USMC Force Structure Review Col Russell E. Smith USMC Director MAGTF Integration Division/

1. USMC Force Structure Review Col Russell E. Smith USMC Director MAGTF Integration Division/ Strategic Vision Group CDD, CD&I, HQMC 30 Apr 2011

2. - A Marine Corps in Transition -Our Guidance As We Began 2

3. SecDef’s Guidance (San Francisco Speech) • “.. to be at the “tip of the spear” in the future, when the U.S. military is likely to confront a range of irregular and hybrid conflicts.” • “… the United States will continue to face a diverse range of threats that will require a more flexible portfolio of military capabilities.” • “… flexible and prepared to fight and operate in any contingency – including counterinsurgency and stability operations.” • “...the maritime soulof the Marine Corps needs to be preserved,” • “..challenge is finding the right balancebetween preserving what is unique and valuable while making changes needed to win the wars we are in and likely to face.” • “…the Marines’ greatest strengths: a broad portfolio of capabilities and penchant for adapting that are needed to be successful in any campaign.” 3

4. SecNav’s Guidance • “… build on Marine Corp’s willingness to adapt and its steady institutional focus on readiness and national relevance “ • “ … conduct a capabilities-based force structure review that balances requirements and capacities throughout the conflict spectrum, across multiple domains (sea, air, ground, and cyber) “ • “… provide me with recommendations that result in a 21st century expeditionary force in readiness” • “… remain capable of being able to project ready-to-fight forces from the sea into potentially hostile territory” • “ must remain a well-trained, morally strong, highly disciplined, high-state-of-readiness force, capable of operating persistently forward in multiple geographic theaters; responding rapidly to any crisis “ • “… primary goal should be to maximize total force capability and minimize risk …” • “… rapidly disaggregate and aggregate to increase forward engagement, rapidly respond to crisis, and rapidly project power in austere locations.” • “Provide options for headquarters and staff reductions and institutional efficiencies.”

5. Expeditionary Force-in-ReadinessDefined • Role of the Marine Corps within the Joint Force • An integrated & balanced air-ground-logistics team • Fwd deployed and fwd engaged – ever ready to respond and protect as directed • Responsive & scalable - ready today to respond to the full range of crises & contingencies • Trained & equipped to Integrate with other Services, Allies and Interagency partners • The USMC is a Middleweight Force…“light enough to get there quickly, • heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival”

6. Force Structure Review Group(FSRG)What We Did 6

7. Capabilities-Based Review A Total Force, Capability-Based Review (Active, Reserve, Civilian) Senior USMC Leadership for 3 months 3 Star Exec Steering Group - CMC Direct Guidance/Oversight Objective: Design a Relevant, Efficient & Effective Force for Crisis Response & Fwd Engagement with a Single MCO Capacity * Mitigated Risk Whenever Feasible With an Operational Reserve * Incorporated Lessons Learned from last 10 years of combat * Employed OSD Planning Scenarios & Analytic Tools to Test the Force * Cross Checked Against Approved OPLANS * Red Team Review Throughout * Examined Capability Bands Between 175-190K Sweet Spot Engagement Crisis Response Power Projection Sustained Op IW/MCO 186.8K Active Force / 39.6K Reserve Force

8. Major Initiatives Ready, regionally focused C2 for crisis response • Ready operating forces manned at 99% enlisted and 95% officers • 5 regionally aligned JTF capable MEB command elements to support GCCs • Increased enablers to create a multi-capable force (enablers + general purpose = multi-capable) Designed for the future • Restructured logistics groups to increase the depth, availability and responsiveness of our combat service support • 67% increase in cyber capacity • Marine Special Operations increased 44% in critical combat and combat service support • Institutionalized IW organizations • ISR structured to tightly integrate tactical, operational and strategic capability for distributed and complex operations Command structures flattened…new operational construct • Changed High Demand/Low Density MOS’ to High Demand/Right Density • A fully integrated operational reserve • Full spectrum readiness • Consolidated/reorganized/eliminated 21 active and reserve higher headquarters

9. Operating Forces • Reduced infantry regiment HQ (8 to 7) • Reduced infantry battalions (27 to 24) • Reduced artillery battalions (11 to 9) • Reduced flying squadrons (70 to 61) • Reduced wing supt group HQs (3 to 0) • Increased UAS squadrons (4 to 5) • Reorganized all logistics commands • Consolidated MPs to support law enforcement requirements • 5 JTF capable MEB HQs for GCCs • Combined two 3 star HQs & realigned 3 star authorization to Cmdr MARCENT • High Demand/Low Density are now • High Demand/Right Density • Joint/MARSOC/CYBER • Increased Cyber 67% (+250) • Increased MARSOC 44% (+1000) • Training/Supporting Establishment • Reduced civilian structure (-2979 or 13%) • Mil-to-civ conversions limited active duty structure reductions • Reorganized installations/consolidate leadership • Training Command consolidation • Downgraded three 2 star billets to 1 stars • Maintained HMX-1, nuclear weapon security, joint billets, chem-bio incident response and embassy support • Reserve • Cadred division, wing, logistics & mobilization command HQs • Reduced regimental headquarters (3 to 2) • Increased civil affairs groups (3 to 5) • Increased CI/HUMINT (1 to 2) • Increased ANGLICO (2 to 3) Structural Changes Note: ~26k in Training, Transient, Patient and Prisoner (T2P2) status 9

10. Next Steps • FY11 Quick Wins • Fully establish MARCENT MEB CE • Stop programmed 202k growth (tanks, AAV, bridge company, combat logistics company) • Deactivate wing support group headquarters • Institutionalize irregular warfare organizations • Consolidate training and education commands & combine staffs • Halt planned civilian growth * • Begin reorganization of logistics commands • Begin Installations reorganization • Speed up CYBER growth* Growth in Cyber/Acquisition is likely necessary

11. Next Steps • FY12 • Strengthen manning of Pacific JTF-capable MEB on Okinawa • Begin strengthening manning of MARSOC • Reorganize military police for future IW operations • Consolidate MARFORCOM & II MEF staffs & move 3 star authorization to MARCENT • Cadre and consolidate major reserve headquarters • FY13 & Beyond • Complete establishment of MARFOR MEB HQs at GCCs • Deactivate infantry regiment • Complete MARSOC capability and capacity increase

12. Way Ahead • Continue developing, sustaining and enabling the Nation’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness • Move forward with implementation • Conduct DOTMLPF analysis ~ next 6 months • FSRG results to inform POM 13 • Seek Title 10 changes for improved access to operational reserve (OSD Support) • FY12 NDAA DOPMA Relief (OSD Support) • Develop a measured way to reduce the force over time “to keep faith with Marines, families and civilians”