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Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology

Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology. Promises, Hype and Security Brett Edwards, University of Bath. Back ground. PhD thesis Why do some aspects of Synthetic Biology attract dual-use concern and not others? Case studies: US and UK Qualitative historical/ constructivist approach.

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Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology

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  1. Dual-use Governance in Synthetic Biology Promises, Hype and Security Brett Edwards, University of Bath

  2. Back ground • PhD thesis • Why do some aspects of Synthetic Biology attract dual-use concern and not others? • Case studies: US and UK • Qualitative historical/ constructivist approach. • Security Studies, Risk, STS • National level focus

  3. Overview 1) Studying ‘what isn’t there’ 2) Synthetic Biology A Case in Point 3) Findings

  4. Studying what isn’t there(1) • Which approach to adopt for the purposes of the research? • Ethical ‘Gold Standard’? • Existing risk assessment frameworks? • Contrast stated objectives with actual achievements in key institutions? • Contrast experiences ‘on the ground’ with policy/academic literature.

  5. Studying what isn’t there(2) • Key aim is to examine political processes which have underpinned the emergence of policy outcomes. • Agency • Institutions/ structures • Ideas • Want to examine changes in ‘the feasible ’ with regard policy as well as implementation.

  6. Focus of analysis

  7. Studying what isn’t there(3) Key Concepts • Four Domains of Governance

  8. Studying what isn’t there(3) Key Concepts (2) Primary and Secondary Securitization - New channels/ forums - Implementation politics

  9. Fair Explanation? Underlying causal mechanisms Unearthing norms: S&T and risk Provision of a theoretical lens

  10. Synthetic Biology A Case in Point

  11. What is Synthetic Biology (1)? • Defined initially by funding councils • Fed into ethical framings in Both the US and UK • EU Ethics reports and SynBerc. • Promissory • Interdisciplinary • Controllable Biology/ Controllable Risks • Applications of Engineering Principles?

  12. What is Synthetic Biology (2)? • Six subfields (Lam et al 2009) • DNA circuits • standard biological parts • Synthetic metabolic pathways • biological synthesis of chemicals • Proto-cell creation • model of a cell • Unnatural components • New proteins, with functions • Synthetic Microbial Consortia • Cells, working together

  13. Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1) • Spread of concern • DNA Synthesis  Academic Field  Amateur Community • Key areas of concern. • Scenarios/ and pre-existing concerns with oversight.

  14. Dual-use concerns about synthetic Biology (1)

  15. Key findings • Roles and successes and failings of specific institutions • NSABB/ ELSI dead zone • Rhetoric belies little governmental interest • Simularity of US and UK • ELSI is king • Role of concerns about ‘Top- down’ Securitization • Externalisation of dual-use concerns about biodefense • Patch-work of responses.

  16. Further questions • Risk and dual-use • Generalizability • Other fields/ other countries • Future relevance of ELSI in Synbio? • Militarization

  17. Thank you!

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