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Non-Malleable Extractors with Short Seeds and Applications to Privacy Amplification

Non-Malleable Extractors with Short Seeds and Applications to Privacy Amplification. Gil Cohen Weizmann Institute Joint work with Ran Raz and Gil Segev. Randomness Seeded-Extractors. Randomness Seeded-Extractors. truly random bits (seed). bits from an imperfect source

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Non-Malleable Extractors with Short Seeds and Applications to Privacy Amplification

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  1. Non-Malleable Extractors with Short Seeds and Applications to Privacy Amplification Gil Cohen Weizmann Institute Joint work with Ran Razand Gil Segev

  2. Randomness Seeded-Extractors

  3. Randomness Seeded-Extractors truly random bits (seed) bits from an imperfect source of randomness Ext almost-truly random bits

  4. Randomness Seeded-Extractors If all points has probability , the source is called an-source. truly random bits (seed) bits from an imperfect source of randomness Ext almost-truly random bits For simplicity, think of it as “uniform hidden bits”.

  5. Randomness Seeded-Extractors Measured in statistical distance. truly random bits (seed) bits from an imperfect source of randomness Ext almost-truly random bits

  6. Strong Seeded-Extractors For any -source and independent is called strongif

  7. Parameters Given • Maximize • Minimize Non-Constructive and Optimal [Sips88], [RTS00] truly random bits (seed) bits from an -source Ext almost-truly random bits Almost matching explicit constructions (…,[LRVW03],[GUV07] ,[DW08],[DKSS09]).

  8. Defined by[DW09] Non-Malleable Extractors

  9. Non-Malleable Extractors with no fixed point.

  10. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor Expanders are low-degree undirected graphs that “look random”. Are known to induce extractors. Nodes Labeled neighbors (think of 1-16).

  11. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  12. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  13. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  14. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  15. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  16. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  17. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  18. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  19. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  20. ANotNon-Malleable Extractor

  21. Non-Constructive[DW09] • Seed length • Output length Compared with strong extractors • Seed length • Output length

  22. Non-Constructive[DW09] • Seed length • Output length Compared with strong extractors • Seed length • Output length

  23. Non-Constructive[DW09] • Seed length • Output length Compared with strong extractors • Seed length • Output length

  24. The Explicit Construction of [DLWZ11] • Conditional efficiency

  25. The Explicit Construction of[DLWZ11] • Conditional efficiency

  26. The Explicit Construction of[DLWZ11] • Conditional efficiency

  27. The Explicit Construction of[DLWZ11] • Conditional efficiency

  28. Main Result

  29. Main Result • Unconditionally efficient

  30. Main Result • Unconditionally efficient

  31. Main Result • Unconditionally efficient

  32. Main Result • Unconditionally efficient

  33. Main Result • Unconditionally efficient

  34. Privacy Amplification - passive adversary - [BBR88], [Mau92],[BBCM95]

  35. is an -source Alice Bob =? Computationally unbounded! Eve

  36. Interesting Measures • Entropy loss • Communication complexity • Number of rounds Alice Bob =? Eve

  37. Interesting Measures • Entropy loss • Communication complexity • Number of rounds Alice Bob from Eve’s point of view =? Eve

  38. Interesting Measures • Entropy loss • Communication complexity • Number of rounds Alice Bob Number of communicated bits =? Eve

  39. Interesting Measures • Entropy loss • Communication complexity • Number of rounds Alice Bob =? Eve

  40. Strong Extractors to the Rescue

  41. Strong Extractors to the Rescue • Entropy loss • Communication complexity • Number of rounds s

  42. Privacy Amplification -active adversary - [Mau97],[MM97],[Wol98],[MW03],[RW03],[DKRS06],[DW09],[KR09],[CKOR10]

  43. Privacy Amplification Protocol Active Adversary • Correctness • Privacy • Authenticity

  44. Privacy Amplification Protocol Active Adversary • Correctness • Privacy • Authenticity If both parties are honest then they agree.

  45. Privacy Amplification Protocol Active Adversary • Correctness • Privacy • Authenticity For any Eve, from Eve’s view.

  46. Privacy Amplification Protocol Active Adversary • Correctness • Privacy • Authenticity For any Eve, .

  47. If

  48. Privacy Amplification Protocols [DS02, DW09] 1 round requires [RW03] gave rounds for [CKOR10] gave rounds for

  49. 2 Rounds Privacy Amplification Protocols ()

  50. The Extractor of [Raz05]

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