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Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy François Héran

Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy François Héran. “Europe and the demographic challenge”. I N E D Institut national d'études démographiques, Paris. 6 th Munich Economic Summit Panel 3: "Europe's childless societies: Go forth and multiply".

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Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policy François Héran

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  1. Questions and paradoxes on population ageing and family policyFrançois Héran “Europe and the demographic challenge” I N E D Institut national d'études démographiques, Paris 6th Munich Economic SummitPanel 3: "Europe's childless societies: Go forth and multiply" CESIfo / Herbert Quandt Stiftung, Munich, 21-22 June, 2007

  2. Do we have a clear vision of the objectives of a family policy? • Filling the gap between people's wishes and behaviour concerning the number of children ("fertility gap")? • To invoke the interest of the State is not sufficient • Possible justification: filling the "fertility gap" contributes to the well-being of the couples and can be a goal for the State • Compensating for the additional costs of childbearing and child raising (micro-level)? • Objection: it is up to each couple to decide. Why should the State interfere with people's preferences? See the US case • Ensuring the active population renewal? • Could be done also through immigration: a collective choice • Ensuring the replacement of generations? • As a duty towards the next generations? But no such thing as a "right to be borne" for the future generations or a "right to find a successor" for the present one

  3. Necessity of further research • No definite answers to these philosophical questions • But the necessity of accumulating better knowledge on the implications and consequences of each choice: • 1/ explaining the different mechanisms of population ageing: to what extent are they "avoidable" or "unavoidable"? • 2/ having a better comprehension of the micro-motives and the macro-factors which influence the fertility behaviour • See the recent calls launched under the 7th EU Framework-programme: they explicitly address these demographic issues for the first time

  4. I.- The three factors of population ageing • First of all: population ageing high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut") • Due to increased longevity (a 4th floor added to the pyramid) = the unavoidable part of ageing • Less important : population ageing generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas") • Secular decline of fertility under replacement level less than 2.05 children per woman ("2nd demographic transition") = the avoidable part of ageing, open to pro-active policy • Strong but limited in time: the backlash of the baby boom (present impact of temporary rise of fertility) • At the beginning large birth cohorts rejuvenate the pyramidbut make it older 60 years later = unavoidable ageing

  5. 1/ Population ageing at the bottom (before)

  6. 1/ Population ageing at the bottom (after)

  7. 2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid

  8. 2/ Population ageing high up the pyramid (additional floor due to longevity)

  9. 3/ A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…

  10. …but 40 years later makes it older

  11. The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050 (INSEE demographic prospects)

  12. An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" ageing • UN demographic prospects (2006) in a selection of EU countries • The graphs give the growth of population aged 65+ and that of population aged 15-64, indexed to 100, over 2000-2050 • Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050 • The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change) • The widening gap between the 65+ and the 15-64 curves displays the relative population ageing • countering population ageing would mean closing the gap between the two curves! • The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pro-natalist policy to maintain the active population over time • A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased longevity

  13. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 SWEDEN 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  14. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 UK 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  15. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 FRANCE 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  16. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  17. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 GERMANY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  18. Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 POLAND 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)

  19. Conclusion of part I • Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decades • Italy, Germany, Poland: it will fill but a part of the gap • In all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population ageing process (France is no exception) • Immigration policy cannot hinder population ageing; it brings but a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago • nevertheless, immigration contributes to the working of home care and institutional care • Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated by any population policy • neither policy immigration • nor family policy

  20. II.- Some questions about the micro-motives and macro-conditions of the fertility decision-making • To assess how policy initiatives could influence the free decisions of the individuals in the number and time of births, we need to understand: • the real costs and benefits of having a child (an additional child) • the individual perceptions of the economic and non-economic constraints • the decision-making process within the couple • But also the macro-factors of the fertility decision including the micro-perceptions of the macro-conditions • Many difficulties in the micro-macro articulation

  21. Macro-level factors (1): Economic circumstances • Since the 80's, fertility is higher in European countries with high female labour-force participation, possibly due to policies in favour of work/family life conciliation • However, further research is needed to bridge the macro-micro divide and elucidate some paradoxes • the French paradox: high fertility, despite high unemployment • the American paradox: high fertility, despite weak family policy • And a more general paradox • At the micro-level, unemployment, atypical working hours, and economic uncertainty negatively affect the fertility decisions • However, except for mega-crises (e.g. the fall of Communist regimes), aggregated data in time series show few correlation between the economic ups and downs and the fluctuations of fertility • Attempts to take into account meso-determinants (such as the "economic morale" of the households) are not very conclusive

  22. Macro-level factors (2): Norms and values • A common theory: individualism, hedonistic values, dissociation of sexuality and marriage, gender equality, etc. tend to reduce fertility • Confirmed at micro-level, within the same country : individuals with "progressive" family values have lower fertility • However, the correlation is negative at the macro-level: • Fertility is higher in countries where individualism and gender equality is highly valued (see World Values Survey) • Marital instability does not entail low fertility levels • "Lowest low fertility" prevails in countries with traditional "familistic values" and rigid family structures (where it is still believed that parents should be married to have children, and mothers should stay home to raise them) • The new order: "familistic" values are anti-natalistic, family flexibility is pro-natalist

  23. Macro-level factors (3): Cultural orientations • Cultural explanations of fertility variations (religion, fatalism, or patriarchy seen as "resistance to change") do not square with the facts • E.g. the Maghreb case (or the Iranian case): • steep decline of fertility in 25 years (from 7 children per woman in the 70's to 2.2 in 2000), despite the Islamic revival • E. g. the Sicilian case (or the Andalusian case) • Fertility variations across Italy (or Spain) imputed to the cultural divide between North and South, Christianity and Islam • But how can you explain recent evolutions with multicentennial factors? The chronological fallacy of anthropological ground • The Italian "mamma": an argument easily turned round • In the 60's, the Italian matriarch loved children so much that she had many of them (multiplicative love) • Nowadays, she loves her children so much that she has few of them and doesn't want them to leave home (exclusive love)

  24. Macro-level factors (4): Public policies • To fill the "fertility gap" between people's wishes and behaviour, policies may support family formation and alleviate the costs of child-raising • Such policies are not limited to the benefits of the Maternity or Children branch of Social protection • Include also sector-based policies (much more relevant than the catch-all cultural factors), such as: • Housing policy (e.g. rented housing for the young couples who wish to found a family, as a first step of the autonomy) • School policy (full-day elementary school, universal pre-elementary school at age 3) • Policies of companies and administrations (parental leaves, definition of working hours, involvement in child care centres) • Child-friendly town-planning • Positive image of motherhood and fatherhood in the medias

  25. Concluding remarks • Most of the population ageing process is due to the inexorable increase of longevity, as a consequence of permanent collective choices • Policy initiatives to increase the fertility rate will never overcome the "unavoidable" part of population ageing • They make sense only if their objective is to counter the "avoidable" part of population ageing, due to low fertility, alleviating the economic and non-economic constraints • However, there is no scientific rationale to justify the priority of internal growth (native births) on external growth (through immigration): the decision is merely political • In practice, the natural increase of European countries will decline, and immigration will turn out to be the first engine of demographic growth (even in France). Family policy is not a domestic alternative to immigration. Both are part of our future in Europe.

  26. Annex 1.Family policy in France, in the European context Source: Social protection counts elaborated by DREES (the Direction of statistics and studies of the French Ministry of Health) J. Bechtel and L. Caussat, in Études et résultats #376, Febr. 2005

  27. Social protection benefits in France, 2003Distribution of risks (or functions) Total amount: 465 billions € = 30% of GDP

  28. Social protection benefits for the families in Europe: cash / in kind [education excluded] (in % of GDP)

  29. Some traits of the French family policy • Complex and not always consistent • More than 30 measures (not easy to evaluate) • Means-tested benefits (for social redistribution), but also tax cuts (quotient familial, tax-splitting system") • Still wavering between extra support to the 3rd child and benefits from the 1st child • But quite consensual and politically neutral • Unquestioned in the last electoral debates • Confirmed every year by la Conférence de la famille • More feministic then familistic • No need to be married; no need to stay home • Strong support to the one-parent families • A 60-year continuity that inspires confidence in the population

  30. Annex 2.Two children per woman in France in 2006: is this due to immigration? Source: INSEE data, exploited by François Héran and Gilles Pison, "Two children per woman in France in 2006: are immigrants to blame?", Population & societies, 432, March 2007 (downloadable from http://www.ined.fr/en)

  31. A large contribution to birthsmay go with a limited impact on fertility • It is often claimed that the French fertility rate is due to foreign population • Surprising though it may seem, the foreign population brings a large contribution to births but a limited impact on fertility (see graph) • 2005: 94 000 babies born to a foreign mother out of 774 000 = 12 % • This raises the national fertility rate by just 0.10 child, from 1.8 (for French women) to 1.9 (for women of all nationalities) • Explanation: • Foreign women have 1.5 child more than the nationals • But represent only 7% of the female population of childbearing age  the 1.5 additional child accounts only for 7% in the national rate • The impact of foreigners on the number of births depends more from the extra number of foreign women than from their extra fertility • If we take immigrant rather than foreign women, the contribution to births increases, while the contribution to fertility gets smaller • since the immigrants have arrived at an earlier age, they resemble more native French women in terms of fertility

  32. France 1980-2005: the limited impact of immigration on the national fertility rate(Source: Population & societies #432, March 2007)

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