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Bernanke Statement before Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010)

Bernanke Statement before Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010). Vaughan / Economics 639. Triggers vs. Vulnerabilities. Triggers – particular events or factors that touched off the crisis.

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Bernanke Statement before Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010)

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  1. BernankeStatement before Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission(2010) Vaughan / Economics 639

  2. Triggers vs. Vulnerabilities • Triggers – particular events or factors that touched off the crisis. • Vulnerabilities – the structural weaknesses in the financial system and in regulation/supervision that propagated and amplified the initial shocks.

  3. Triggers • Major Trigger (i.e., most prominent) – prospect of significant losses on residential mortgage loans to subprime borrowers that became apparent shortly after house prices began to decline. • Minor Trigger – “sudden stop” in June 2007 in syndicated lending to large, relatively risky corporate borrowers.

  4. Vulnerabilities – Private Sector • Dependence of “Shadow Banking System” on unstable, short-term, wholesale funding. • “Shadow Banks” – financial entities other than regulated depository institutions that serve as intermediaries to channel savings into investment. • Securitization vehicles, ABCP vehicles, money market funds, investment banks, mortgage companies, etc. are part of the shadow banking system. • Reliance of shadow banks on short-term uninsured funds made them subject to runs (which, in turn, led to “fire sales” of assets).

  5. Vulnerabilities – Private Sector • Deficiencies in risk management and risk controls. Examples include: • Significant deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards before the crisis (not limited to subprime borrowers). • Similar weakening of underwriting standards for commercial real estate. • Excessive reliance by investors on credit ratings. • Inability of large firms to trace firm-wide risk exposures (including off-balance sheet). • Inadequate diversification by major financial firms.

  6. Vulnerabilities – Private Sector • Excessive leverage by households, businesses and financial firms. • Derivatives: • Throughout the crisis, virtually all derivatives contracts were settled according to their terms (i.e., without incident). • Credit derivatives (credit default swaps or CDSs) were a problem. AIG took large positions without hedging or providing adequate capital.

  7. Vulnerabilities – Public Sector • Statutory framework of financial regulation in place before the crisis contained serious gaps. • Most shadow banks were not subject to consistent and effective regulatory oversight (special purpose vehicles, ABCP vehicles, hedge funds, nonbank mortgage origination companies, etc.). • Some shadow banks were subject to prudential oversight but it was weak/inadequate (investment banks, AIG) • Result: lack of data that could have revealed risk positions/practices.

  8. Vulnerabilities – Public Sector • Regulation/supervision focused on safety-and-soundness of individual firms/markets, not on systemic risk. • Poor oversight of Freddie/Fannie. • Were allowed to grow rapidly (in part through purchases of subprime MBSs) with inadequate/poor quality capital. • Ineffective Use of Existing Authority (especially by bank regulators) • Concrete profits vs. “ bad feeling”

  9. Vulnerabilities – Public Sector • Weak Crisis-Management Capabilities. • In contrast to the regime in place for depository institutions, no one in the U.S. government had legal authority to resolve failing nonbank financial institutions (including bank holding companies) in a way that would impose appropriate losses on creditors while limiting systemic effects. • “Too Big to Fail” • Causes moral hazard. • Gives competitive edge to large firms over small firms. • TBTF firms can become systemic threats.

  10. Causes of Housing Boom • Not monetary policy. • Feedback loop between optimism regarding housing prices and innovations in the mortgage market. • High rate of foreign investment in U.S. (savings glut).

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