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STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSFORMED AND VIABLE RESERVE FORCE

RESERVE FORCE. STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSFORMED AND VIABLE RESERVE FORCE. Part-time volunteers making a difference for a better life for all. By M ajor General R.C. Andersen 15 March 2005. RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY AIM. PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT

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STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSFORMED AND VIABLE RESERVE FORCE

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  1. RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRANSFORMED AND VIABLE RESERVE FORCE Part-time volunteers making a difference for a better life for all By Major General R.C. Andersen 15 March 2005

  2. RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY AIM PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILISATION OF A TRANSFORMED AND VIABLE RESERVE FORCE

  3. ESSENTIAL MILITARY DILEMMA “In effect, the most difficult military problem to resolve is that of establishing a security system, asinexpensive as possible in time of peace, capable of transforming itself very rapidly into a powerful force in case of the danger of aggression.” (André Beaufre)

  4. BACKGROUND • PROJECT PHOENIX – PHASE 1: SURVIVAL • RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY APPROVED BY PDSC ON 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AFTER REVIEW OF COMBAT READINESS • ACCOMPANIED BY IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTION • BEING IMPLEMENTED BY ALL SERVICES AND DIVISIONS

  5. RESERVE FORCE END STATE THE RESERVE FORCE IS A FULLY TRANSFORMED, INTEGRAL AND DEPLOYABLE ELEMENT OF THE SANDF ENABLING SUSTAINABLE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

  6. STRATEGIC ISSUE THE ROLE WHICH THE RESERVE FORCE MUST PLAY IN THE PROVISION OF AFFORDABLE DEFENCE CAPABILITIES HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY OPERATIONALISED IN THE FORCE DESIGN AND STRUCTURE OR IN FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLANS.

  7. AIMS OF THE STRATEGY • TO ALIGN WITH AND COMPLEMENT THE MILITARY STRATEGY • TO ENTRENCH THE BUSINESS CASE • TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEPLOYABLE RESERVE FORCE • TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESERVE FORCE SYSTEM

  8. SCOPE • PART 1: MILITARY STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT AND BUSINESS CASE • PART 2: GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEPLOYABLE RESERVE FORCE • PART 3: GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVE FORCE SYSTEMENABLERS

  9. PART 1: STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT • MILITARY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT • RESERVE FORCE SUPPORTING THE STRATEGY • BUSINESS CASE FOR THE RESERVES

  10. THE RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY IN NATIONAL CONTEXT Nation building National pride National will National goals Broad skills base Common culture Civil/Military Relations Power Projection W I N T H E W A R (ENDS) (WAYS) T H E F I F T H L I N E Create Awareness THE RESERVE FORCE SYSTEM Justify Promote and Understand Recruit (MEANS) Employers (CSND) Political (Portfolio com) Population at large (Shield) Youth (Shield) Citizens of South Africa

  11. MILITARY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT Defence against aggression MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES Constitutional Imperatives CONSTITUTION Promoting Security Supporting the people of South Africa Parliamentary expectation IMPLEMENTATION (Ends) Missions Multi-role Preparation MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS Reserve Force Mission essential Training Mission- trained Force Skills-based capability Strategic Support Capabilities Mission-based Approach Selective Engagement Light Mobile Strategic Positioning Conventional Warfare C4I3RS MILITARY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES (Ways) (Means)

  12. RESERVE FORCE ADDING VALUE Defence Against Aggression MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES Constitutional Imperatives CONSTITUTION Promoting Security Supporting the People of South Africa IMPLEMENTATION Executive expectation (Ends) Military Missions MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS Multi-role Preparation Sustainable One Force Expansion capability Ready/1st and 2nd line Reserve Force Mission-trained Force Mission-essential Training Skills-based Capability Increased Options and Credible Deterrent Mission-based Approach (Ways) Light Mobile Strategic Support Capabilities Strategic Positioning Selective Engagement Conventional Warfare MILITARY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES C4I3RS (Means)

  13. RESERVE FORCE STRATEGY CONSTITUTION (ENDS) Defense Against Aggression EXECUTIVE EXPECTATIONS CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVES Support The People (WAYS) Promote Security MILITARY MISSIONS Selective Engagement Strategic Positioning MILITARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES Increased Options and Credible Deterrent ENABLERS RESERVE FORCE SYSTEM Strategic Direction Conditions Of Service Mission Essential Training Mission Trained Force EMPLOY FORCES Legal Framework HR Strat 2010 MSDS MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS Skills based Multi-role C4I3RS Transform Light Mobile Capability System Development Employer support Reserve Force, Specialist /Ready/1st /2nd Capability portfolios Reserve Force enabling sustainable defence Conventional capability Sustainment MILITARY STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES (MEANS) PROVIDE AND SUPPORT FORCES

  14. PART 2: THE RESERVE FORCE (MANAGED BY SERVICES AND DIVISIONS THAT PROVIDE FORCES) • THE BUDGETARY SITUATION • Currently residue of budget. • No investment to get to cheaper solution. • Renewal and transformation must be funded.

  15. FORCE STRUCTURING • No stable force design to guide development. • Design based on budget constraints. • Affordability not operationalised. • Capability requirements should be primarydriver. • RELEVANCE OF THE SERVICE MODEL • Based on historic paradigms. • Does not capture current community dynamics. • Must be accessible for developmental aspirations. • Incentives must be provided.

  16. STAFFING • MSDS will not rejuvenate Reserves. • Units below strength, ageing and notrepresentative. • MSDS intakes should be increased. • Alternative intakes required. • Old and unfit to be phased out. • TRANSFORMING • Leader group largely white. • Lack of interest amongst white youth. • Limited NSF recruitment. • Direct recruitment based on unit readiness required. • Involve Reserves in recruiting.

  17. TRAINING • Not user friendly or accessible. • No external accreditation or value. • Courses to be modularised and accredited. • Couple training to operational readiness.

  18. PART 3: RESERVE FORCE SYSTEM (MANAGED BY THE RESERVE FORCE DIVISION) • LEGAL AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT • Limited job and financial protection. • Uncertainty on PSO deployment. • No General Regulations. • Defence and Moratorium Acts to be improved. • Finalise General Regulations.

  19. INCENTIVES FOR RESERVISTS • No meaningful incentives. • Consider incentives, eg, tax relief. • Consider Provident/Pension Fund. • INCENTIVES FOR EMPLOYERS • No employer incentives. • Implement incentives based on international benchmarks. • CSND must assist with lobbying.

  20. EMPLOYER AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT • Limited employer support. • Limited support and understanding in communities. • Create CSND. • Focus SHIELD on employers and decision makers.

  21. RESERVE TRAINING SYSTEM (RTS) • MSDS will not provide officers and specialists. • No incentive to join reserves. • Launch RTS (URTU). • VOLUNTARY YOUTH INDUCTION SYSTEM • Lack of awareness amongst youth. • Implement youth induction system separate from education. • System must be voluntary and avoid “militarisation” criticism.

  22. STRATEGIC DIRECTION • Regularly benchmark and test strategy against Mil Strategy and FE Strategy. • Revise as necessary. • PROMOTING THE RESERVE FORCE • Regular benchmarking. • CSND to survey employers. • Continuous monitoring and improvement of methods.

  23. GUIDELINES FOR THE SYSTEM AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT The strategy is supported by specificobjectivesand guidelines for planning.

  24. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS • Legitimate (Parliament and public) • Transformed (Government policy) • Structured (Ready/1st/2nd line) • Resourced (adequate) • Prepared/employed (Readiness schedules) • Empowered (Legal framework) • Supported (Strategic, operational, tactical andpsychological)

  25. CONCLUSION • A fully transformed and viable Reserve Force is part of the solution to the current budgetary constraints. • Its role in providing affordable capabilities must, however, be properly appreciated and operationalised in the force design and structure. • Unless HR Strat 2010 is fully implemented, neither the Regular Force or the Reserve Force will be sustainable.

  26. Questions?

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