On the Frontlines

1. On the Frontlines Reaching out to Engage Policing

2. 2015 White Paper on Policing • Welcome the timely release of the White Paper on Policing • The last 20 years have seen a move away from Apartheid-style kragdadigheid in policing  a more collaborative approach to policing, community-driven. • Police Force  Police Service • The overarching policy framework to capture a democratic approach to policing has been absent. This is the gap that the WP seeks to fill • Shifting sands of criminal activity, globalisation and the high incidence of violent crime

3. Under Threat • The current philosophy that informs policing however, is under threat. As our fledgling democracy experiences challenges based on both genuine frustrations related to service delivery as well as more orchestrated efforts to create domestic instability, policing is less willing to be subjected to civilian oversight. (White Paper, 8-9) • From inside – service delivery frustrations • From outside – plans to destabilise the country • Policing less willing to subject itself to civilian oversight • White Paper: • Reaffirm a policing system that is in line with the Constitution and required by a democratic South Africa • Demilitarisation, Community Participation in Safety and Integrated Safety approach

4. How does the response to the threat manifest? • Increased Militarisation • Implementation of an ideology that stresses the use of force and threats of violence to solve problems • Uses military power as a problem-solving tool. (Kaskar) • Weaponry, Language that is used, how the SAPS is organised, how operations are modelled • Increasing use of military to sweep away internal security issues; • Paramilitary elite police units & increasingly “zero tolerance” approach to fighting crime

5. How does the response to the threat manifest? • Increased use of (crime) intelligence-led policing • Punted as a way of moving away from a militarised policing model • Use of intrusive and disruptive surveillance can be equally violent or lead to more targeted forms of violence – harassment of “troublemakers” or worse • Characterising / profiling legitimate protest actions as criminal

6. How does the response to the threat manifest? • Consistent messaging around protests that they prone to violence and therefore need contingency planning for an outbreak of violence. • Breaches of the RGA – unlawful banning, political interference • Preparations for policing of gatherings and protests that anticipate violence or instigate violence • One-size-fits-all definition of “violence” – • Rather: a continuum peaceful disruptive violent (“violent” is reserved for where people are injured or even killed)

8. Our experience on the ground is different • Most protests are NOT violent. (SAPS IRIS) • And yet from IPID’s records….

9. SAPS IRIS information

10. SAPS IRIS information – peaceful vs unrest-related crowd management incidents – 1996 - 2012

11. SAPS IRIS information – service delivery protests Table: Peaceful and unrest-related protests in South Africa per province, 2009–2012. Sources: IRIS-BIS statistics, Ministry of Police, released in response to Media24 Investigations Promotion of Access to Information Act request, and calculations by Murray Hunter T

12. The misdirected narrative of the “violent protest” • “ An essential element of life in a democratic space is the right to protest… • Over the last two decades South Africa has witnessed a steady increase in the rate of public protests – the root causes of which fall outside of the mandate of the police. The police are thus increasingly being called upon to respond to large numbers of protest incidents; many of which turn violent. It is most often during these incidents where police action is subjected to increased levels of scrutiny. The ability of the SAPS to effectively maintain public order thus necessitates a shift in approach to maintaining and restoring public order. Delivering on this mandate will be dependent on the police being properly structured, trained and capacitated….. • “This new approach should nonetheless not detract from the police remaining citizen-centred in its approach to dealing with incidents of public violence. Responsibility to participate in and maintain peaceful protest is a precondition of communities as well.” (White Paper, 13)

13. And so… • BUT… • Exaggerated scale of protests and potential for violence (Min of Police at SAPS POP Conference 31/01/2014) • Service delivery protests become recast as an “upsurge against state authority” (Cmsr of Police addressing Parliament, Sept 2014) • Criminalises legitimate, legal and lawful action • Undermines lawful protests and fundamental human rights to peaceful protest, assembly and expression • Sets up the community as the potential criminals, needing a crime-response where no crime has been committed.

14. Under Siege? • “Justifies” an Increasingly violent response • Complaints of police violence in crowd control situations: 5 (2006)  59 (2009) • Mostly Assault GBH charges • Need for acting in “self-defence” • Culture of impunity – • acquittal of police officers who use lethal force in contravention of standing orders (see AndriesTatane) • Low prosecution levels from complaints to IPID (1 prosecution out of 204 cases)

15. An iron fist, a velvet glove? • “An immediate leadership imperative is to ensure that policing returns to the ideals championed in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and emphasised in the National Development Plan…. • The discourse on demilitarisation is thus about conduct, and about the police service displaying an unwavering commitment to its constitutional mandate as a civilian police embracing a human rights culture” (White Paper).

16. And yet • In September 2014 SAPS sought more than R3bnto double POP personnel nationally, invest in its arsenal of lethal and non-lethal weaponry and beef up intelligence-gathering capacity. • Use of deadly/excessive force is up • 87/204 cases referred to IPID Assault GBH • Paramilitary training and operations • Tactical Response Team (2009 Mpumalanga) • National Intervention Unit • Use of Military in policing

18. Artificial Intelligence • “An intelligence-driven approach forms the backbone of the duty to detect and deter crime. Collated and verified crime information informs, among others, targeted police patrols, local operational planning and efforts to improve and strengthen crime investigation, reduction and prevention. Generating the kind of information needed to better understand the type of crime, violence, threats and vulnerabilities that disparate communities face must be supported by a community-centred approach to policing”. (White Paper 2015)

19. However…. • When applied to the right to freedom of expression and to peaceful protest, • It assumes lawful protests are criminal in nature; • Uninvited surveillance can intimidate protesters exercising their lawful rights; and • Serves to silence voices who are critical of power-holders or in SAPS’s words in “an upsurge against state authority”

20. National Instruction 4 • “make an attempt to gather information pertaining to the proposed gathering” • POP unit information network (and crime intelligence network where appropriate) • Threat Assessment (based on available operational information, incl. past experience with the parties) • Assess likelihood of violence • National Instruction 4: • Vague and overly broad mandate • No requirement of choosing the least invasive method • No guidelines for storing or discarding information • “necessary and proportionate” in line with international human rights law • “pre-policing” and profiling protesters as potential criminals with no evidence of wrongdoing

21. Our Recommendations • Bring an end to police violence against protesters • Strengthen the legal protections for protesters • Develop a path to genuine demilitarisation of policing • Curtail intelligence-led methods in public-order policing • Address the failure of the oversight structures to bring perpetrators of police brutality to justice