Policy summary

1. Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan, 2005 – 2010 Policy summary

2. Approach Independent evaluation: • Standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, assessing the extent of progress made by the international community in supporting CPPB in Southern Sudan. • Pilot the working draft of the Guidanceon evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities (OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation). • Evaluation anchored in Conflict Analysis and critique of usage.

3. How important are donors? • $4.05 bn allocated from the 15-donor portfolio. About $3.6 bn actually spent to date, 50% for humanitarian. Additional $1 bn/year for UNMIS. • GoSS received a total of US$7.9 billion in oil revenues from 2005-2009, representing about 95% of its total income. Drop in oil prices in 2008 led GoSS to cut its budget by a third. • Donors met about one-quarter of total GOSS Budget in 2009 – significant increase in %.

4. Netherlands, EC, 15% 12% Norway, 9% Canada, 5% Sweden, 5% UK, 14% Other, 11% Denmark, 3% USA, 34% Germany, 3% Belgium, 0.3% Donor expenditure in Southern Sudan (2005-2009) US$2.96bn

6. Overall Findings • Donor contributions to CPPB have been only partially successful, because: • Donor policies and strategies did not fully take into account key drivers of violence • This led to an overemphasis of basic services and a relative neglect of security, policing and the rule of law, which are essential in state formation. • A dominant theory of change has emerged based on the conceptual assumption that ‘all development contributes to CPPB’. • This leads to discourse around ‘post-conflict recovery’ and ‘peace dividends’, on which the aid architecture was based, but is of questionable relevance in a context where continuing insecurity, humanitarian need and political fragility are the defining features.

7. Donor Coordination • Donor coordination limited to sharing information, and rarely is there a joint donor approach to addressing the immediate causes of violence. • Reasons = (1) high level donor meetings (mostly on CPA) confined to Khartoum/abroad; (2) Joint mechanisms usually only about harmonization with GoSS; (3) flexibility constrained by 3-5 year programmes (long procurement/capacity building). • Too much emphasis on organised IDP/refugee returns, not enough on spontaneous return and community-based reintegration. • The limited capacity of GoSS in determining a strategic direction for aid policy has,in turn, impaired the development of a clear joint donor policy.

8. Modalities of Aid • CPPB requires field presence and flexibility. USAID performed best on this. • The slow and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures associated with most of the pooled funding mechanisms (only 20% of total donor funding) have undermined the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of programmes.Funding mechanisms such as the MDTF, which score highly on donor coordination, harmonization, and to some extent government ownership have failed to deliver on the ground. • There have been seven major pooled funds, and there is evidence to show that those managed by contractors have performed more efficiently

9. Performance by Aid Category • The conflict analysis highlighted the importance of linking development activities to local peace building in three respects: the recognition of key drivers of violence; the appropriate geographical placement of assistance in areas most prone to violence; and the institutional support necessary to uphold peaceful relations within communities. • The most effective programmes are those that have promoted linkages with the wider governance and security environment, including building capacities in local government.

10. Performance by Aid Category • Recent improvements in supporting security sector reform (SPLA, judiciary, police), but UNMIS failure to address civilian security. • Donors slow to support decentralisation and pluralism. Over-emphasis on strengthening central (Juba) institutions? And formal governance rather than links to customary law. • Greater emphasis should have been given to alternative livelihoods. Particular problems with cattle ownership and youth.

11. Performance by Aid Category • Little correlation between supply of basic services and incidence of violent conflict. In most States the challenge is to ensure security before benefits of services can be realised. Local conflict analysis required. • Local Government Act seeks to extend the formal justice system to county level, but unclear boundaries and tensions between this and customary law. More training and integration of chiefs and sub-chiefs required.

12. Key Conclusions • In dynamic conflict settings, an analysis of the political economy of the transition from war to peace must be constantly updated. •  Aid is not a neutral constituent, and some donors have been wrong in trying to separate aid from political dialogue. • There are certain sectors – security, policing, rule of law – where international support is of greater priority than basic services.

13. Key Conclusions • Several of the pooled funds have been highly inefficient. By contrast, some bilateral interventions have provided the most effective support towards CPPB, based on frequent monitoring and, most importantly, sufficient number and continuity of staff on the ground.  • There has been insufficient assistance given towards preparing Southern Sudan for secession.