Influence and Power in the EU: the case of Poland and the Eastern Partnership

1. Influence and Power in the EU: the case of Poland and the Eastern Partnership Dr. Nathaniel Copsey Dr. Karolina Pomorska Warsaw, PISM, 4 March 2010

2. Structure • National preferences and influence and why they matter • What factors determine the shape of national preference in the European Union? • What have we learnt about the preferences of the newer Member States? • What have we learnt about the capacity of Poland Member States to exercise influence in the European Union? • About the research project: thanks to ESRC, Polish Government and British Academy

3. National Preferences • Moravcsik’s theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1998) • Capacity to exercise power and influence in the European Union is dependent on the intensity with which a given Member State holds a particular view • Study concentrated overwhelmingly on UK, France and Germany in the 1980s • Need to investigate how useful this is for understanding the EU-27

4. Preferences and Power • Focus on upward form of ‘Europeanization’: expanding area of academic enquiry in recent years, new Member States, unlikely power brokers etc. • Problematic nature of ‘power’; problems of measurement/causality • Thus project examines the capacity of a new Member State to exercise ‘influence’ within the EU • Draws on Lukes’ second dimension of power

5. Synthetic Framework for Old Member States’ National Preferences

6. Capacity to Exercise Power and Influence • Independent variables: population and economic strength • Dependent variables: intensity of policy preference, skill at alliance forming, administrative capacity, persuasive advocacy, receptiveness of other Member States, domestic political strength

7. Fixed Variables Table 1: The Crude Political Power of the Five Largest Member States by Population and GDP • Source: IMF (2008)

8. Dependent Variables

9. To recap: assumptions about Influence • Capacity of states to exercise influence in EU seen as determined by two factors: (1) intensity with which it holds a given preference and is willing to argue for it (Moravcsik); and (2) its capacity to secure a desired outcome (determined by a number of dependent and independent variables) (see Copsey and Pomorska, 2009)

10. Preliminary Findings:National Preferences I • We should be careful in making assumptions about the nature of national preferences based on ‘ideal-type’ models or based on the experiences of old Member States (see Copsey and Haughton, 2009) • Of course, in many instances newer Member States may not have a preference at all – not surprising • Or they may not know what their national preference should be – this is more surprising • Notion of defence of ‘national interest’ without any means of knowing what these national interests truly are • Often lack the reliable data (cost–benefit analyses) that could point towards what a preference should be

11. Preliminary Findings:National Preferences II • Above all, we should not assume that the policy-making process resembles, for example, Dahl’s descriptions of pluralism in the United States • Consultation with interest groups, such as trade unions, lobbyists, or business confederations remains very underdeveloped • In consequence, policy-makers tend to overemphasize ‘catch-all factors’ in explaining why a particular policy has been adopted: i.e. geopolitics, history, security • These factors offer ex post justification for a particular action but do not explain why a state ought to have acted in that in the first place • Thus the notion of national preferences in the EU-27 requires some thorough re-examination and a revised theoretical framework

12. Preliminary Findings:New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in the EU • Most newer Member States do not have, and may never have, the capacity to exercise ‘influence’ in the way that we understood older Member States to have done in the past • Crucially, many newer Member States are not interested in being ‘influential’ let alone ‘powerful’ • Poland is, however, different in this respect

13. Preliminary Findings:New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in the EU • Administrative capacity remains the principal weakness – this is also true of many other older Member States - Demoralization of elite segments of civil service - Weakness of coordination of European policy - Failure to foster productive networks between Poles working in Brussels and Warsaw – and occasional active discouragement! • Problems of ending conditionality: less willingness to undertake annoying reforms; less willingness to learn from best practice in other Member States and adapt it to match local particularities; time for a ‘rest’ mentality

14. Concrete Case Study • Poland’s Influence on the EaP • Alliance-Building • Persuasive Advocacy • Receptiveness of Other Member States • Administrative Capacity/Experience

15. Alliance-Building • Change of Government in 2007 • Choice of Sweden (but cf. Lithuania) • Role of Sweden in guiding the initiative through committees in the Council, especially during the Czech Presidency • Improved relations with France and Germany

16. Persuasive Advocacy • Credibility boost post-2007 • Clearer delineation of competences between PM and President • More measured tone • War in Georgia provides impetus and gives credence to Poland’s overall position on relations with the ex-USSR

17. Receptiveness of Other MS • Election of Sarkozy • But views on finalité politique unchanged • Union for the Mediterranean assuages southern discomfort • Impact of the War on Georgia – senior levels of the Commission bureaucracy mobilized by Barroso and Day

18. Administrative Capacity • Poles remain ‘rough around the edges’ • Improvement needed regarding co-ordination (“playing many pianos at the same time”) • Many proposals prepared for domestic not EU audiences • Above all – ‘them’ in Brussels versus ‘us’ in Warsaw

19. Conclusions: How to be Influential • Learn the value of constructive ambiguity • Bureaucratize and depoliticize the issue where possible • Set concrete but minimalistic targets with a short time frame – logic of small steps

20. Conclusions: Where Next? • What may be needed next: - Revised concepts, frameworks and theories to explain better the notion of national preferences and how they are formed - More robust means of measuring power and influence in the EU; use of Lukes’ third dimension of power - More comparative work on how European policy is made in the newer Member States

21. More information • Copsey and Haughton (2009) ‘The Choices for Europe’. JCMS, Vol. 47, No. 2. • Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘Poland’s Power and influence’. Comparative European Politics, forthcoming July 2010. • Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘The Influence of the Newer Member States in the European Union’. forthcoming Europe-Asia Studies. Contact Nat Copsey, Aston Centre for Europe: n.copsey@aston.ac.uk Karolina Pomorska, Maastricht University: karolina.pomorska@maastrichtuniversity.nl