270 likes | 720 Views
Shiga Toxin-Producing E. coli (STEC) Threats to the New Zealand Economy. Dr Roger Cook Assistant Director (Science) & Principal Adviser (Microbiology). Threats via Where?. Absenteeism or Trade?. Absenteeism 90-100 notified cases a year (c.w. campylobacteriosis)
E N D
Shiga Toxin-ProducingE. coli (STEC)Threats to the New Zealand Economy Dr Roger Cook Assistant Director (Science) & Principal Adviser (Microbiology)
Threats via Where? Absenteeism or Trade? • Absenteeism • 90-100 notified cases a year (c.w. campylobacteriosis) • Small threat, more so if a serious outbreak • Trade (Primary threat) • Not disregarding human health • Not one case attributed to NZ beef or veal • Primarily lost trade in beef
58% of $1.7b = $1b Worthy of protection
Potted History STECs & E. coli O157:H7 • 1982 O157 first detected in the United States • 1976 O26 in NZ beef in Canada • Dr Karl Bettleheim, Heather Brooks, ESR, USDA-ARS – STECs common (not O157) • 1991 MIRINZ O157:H7 proposal to HRC • No bodies, no funding • 1993 cases reported in NZ • 1993 …
Incident that Changed History + 1993 + E. coli O157:H7 + undercooking = Big Trouble US industry not under adequate control
MegaReg (United States) Pathogen Reduction HACCP Rule 1995 • Mandatory (1997) • E. coli biotype 1 testing (faecal contamination) • Sanitation standard operating procedures + ZFT • Salmonella testing (FSIS) • Decontamination interventions • E. coli O157 in ground beef (FSIS) • Commercial (1998) with a subtle FSIS push • E. coli O157:H7 • Assurances for raw materials
MegaReg (Imports) NZ view: Imposed, without a risk-basisTheir problem, not ours!! • SSOPs • New Zealand GHP and MAF Manuals • Microbiological monitoring • Extensive since 1965, and NMD • Salmonella testing (never on carcasses) • Not an O157 problem in New Zealand • Low number human cases • 2900 beef carcasses negative • DON’T need decontamination (>$$$)
Barriers to trade : Pre WTO Technical Barriers Tariff Barriers
Barriers to trade : GATT GATT removed tariff barriers, but technical barriers remained
Barriers to trade : WTO SPS WTO SPS Agreement + Codex Standards = Risk basis = Trade parity for New Zealand
O157 Equivalence We fought, we lost • Commercial, not FSIS • Avoided SPS risk requirement • Importers terrified of a recall • But then we won … • Our own bulk meat E. coli O157:H7 (1998) programme acceptable to MICA. Daily testing, all US–listed premises • National database • Did avoid decontam. interventions • Huge cost saving
Reasonably Unlikely to Occur Composite analyses positive (4y) • If all five in a composite positive • Just 2/28,430 tests (0.01%) • If just one in a composite positive • Just 2/142,151 cartons (0.002%) • One test positive = 1 days production lost to the US market
Twist-in-the Tale Setback - Bobby veal (2003) • FSIS ground beef detection • NZ bobby veal • How? Historically retorted. Changing use. Boutique low fat burgers from trim from table cuts. • Accidental findings in NZ • Protection of adult beef trade • NMD profile worse • Separate O157:H7 programme • Decontamination interventions implemented
1998-2007 Negligible Prevalence Composite analyses positive • Adult beef • 18/63,275 tests (0.04%) • 18/316,275 cartons (0.002%) • Bobby calf • 815/29,854 tests (2.73%) • Same as US beef • Small proportion going to ground beef
A New Environment (2007-2008) The year from …. • US lost control of theirE. coli O157 • New requirements (again for imports) • Increased border testing and recall • New regulatory raw material testing (pre-test) • Increased sample number • Increased sample size and surface • Increased method sensitivity • Non-toxigenic isolates now deemed positive • Increased corrective action review and escalated testing.
Risk to New Zealand Border Testing • Microbiological separation of lots • A container tests positive • All product from any processing day in that container is affected • Split shipments – subsequent and PRECEDING • Recall of product already in the US, perhaps processed • Untenable to US importers and NZ exporters. • Trade ceased temporarily BUT for what risk?
Risk to New Zealand Top level negotiations – risk mitigated • FSIS agreed to: • O157 is of negligible prevalence (beef, not bobby) • A container is a separate unit. Only product from a single days prod’n tested (mixed days in container) • Only product in that container from that day affected • N60 to be implemented in NZ, and PFGE profiles to FSIS to facilitate attribution to NZ • But still a huge risk • Every detection in the US raises flags • Bobbies?
Risk to New Zealand Amended NZ Monitoring programme • Risk of more detections? • More samples • Greater sample size • Counting atoxigenic isolates • Bobbies? • Too soon to tell
NZFSA Performance Target E. coli O157:H7 prevalence in bobby veal • Reduce by 50% by 2012.
Research (NZ Context) • Source attribution (molecular) • Primary reservoir • Transmission pathways on farm • Changing husbandry • Herd homes • Transportation • Effect of processing and inspection • Decontamination • Optimisation • Ozone • Bacteriophage • Refrigeration • Method validation & molecular typing
Conclusion • No evidence of a risk of NZ beef or bobby veal to human health in NZ and the US. • Fingers crossed • Strategies in place • Testing requirements and actions on detection are economically onerous and threaten beef exports. • Recently advised initiatives from the US further threaten the $1b US beef export market. • Offal type muscle meats • Primal (table) cuts • Non-O157 STECs • Research (attibution and control) imperative