term priorities University of Kent in Brussels - EuropeanGeopolitical Forum October 12, 2011 Emmanuel Dupuy, PoliticalAdvisor (POLAD) of french Task Force Lafayette (Febuary-July 2011)

  2. ComprehensiveApproach : a tentative of Definition • In the ambit of complexcrisisrequiring a better coordination of civil and militaryactors, both in an international and local environment, the concept of « comprehensiveapproach » as mergedat the level of international organisations (Nato, EU, UN) as well as states ; • It concerns restauration of security, installation of a good governance and stabilization , and thusthroughout a inter-agency, interministerial or inter-organizationapproach ; • Concept appeared in the end of 2000 : « Global Approach », « comprehensiveapproach» « multidimensionalapproach» or « integratedapproach»; • Comprehensiveapproach(insights vision – eachValley in Afghanistan isdifferent ) vsCentralisedapproach (bureaucratic vision – defined in NATO HQ’s) ? At the end : ComprehensiveApproachisjust about finding a betterinterraction (harmonization, cooperation) betweenvariousactors, wich in a globalized world, are obliged to worktoogether, regardless of thereownindividual agenda

  3. Counter Insurgency (COIN) & Comprehensive Approach : two faces of a Global Strategy • The 4 rules of COIN (cf : in reference to french strategicthinkers, based on their colonial warexperience in Algeria and Indochina (Ltc David Galula, Colonel Roger Trinquier, General Hoggard, Bernard Falle) are particularlyappliable to the Afghan context : • "The First Law: The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent ; • "The Second Law : Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority" ; • "The Third Law : Support from the Population Is Contingent" (…) "The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win” ; • "The Fourth Law : Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential"

  4. Comprehensive Approach in acts “Comprensive Approach” principles (Live amongs the population/Concentration of Might/Fight, Reconstruct and Stabilize/Win Hearts and Minds…)finds its roots in reference to the prophetic essay CounterinsurgencyWarfare: Theory and Practice, written by french colonel David Galulain 1964: • " Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents. • " Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages and towns where the population lives. • " Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. • " Destroy the local insurgent political organizations. • " Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. • " Test these authorities.... Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to active leaders. Organize self-defense units. • " Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. • " Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants."

  5. Organigramme du Pole Stabilite Chargé de mission Energie, Santé & Education Conseiller technique du Gouverneur de Province (à pourvoir)

  6. PROJECTS Province de KAPISA Electrification ligne M-e-R / NIJRAB 5,9 M€ Education : Centre de formation des maîtres à Nijrab M-e-R Justice: mise en relation des systèmes de justice formels et informels (en cours d’étude) Gouv : District Delivery Program (DDP) Tagab (financement français - 1,5 M€) NIJRAB TAGAB Santé : Hôpital de Tagab (en lien avec les CIMIC) Projet filière pomegrenades en vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Electrification vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Projets hydro-agricoles en vallée de Tagab (en cours d’étude) Gouv : District Delivery Program (DDP) Surobi (financement US) Santé : Hôpital de Surobi Zone d’effort Gouvernance & justice District de SUROBI Santé Education Energie Hydro-agriculture Filières horticole

  7. French POLE DE STABILITE (Stabobs) : a concrete exemple of global approach • Gouvernance • Justice • Hydro-agriculture • Valorisation des ressources (pomegrenades) • Energie / Electricité • Santé • Education • Etudes / Conseil • CIMIC (MAE-Mindef) • FCO MAIL • French Investment in Afghanistan : 100 M euros • 16,5 M in Kapisa and in Surobi

  8. From Reconciliation to Transition Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP) • A « Global » IncentiveTowards Transition : Kapisa, Model Province for Reconciliation (designated as so by High Peace Council) : • Now: Key Terrain Districts : Surobi in Second Package (0 to 6 months)/ Performance BasedGovernor’sFund (PBGF) in Kapisa (Third Package Transition - 6 to 12 months) ; • Tomorow: « Afghan Led » operations(Securitywith ANSF/DevelopmentwithGovernor and Sub-governors and Line MinistersRepresentatives) ; • Aftertomorow: FromPost-2014 « Out-Strategies » to 2025 Transformation philosophy. (towards a « DiplomaticSurge ») • A « Bottom up » Process : • Positive and Immediate impacts on Local Security Agenda : • Recconciliationwillbe won in the valleys as well as at the level of the High Peace Council ; • Implement Local and Community Security (throughout ANSF and ALP) in order to allow the return of Intermediary INS , « upsetbrothers » back intotheircommunity. • Development and Stabilization : • Winning « Hearts and Minds » of the population : CIMIC, PRT, STABOBS (Pole de Stabilité) actions as generators of employment; • Promoting Positive action of the Coalition Forces.

  9. Global Challenges • At a National Level : After the death of Ben Laden and assasination of Professor Rabbani, whatStrategy ? What Narrative for R2 processus ? • Whatwillbe the Hidden Agenda of Pakistan (mostly ISI) after Ben Laden’sdeath ? • Atwhatlevel of discussions are wewilling to go with Taleb Leadership (including the top leaders amongstwhich Mollah Omar, Haqqani, Hekmatyar) ? • How can the Govermentovercome the recent accusations of the « Counter-productivity » of the Program (as presented in some local medias) ? • Consider the differences of approach and sincerity of engagmenttowards CF and GIROA between HIG, Taleb and Haqqani system. • At a Provincial Level : Reintegrationis a « Mile Stone » for Governance and thusTransition, taking in account: • Difficult Coordination between Provincial Administration and GIRoA ; • Diversion of financing (reintegration of false INS / new grievances : land grabbing) ; • Political use of the Processus in order to implement local politicians (possiblycorrupted) • Long Time Deadline Procedures (approximately 10 potential INS group leaders, candidates for APRP have been waiting for more than a months); • Local divergences (lack of will in Tagab and AlasayDistricts at the level of sub-provincial Governance)

  10. FromTransition (towards 2014) to Transformation (horizon 2025)… • Transition : an afghan matter (agenda of president Karzai) ? under Pakistan monitoring ? Nato’s business ? or on a true bilateral agenda (JANIB) ? • Announcement by President Karzaï, (21 march and 25 june) of the processus of transfert of authority (security & institutions) is now totally blocked by the on going insecurity in Kabul city • Two main objectifs « non negociable » for France (cf : visite PR in Surobi, 12 july - « Il faut savoir finir une guerre ») : • District of Surobi in tranche 2 (december) completing the 13/14 districts ok Kabul province ; • Province de Kapisa in tranche 3 (but on a global dimension : 7 districts toogether).

  11. Geological break/ Geostrategic Rupturedeclined to the Afghan case • An Afghanistan « fragmented » and « shaped » by it’sgeography and by geopolitics: The pifall of Afghanistan are alsoopportunities for its future…. • endogenefactors(altitude, latitude, longitude) • exogeneactors (close but no so « friendly » neighbours, farawaypartners)

  12. Obama’s and Bush war ? Have we the same ennemies ? • The « nomination » in Bonn of the least reliable candidate but the most compatible with the views of Washington : Hamid Karzai , former executive of californianoilcompany, UNOCAL (2001) : actuality of the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gazoduc • GIROA and power brokers composed of former war lords (Fahim, Khalili, Bismullah Khan, Dostom, Abdullah Abdullah, Mojaddedi, Sayaf, YunusQanani) ; • A Constitution « born in pain », shaped in the sole interest of USA (2004) : eventhoughtitwas a afghano-french co-production ; • The Governance agenda : generalelections(presidential in 2004/2009 ; Legislatives in 2005/2010) considered by the International Community(eventhoughttheirimplicit validation by UNAMA) as not convincing and incompatible with the Rule of Law criteria; • A military and financial « Surge » : « Obama’swar » have becomehours....

  13. « Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? Can we speak of a military victory ? • Almost destroyed in 2004 (except some small areas of taleb resistance in the south - Helmand, Kandahar) the Insurrection reappears in a global scheme in 2006-2007 – and thus tighly linked with regional and local political instability and illegitimacy ; • Sacrality of the COIN concept : Counter-Insurgency & Counter terrorism ; • « Win hearts and minds » ? Is it that the only purpose of ISAF presence ? (tactical, operational and strategic long range planification of NATO in confrontation of possible and prospective confrontation with China ?

  14. « Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? A political failure ? • An artificially re-elected (to elect again ?) President ? • A inefficient GIROA, notably corrupted et playing « double jeu » ? • An International Community voiceless ? • An unexisting unique Europe’s voice in the Afpak agenda ? • Validation of the principle of Interference (Iran, India, Russia, Pakistan) ? • Negation of our Moral and Ethics (Reconciliation at strategic level) ? • The « empty-chair policy» (Pakistan’s ISI « grand strategy » to prevent the former tadjik Northern Alliance military and political chiefs to rearm and eventually defeat again the Talebans in the scenario of post-2014 civil war ? • Our incapacity to anticipate futher than by the end of 2014 (from transition to transformation) ?

  15. « Afghan paradox » : A military victory ? A political failure ? A hidden strategic agenda ? A hidden strategic agenda ? • The Strategic partnership agreement between NATO and Afghanistan submitted to the « traditional » Loya Jirga : expression of a domestic and parlamentary fatigue focused on President’s Karzai legitimacy ? • The role of regional actors in the scenarios of post-conflict management and reconstruction : the rise of a « AfCent Agenda » based on a transregional solidarity (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, SCO, under the leadership of Uzbekistan) ? • Merge of Interculturality and Religion as a factor of mutual comprehension (Organisation of the Islamic Conference, OIC, under the presidency of Kazakhstan) ? • China in the line of sight ! (strategic interest for military expansion throughout Asia, incapacity to prevent proliferation of arms race)….

  16. The risks and opportunitiesof the Privatization of Defence and Security ? • « Civil Surge » vs « Military Surge » in the perspective of the « out / thin out » IFAS strategy in the scope of 2014 ; • Private Miltary & Security Companies (SMP) still massively present and quite active but reluctant to stay on a long range period : « libyan eldorado » ? • Training, mentoring, formation and partnership with ANSF : The objective is to have, by the end of 2014, 460 000 security forces (ANA, ANP, NDS, ALP, ANCOP) ; • DDR (Disarmement, Demobilization, Reintegration) perspectives linked to APRP (Afghan Peace & Reconciliation Program) ; • A « normalised » Afghanistan on a military level (PfP of NATO) and a « stabilised » Afghanistan on diplomatic and strategic criterias (from « AfPak » bureaucratic follow up to « AfCent » awareness) ?

  17. Shona ba Shona todayHopes and Changes tomorow ? • Malgré tout, existe dans ce pays une vocation à la modernité et à l’installation de l’Etat de droit (ce fut vrai dans les années 20, 60-70 et pourquoi pas demain) ? • L’expression de la « rue afghane » est une réalité : manifestation (contre la main tendue aux talebs suite au discours du président Karzai) du 5 mai dernier à l’appel de l’ancien chef du NDS, Amrullah Saleh ; • L’émergence « balbutiante » de partis politiques est une avancée démocratique qui fera des émules (à l’instar de la Coalition nationale « TaghirwaOmide » sous la houlette d’Abdullah Abdullah, Waly Massoud, YounousQanani, HoumayounAssefy) ou encore la coalition en gestation liant l’ancien Vice-président Zia Massoud et Dostom ; • Des candidats sérieux à la succession de Karzai : Dr. Ashraf Ghani (Patron du JANIB, en charge de la transition), Ali Ahmad Jalili, ancien ministre de l’Intérieur, professeur à la NDU… • L’ONU souhaite prendre le relais de l’ISAF : si l’on en croit la « feuille de route » du prochain Haut-représentant de l’ONU (LakdharBrahimi) et ses 35 propositions renforçant les fondamentaux du multilatéralisme (PeaceKeepingand ConflictResolution) ; • Des ANSF (ANP, ANA, NDS et ALP) bien entrainés, suffisamment armés et nombreuses (350 000 pax) offrent le meilleur message possible en faveur de la transition, du Partenariat et in fine de l’afghanisation…

  18. QUESTIONS ?

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