Addressing the Challenges of Limited Conflict

1. Addressing the Challenges of Limited Conflict Ariel E. Levite Prof. Sondhi’s Memorial Lecture JNU, New Delhi, October 14, 2004

2. The Evolving Security Environment The Nature of Contemporary Warfare Challenges limited conflicts pose to Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy The novel Paradox of Employing Force Challenges for the Military First Order Implications for Defense Planning Structure of the Presentation

3. Is volatile and unsettled, with much conflict alongside cooperation Violent conflicts are not going away These conflicts retain a few classical, yet assume also many novel features: Large spectrum of scenarios Considerable variation in the type and saliency of interests challenged (rarely at the high end?) Intra-state conflicts and non state actors are increasingly pronounced Domestic, international, and global dimensions of conflict are more than ever intertwined The Contemporary Security Environment (I)

4. Some classical aspects of warfare have not gone away: Friction and grinding Uncertainty (fog) and confusion Blood and destruction A measure of moderation and restraint (ethically and prudentially driven) The Evolving Nature of Warfare (I)

5. Yet many novel features have emerged, including: Speed/tempo and continuity of operations Precision Strike capability Range & stand-off delivery of firepower Unclear delineation of the battlefield and blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants an Battlefield transparent to superiors & the public Ease & scope of real time communications The Evolving Nature of Warfare (II)

6. The nature of some adversaries and the strategies they employ has undergone a profound change: To offset their profound inferiority in classical warfare, many employ novel strategy and tactics for winning that go far beyond classic asymmetric warfare They combine a mix of audacity, ruthlessness, creativity, patience, resolve, and global reach both to hurt you and incur and induce self pain to win They are often organized as networks (rather than hierarchically) The Evolving Nature of Warfare (III)

7. These adversaries consciously and deliberately deploy and use their combat assets in or near residential areas or sensitive civilian sites either to: Lure you to hit them Provide them with immunity (human shields) They present you with the unpalatable choice of either giving them ‘de facto’ immunity or risking non-combatant casualties, collateral damage, and political backlash The Evolving Nature of Warfare (IV)

8. The temporal, spatial and functional separation between war and politics increasingly withers away Growing divergence and tension arise between political and military “logic of (using) force”, and measures of accomplishment (victory vs. success, conquest, killing, and destruction) War of “kinetics” gives way to war of “effects” The internal logic of warfare (linking the tactical, operational, and strategic levels) is changing--a“battle of narratives” assumes prominence The Evolving Nature of Warfare (V)

9. The “correlation of forces” is gradually losing much of its relevance as a key determinant of the outcome of military confrontation, as: So much of the fighting occurs differently Overwhelming military and resource preponderance cannot be easily used or translated into desired effects (Gulliver’s Trouble”)--you can blow up almost anything you wish, but whether, when, which, and how should you? Precision leverage External and loosely coordinated non state actors can effectively meddle in violent conflicts The Evolving Nature of Warfare (VI)

10. The cornerstone of traditional deterrenceandcoercive diplomacy postures has become increasingly brittle Threats of both denial and punishment lose much efficacy, may even prove counter-productive: Unpredictability limits their practice Prospects of their denial may under whelm our foes Our threats of punishment lose credibility, efficacy due to deficient capacity to identify (“low signature”), respond, and risk “overkill” and retaliation Even credible threats of action or retaliation might lure (rather than dissuade) aggression Contemporary Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy

11. There is a strong incentive to employ force early (including pre-emptive) and intensely against threats we presently face . Yet three clusters of reasons converge to encourage imposing pronounced limits on timing, context, and objectives, constraints on sequence, means, and requirements on processes for employing force: Escalationcontrol Expediency- sustaining supportfor using force and reaping its benefits Legitimacy- legal obligations, ethical concerns and political requirements The line between expediency and legitimacy is blurred The Novel Paradox of Employing Force

12. Escalation avoidance becomes broader and more widespread (well beyond the superpowers and outside the nuclear context) Expediency encourages greater restraint in timing and context for applying force, as well as in its signature Valuesoftenencouragebroader and more restrictive constraints on employment in certain domains Even non-democratic states are growing more attuned to the first two considerations Evolving Rationales for Limitations

13. Geographical scope Parties to be engaged Type of weapon systems and composition and size of forces to be employed Tolerable levels of one’s own casualties, as well as Prisoners of War Acceptable type and scope of foe’s casualties Common Types of Constraints (I)

14. Acceptable targets and collateral damage (type, permanence/duration) Duration of operation Proportionality of response Pace and sequence of operations ROEs Discretion available to field commanders Common Types of Constraints (II)

15. The military remains a blunt instrument of statecraft, yet its tasks are increasingly complex and sensitive It is expected to produce quick and effective results (“instant gratification”) even when: Assigned daunting missions Presented with less than clear, explicit, coherent, consistent, and viable mission statements Facing elusive, ruthless foes guided by extreme and unfamiliar logic and concepts of warfare Subjected to highly restrictive constraints on its freedom of action and micro-managed New Challenges for the Military (I)

16. Subjected to intense scrutiny of its battlefield performance, and faced with unrealistic new public expectations of effectiveness and precision and growing demands for accountability (including legal responsibility) Its missions are increasingly affected even in real time by public and political expectations Its operations are still predominantly subjected to classical laws of armed conflict (the key yardsticks of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination) and increasingly also to IHL that are of limited relevance in regulating contemporary warfare due to: New Challenges for the Military (II)

17. Blurred lines between war and peace situations Difficulty of clearly identifying combatants Invalid premise of “reciprocal restraint” Inadequacy of the “proportionality” yardstick (both in factoring in anticipated damages, and in legitimating punishment) The meaning of the “necessity” is uncertain in a globalized, inter-dependent world Lack of universality and inconsistent interpretation Cultural and value divergence New Challenges for the Military (III)

18. It has to harmonize its actions in real time with diplomacy, and integrate its efforts with national and regional civilian agencies and security organs It is also often called upon to engage in inherently civilian (public order, reconstruction, nation building) functions, and deal with diverse national, and foreign entities, including numerous NGOs. It is required to be prepared to increasingly operate on a short notice across a broad range of scenarios. These range from PSO to counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, intervention, to limited WMD threats and high intensity conflict New Challenges for the Military (IV)

19. Actionable intelligence (strategic, operational, tactical) is absolutely necessary for success Force remains highly relevant, though typically not the instrument of first (nor increasingly of last) choice Force must increasingly include non-military organs and assets To be a legitimate, viable, and expedient instrument of statecraft, especially for democracies, the use of force must be subjected to increasingly demanding parameters First Order Implications for Defense Planning (I)

20. When employed, it must be applied selectively, aim precisely, and produce discriminate(nuanced, precise, calibrated, brief, temporary, not necessarily lethal)effects(casualties, destruction, incapacitation, and projection of presence/resolve) Novel political, policy, and public understanding must guide, precede, accompany, and follow use of force First Order Implications for Defense Planning (II)

21. A fundamental transformation in civil-military affairs is essential to cope with the new challenges posed by limited conflict This transformation is a pre-requisite for enhancing the credibility of deterrence and coercive diplomacy, and back them up if and when such conflicts ensue The transformation must occur well beyond the military, and encompass the entire security establishment and its interface with key state organs, both para-military and civilian ones Such transformation must overcome formidable policy, political, bureaucratic, and logistical challenges Intermediate Conclusions

22. The military itself should transform in several complementary directions Key directions for military transformation include: Jointness: tighter integration of military strategy with broader policy, and military operations with activities of other security organs Reorientation to cope with a “Battle of Narratives” Discrete, precise, yet resolute employment, varying yields and effects (“ Dial a Yield” incl. LTL) Maximizing firepower over conquest, destruction Broadening the toolkit: synergy with non-orthodox warfare (IO, Special Forces, Covert Action) Directions for Military Transformation