Case Study: Bosnia

1. Case Study: Bosnia Yunzhou Nam Peter Brüesch

2. Outline • Introduction • Historical Background • Bosnian Case • Key Events • Failures/Lessons Drawn • Conclusion • Significance of Case Study • Bosnia Today • Wheeler Framework

4. Historical Background • Bosnia as republic of Yugoslavia • Ethnic tensions between Bosnian Muslims, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats • Problem: Regional Ethnic majority (Serbs) are local ethnic minority (Bosnian Serbs)

5. Josip Broz “Tito“ • Leader of Resistance movement in Yugoslavia during WWII • President till death in 1980 • Promoted a Yugoslavian nationality • Granted rights and autonomy to republics and provinces

6. Slobodan Milosevic • President of Yugoslavia after 1989 • Nationalistic, promoted idea of “Greater Serbia“. • Annex territories with Serbian population to Serbia • Depicted Serbia as being threatened by outside forces

7. Croatia and Slovenia • (Unilateral) declaration of independence • Croatia and Slovenia • Croatia: 600,000 Serbs • Serb ‘hysteria’ • Summer 1991: JNA military campaign in Krajina

9. Step 1: Do Nothing • July 1991 • WEU majority: “send force to impose peace” • British hesitation: “use of force will escalate war” • Alternatives: • Tweak conflict into ‘interstate’ war • Pledge to arm against JNA • Threat to employ air strikes

10. Step 2: Dismiss Alternatives • Recognition of Croat sovereignty • Pandora’s box of secessionist movements • Employment of force • Constitutes infringement of sovereignty • Air strikes – what if unsuccessful?

11. Step 3: Arms Embargo • September 1991 – Resolution 713 • Contributing to ‘international peace and security’ • Sidestepped the sovereignty issue • A hindrance in later stages

12. Step 4: By Hook or by Crook • January 1992 • Croatia and Slovenia recognized as independent • Legal dilemma • Utipossidetisjuris • Carefully skewed to justify the argument

13. Step 5: Upping the Ante • Western governments – too little, too late

15. Way out (1) • August 1992 • Resolution 770 • Chapter VII of UN Charter • First time the use of force had been authorized • UNPROFOR II • Strictly self-defence • Saved hundreds of thousands from starvation • Ground troops vs Air strikes

16. Way out (2) • Resolutions • #819: Safe area set up in Srebrenica • #824: More safe areas • #836: Close air support for UNPROFOR personnel • April 1994 • NATO airstrikes – the only option available • “inflicted serious damage on the Bosnian Serb war machine”

17. “The Last Stand” • Split Agreement • Operation Storm • Srebrenica Massacre • Operation Deliberate Force • Dayton Peace Agreement

19. Lessons Drawn • Lack of resolution • Misperceptions • Other failures

20. Lesson: Lack of Resolution • Importance of preventative deployment of forces • Whether or not to deploy ground troops • Safe havens set up too late • Whether or not to lift arms Embargo • Possible consequence of exploitation by aggressor

21. Lesson: Misperceptions • Airstrikes – significant but not decisive • Misread acts of aggression as civil war

22. Failures • Insufficient troops to demilitarize safe areas • 3,500 instead of the required 32,000 • Scale of airstrikes > Authority given by #836 • Srebrenica Massacre

24. On a positive note… • Merits of UNPROFOR • Efforts to obtain legality

25. Significance of case study • From Hesitancy and non-action over UNSC Resolutions and humanitarian aid to extensive bombing campaign • Evolution of humanitarian intervention within case study • Although slowly, action stepped up and the intervention was seen through. (in contrast to Somalia and Rwanda) • Air strikes perceived as crucial means to “success“ of campaign. • First Resolution with all necessary means provided on humanitarian grounds

27. Bosnia Today • Independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina • Democracy with 3 presidents (Bosnian, Serb, Croat) that rotate the presidency • Politics still dominated by nationalistic rhetoric and ethnic divide not overcome. • Many Serbs don’t recognize war crimes. • Economically recovering thanks to large investments from Europe. • Monitored by EUFOR Althea • Key question: Bosnia and Herzegovina sustainable as a state with tree nationalities?

28. PPP GDP per capita

29. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Ratko Mladic Captured in 2011 and on trial Radovan Karadzic On trial since 2008 Slobodan Milosevic On trial from 2002-06 Died in custody in 2006

31. Proportionality • Not enough ground forces. Only 3500 instead of the proposed 32000. • Safe areas were overrun and people massacred. Mandate to use force in self-defense not proportional to actual threat. • Hundred thousands of people and more could be saved from starvation due to the impact of UNPROFOR • Air campaign successful in destroying Serbian war machinery but exceeded its humanitarian purpose

32. Positive Humanitarian Outcome Short term (rescue) • Safe zones overrun and people massacred • In general, more could have been rescued by more decisive force. • People saved from starvation. Long term • Politics still mostly marked by nationalistic rhetoric • Problem of Milosevic and nationalistic Serbia was not solved at Dayton and thus conflict in Kosovo happened. • No resurgence of violence and economically recovering • Compared to countries of our other case studies doing BY FAR the best

33. Legality • All necessary means obtained in UNSC Resolution • Air strikes went technically too far. Only allowed in order to protect UN mission and safe zones. • Utipossidetisjuris→ ends lead to means

34. Thank you for your attention