Non-cognitivism in religious faith and language

1. Non-cognitivism in religious faith and language Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Non-cognitivism • ‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false; factual belief; can be known (cognition) • A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in love’ - expression of a value I hold, not something I know (non-cognitive) • Is religious language like the first or the second?

3. Søren Kierkegaard • Religious faith is not a philosophical system or set of beliefs; it is held passionately. • To believe that God exists, but to treat this as just another fact, about which we feel nothing, is not to have faith. Faith isn’t (just) a matter of what, but of how, we believe.

4. Objective uncertainty • The commitment that characterizes faith requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap requires objective uncertainty. • Objective certainty will not have the same impact on one’s life as faith in the face of uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty for this reason.

5. Is faith irrational? • Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense against the understanding… because the understanding will penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’. • Religious faith in its trust and commitment is ‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the limits that reason can reach for itself.

6. Is Kierkegaard a non-cognitivist? • There are facts about God, but we cannot know these facts using reason. • Religious faith must involve an emotional response. • So religious language is expressive, not merely fact-stating.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein • Language can be compared to games • Both are guided by rules - what you can do, what words mean • The meaning of words lies in how they are used • Cp. ‘the peace of the Lord passes understanding; ‘the car passes the house’

8. ‘Language games’ • Examples: asking, thanking, cursing, praying, greeting • A language game is the spoken aspect of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole collection of cultural practices, but Wittgenstein also emphasises its biological basis

9. Religion • Religion involves many language games, but not a whole form of life • A distinctive part of a distinctively human form of life; rooted in natural human responses

10. Religious language • Religious language governed by quite different rules, e.g. asking God and asking your boss for prosperity • ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’ • ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64) • Religious language is not descriptive, but expressive

11. Phillips: defending Wittgenstein • Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational criticism • ‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death, joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’ If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we are right to reject it. • However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not true’ - it does not make factual claims. Religious language takes its meaning from religious life. • To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists independently of religion is a ‘monstrous illusion’

12. Objection • Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of religious belief and language, not an analysis of it - religious believers think ‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they will exist in heaven after death • Religious language could have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it can be both factual and expressive