Friendship and pleasure elements of happiness

1. Friendship and pleasureelements of happiness Ethics – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII and X

2. The Three Types of “Friendship”

3. The Object of Friendship • No friendship with inanimate objects (no mutual love or benevolence). • Friendship with other people: • Benevolence for the friend’s sake • “friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill” (1155b 34). • Both parties must be aware of reciprocated goodwill in order to be friends.

4. Three Types of “Friendship” • Friends of Utility • Friends of utility are “friends” because of the mutual benefit the other provides. • Friends of Pleasure • Friends of pleasure are “friends” because they mutually share interests in the same thing. • These kinds of “friendship” cannot endure for long. • Interests change • Needs change

5. Three Types of “Friendship” • FRIENDS OF VIRTUE * • “they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in their own right” (1156b 7-9) • “each [person] is good without qualification and good for [the] friend, since good people are both good without qualification and advantageous for each other. They are pleasant in the same ways too, since good people are pleasant both without qualification and for each other” (1156b 13-16) • “These kinds of friendships are likely to be rare, since such people are few” (1156b 25)

6. Comparison of “Friendships” • “Those who are friends for utility dissolve their friendship as soon as the advantage is removed; for they were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient for them” (1157a 15-17) • “it is possible for bad people as well [as good] to be friends to each other for pleasure or utility, for decent people to be friends to base people . . . Clearly, however, only good people can be friends to each other because of the other person himself; for bad people find no enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit” (1157a 18-20)

7. Why Do I Need Friends? • True friendship is the closest we actually get to self-love. • The friend is an equal of mine. • I wish my friend well, and my friend wishes me well. • Thus, I wish myself well (but only through friends). • True friendship keeps one honest about virtue. • Since true friendship requires virtue, I must be virtuous to stay equal to my friend. • Since true friendship requires virtue, I will admonish my friend when they morally backslide and stop acting virtuously. If the friend refuses to be virtuous, I will have to distance myself from the friend or even end the friendship (and let everyone know that we are no longer friends).

8. Equality and Unequality in Friendships

9. Friendship is a State • Friendship is a state, not a feeling. • Friendship requires the right kind of relationship between people: • Friendship requires a sense of equality between the friends. • “Though . . . an excellent person is both pleasant and useful, he does not become a friend to a superior [in power and position] unless the superior is also superior in virtue; otherwise he does not reach . . . equality” (1158a 34-36)

10. Friendship between Unequals • These are sometimes called “friendship,” but they require a superiority/inferiority relationship: • parent / child • older / younger • man / woman (!) • ruler / ruled • “In all friendships that rest on superiority, the loving must also be proportional; for instance, the better person . . . must be loved more than he loves” 1158b 25-29)

11. “Friendship” qua Politics • Three political systems: • monarchy ( can lead to tyranny ) [paternity] • aristocracy ( can lead to oligarchy ) [man/woman] • timocracy ( can lead to democracy [!]) [fraternity] • Aristotle on Democracy: • “Democracy is found most of all in dwellings without a master, since everyone there is on equal terms; and also in those where the ruler is weak and everyone is free [to do what he likes]” (1161a 6-8)

12. Pleasure and the Happiest Life

13. Pleasure is Good, but Not the Good • Contrary to Mill, Aristotle does not consider pleasure to be intrinsically good. • The summumbonum is eu-daimonia, not pleasure. • The virtuous person indeed feels pleasure in virtue, but the virtuous person is not virtuous in order to feel pleasure. • Pleasure is an activity, not a feeling. • Pleasure is not a process (not susceptible to beginning and ending) • Pleasure is always perfect (completed) • The most pleasant thing would be that which is most perfect and complete.

14. The Life of Study • The life of study is the most complete and perfect life since theoretical study is most pleasant. • Study requires leisure and the freedom from occupation. • The political life “require trouble” (1177b 17) • Knowledge is good for its own sake and does not need to be “put to use.” • Philosophy is “the most useless” subject of all. • Politics and honor “aim at some [further] end, and are choiceworthy for something other than themselves” (1177b 19-20) • Thinking is the closest human beings can get to God-like activity. • God =df “thought thinking itself” • God does not change and is therefore perfect and complete.

15. The Two Truly Happy Lives • THE LIFE OF POLITICS AND HONOR • moral virtue • honorable friendships of both equality and unequality • e.g. Solon • THE LIFE OF STUDY • moral and intellectual virtue • honorable friendships of both equality and unequality • friendship with wisdom/God-like activity • philosophia=df “friendship of wisdom” • e.g. Anaxagoras