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Different Threats, Common Threads: How Plant Security Can Help Sell P2

Different Threats, Common Threads: How Plant Security Can Help Sell P2. National P2 Roundtable April 9, 2003 Louisville, KY. RS Butner Director, ChemAlliance Pacific NW National Laboratory scott.butner@pnl.gov. Overview of Presentation.

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Different Threats, Common Threads: How Plant Security Can Help Sell P2

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  1. Different Threats, Common Threads:How Plant Security Can Help Sell P2 National P2 RoundtableApril 9, 2003Louisville, KY RS ButnerDirector, ChemAlliancePacific NW National Laboratoryscott.butner@pnl.gov

  2. Overview of Presentation • What is ChemAlliance, and what do we have to do with Homeland Security? • Plant Security – why it’s an issue • Policy & Industry responses to the issue • Reducing the risks • inherently safer chemical manufacturing • “green” chemistry • process intensification • References/Further Reading

  3. What is ChemAlliance? • ChemAlliance (www.chemalliance.org) is an EPA-OECA supported Compliance Assistance Center. • Our mission is to help small chemical manufacturers improve their environmental performance • We serve as a clearinghouse for compliance and P2 information • access to tools and training • emphasis on cost-effective compliance strategies • technical assistance programs • trade & professional associations • peer-to-peer mentoring

  4. Chemical Plant SecurityThe Perspective after 09/11/01 “…according to EPA, 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have accidental toxic release ‘worst-case’ scenarios where more than one million people…could be at risk of exposure” Source: US EPA

  5. Chemical Manufacturing Facilities Represent Real Threats for Terror Attacks • Routinely process large quantities of materials that are: • toxic • volatile • flammable • stored under extremes of pressure, temperature • Often close to population centers • Vulnerable to attack • relatively low security • numerous • critical to the economy

  6. Policy Responses to the Threat • GAO recommends a comprehensive chemical security strategy • identify high risk facilities • clarify roles of industry, government • pursue legislation to require industry to assess vulnerability and take corrective action • EPA has specifically addressed chemical and petroleum sectors in its Homeland Security strategic plan • working with industry on voluntary initiatives • working with SBA, others to develop outreach • Including security issues during onsite visits to manufacturing facilities, including targeted visits to high-risk facilities

  7. Industry Responses to Terror Threats • Industry response stresses site security, “voluntary” action • “Site Security Guidelines for U.S. Chemical Industry” issued October 2001 • Joint effort by ACC, SOCMA, and the Chlorine Institute • emphasis on site and operational security via “rings of protection” • Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) and related Prioritization Methodologies • AIChE/CCPS • Sandia National Lab • SOCMA • ACC • Many private companies (BASF, Air Products, G-P)

  8. Different Threats, Common Threads • Short-term responses focus on plant security • Long-term responses are likely to have much in common with P2 strategies • inherently safe chemical processing • “green” chemistry • process intensification • P2 programs can use heightened awareness of security issues to sell P2 • cost-effective strategies for reducing risk • simultaneous progress on parallel objectives

  9. Inherently Safer Chemical Processing • Has it’s roots in process safety discipline, dating back many decades • Underlying principles are common to P2 • use less hazardous materials when possible • reduce inventories of hazardous materials • generate “just in time” • reduce inherent risks of reactions • reactor designs, operating schemes to reduce possibility of “runaway” reactions • reduce severity of processing/storage • (lower pressure, lower temperature)

  10. “Green” Chemistry • Emphasis of green chemistry tends to be on synthesis routes and solvent selection, rather than equipment engineering • biologically-catalyzed reactions • low-toxicity reactants and solvents • aqueous and solvent-less reaction processes • EPA’s approach to green chemistry stresses early assessment and reduction of chemical risks

  11. Process Intensification • Process intensification = “…strateg[ies] for achieving dramatic reductions in the size of the [manufacturing] plant at a given production volume” • specific strategies may include • unit integration (combining functions) • field enhancement (using light, sound, electrical fields, or centrifugal force to alter process physics) • micro-scale technology

  12. Examples of Process Intensification (PI) in Industry • GlaxoSmithKline has demonstrated 99% reduction in inventory and 93% reduction in impurities by using spinning disk reactors • Studies show that process integration on the Bhopal facility could have reduced MIC inventories from 41 tons to < 10 kg. • ICI has demonstrated byproduct reductions of 75% by using integral heat exchange (HEX) reactors • Use of HEX reactors can result in ~100-fold reductions in chemical inventory!

  13. Some Caveats • Process modification is non-trivial for the chemical industry • Some strategies tend to shift risks, rather than reduce them • e.g., reducing inventories may increase transportation • Even if all risk could be eliminated from chemical manufacturing facilities, other targets exist • only 18% of facilities required to report under RMP were chemical manufacturing facilities! • underscores importance of moving towards safer products, not just safer processes • The “risk vs. efficiency” equation has implications for sustainability. • beware of “easy answers!”

  14. Summary • Chemical manufacturing facilities have a heightened awareness of process risks since 9/11 • Many of the strategies for reducing risk are also effective P2 strategies • inherently safer design • process intensification • “green” chemistry and engineering • Demonstrating this linkage may help “sell” P2

  15. References • US EPA, Chemical Accident Risks in US Industry, September 2000 • US General Accounting Office (GAO), Voluntary Initiatives are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness is Unknown. US GAO Report GAO-03-439, March, 2003. • Ragan, P.T., Kilburn, M.E., Roberts, S.H. and N.A. KimmerleChemical Plant Safety - Applying the Tools of the Trade to New RiskChemical Engineering Progress, February 2002, Pg. 62 • Royal Society of Chemistry, Note on Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, 03/16/2000 • Bendixen, Lisa, Integrate EHS for Better Process DesignChemical Engineering Progress, February 2002, Pg. 26 • Stankiewicz, A and J.A. Moulijn, Process Intensification, Ind. Eng. Chem. Res. 2002, vol. 41 pp 1920-1924. Note: Chemical Engineering Progress articles are available online to registered users, via http://www.cepmagazine.org/

  16. Web Links • Responsible Care Toolkit: Security Assessmenthttp://www.responsiblecaretoolkit.com/security_guidance_siteSec.asp • Site Security Guidelines for the US Chemical Industryhttp://www.socma.com/PDFfiles/securityworkshop/SecurityGuideFinal10-22.pdf • US EPA Strategic Plan for Homeland Securityhttp://www.epa.gov/epahome/downloads/epa_homeland_security_strategic_plan.pdf • A Checklist for Inherently Safer Chemical Reaction Process Design and Operationhttp://home.att.net/~d.c.hendershot/papers/ccps10-02.htm • Environmental Media Services – Fast Facts on Plant Securityhttp://www.ems.org/chemical_plants/facts.html • Environmental Media Services – Inherently Safer Processeshttp://www.ems.org/chemical_plants/inherent_safety.html

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