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Political Economy of Development Effectiveness: The Way Forward

Political Economy of Development Effectiveness: The Way Forward. Professor Richard Robison, MU Professor Wil Hout, IISS Associate Professor Caroline Hughes, MU Dr Jane Hutchison, MU Dr Aris Arif Mundayat, UGM Dr Ian Wilson, MU. Starting point:.

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Political Economy of Development Effectiveness: The Way Forward

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  1. Political Economy of Development Effectiveness: The Way Forward

  2. Professor Richard Robison, MU Professor Wil Hout, IISS Associate Professor Caroline Hughes, MU Dr Jane Hutchison, MU Dr Aris Arif Mundayat, UGM Dr Ian Wilson, MU

  3. Starting point: Donors’ attempts to operationalise political economy have been inconsequential, ‘there is little evidence that it is prompting them to question their (mostly implicit) assumptions about how development happens’ (Unsworth 2009: 884)

  4. Donors continue to assume: Development is a public good, essentially uncontested and objectively known. Hence, opposition is misconstrued; considered self-interested and malleable (eg with the right incentives). Partnerships as key vehicle of inclusion: assumed to be more robust than they are - or look for them and cannot find them.

  5. Taking political economy seriously: Development results from fundamental structural change; it is a process of conflict and contestation. Outcomes determined by the relative strength of social forces: this is not often amenable to donor intervention because of concerns for stability. Development is difficult for donors to orchestrate: problems of ‘political will’ and unintended effects.

  6. Structural political economy: Gives due recognition to structural constraints, but also emphasises contingency and agency – Considers reform alliances are possible – but asks: what, when, where?

  7. To carry off reform: Donors look for dedicated (committed) reformers – eg ‘champions’, ‘drivers’, ‘leaders’. In fact, reformers (those with the power/authority to implement) are often opportunists – their commitment is tactical or contingent: risky, short-term.

  8. Case study examples: Manila mayors and slum eradication. Little commitment to poverty reduction goals but open to donor assistance with urban development. Cambodian MoI and decentralization reforms. Concern to facilitate mobilization of the poor in the interest of populist Party campaigning and promoting power of MOI.

  9. Analysing reform alliances: Types of reformer

  10. Analysing reform alliances: Types of alliance

  11. Development interventions: need clear analysis of tactical interests of various allies; involve on-going contestation, re-negotiation, attention to relationships; need constant work on tactical alliances as a key aspect of project/program planning and implementation.

  12. Issues: The people aid should benefit are often idealists who are open to tactical alliances with donors. But Tactical alliances with pragmatists and opportunists can marginalise idealist reformers; pragmatists can be co-opted and the alliance loses purpose.

  13. Striking a balance • Alternative: combine tactical alliances with pragmatists and opportunists with solidarity relationships with idealists and beneficiaries • This allows donors to use the influence of opportunists to secure reform while preserving political space for the continued pursuit of ideals.

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