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The Quality of Government

The Quality of Government. What you get? What it is? How to get it! Bo Rothstein The Quality of Goverment Institute Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg. The Quality of Government ( QoG ) Institute at University of Gothenburg.

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The Quality of Government

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  1. The QualityofGovernment Whatyou get? What it is? Howto get it! Bo Rothstein The QualityofGovermentInstitute DepartmentofPolitical Science University of Gothenburg

  2. The QualityofGovernment (QoG) Institute at University of Gothenburg • Started in 2004 (minor grant tobuilddatabase) • Indepententacademic research institute • Major funding for research from 2007 (about 8 mil. Euro). About 20 researchers • Aim: To carryout and promote research about the importanceoftrustworthy, reliable, competent, non-corrupt, non-discriminatory, and competentgovernment institutions = QoG

  3. QoG Resources • Twoopen access major cross-country and over time databanks • Largest survey so far ofQoG (34000 n) • QoGexpert survey for 126 countries • About200 workingspapers, published articles, books, etc. • Just ”google” QoG

  4. ANTICORRP • Anticorruptionpoliciesrevisited: Global trends and EuropeanResponsesto the ChallangesofCorruption • Large-scale integrative projectfunded by the European Union SeventhFramework program • Started in 2012 and will last for 60 months • Involves 21 research groups in 16 EU countries • Total budget about 10 mil. Euro • Largest EU-funded research project in the social sciences • www.anticorrp.eu

  5. ANTICORRP:Background and goals • Goal: To investigate factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruptionpolicies • Interdisciplinaryproject • While the detrimentaleffectsofcorruption on many central aspectsof human well-beingare by nowwell-known • knowledgeabouthowcorruption can be successfully fought by political means is much less developed • The failureof the international anti-corruptionregime

  6. The Quality of Government: Corruption, ineguality and social trust in a comparative perspective (University of Chicago Press 2011)

  7. QoG - An example: IMF 2006 • “promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper”

  8. But…. howimportantis QoGcomparedtootherpoliticalvariables? • The huge and impressivesuccessofdemocracy and democratizationsince the 1970s • Morecountriesthaneverarenowconsideredto be democratic • Morepeoplethanevernowlives in democracies • But …. the effectofdemocracy on human well-being is so far not impressive

  9. QoGversusDemocracy • For all standard measuresof human well-being, QoGmeasuresclearlyoutperformsmeasuresofdemocracy • This is not a problem that is relatedonlytodevelopingcountries or former communistcountries • An overwhelming part of human misery in today’sworld is caused by lowQoG • Thisshouldhaveimplications for research

  10. Whyare definitions important? • In order tostudy it, wehavetoknowwhatwearespeakingabout • Terminologycan be veryconfusing • If we do not have a clear definition, wecannotoperationalize and measure • If wecannotmeasure, wecannotexplain variaton • If wecannotexplain variation, wecannotcombatcorruption

  11. Terminology • GoodGovernance • State Capacity • Governmenteffectiveness • Corruption • State capture • Ruleoflaw • QualityofGovernment

  12. What it is: The many problems ofdefiningQoG • The ”too broad” definitions • The relativistic definitions • The simplywrongdefinitiions • Definitions thatincludewhatwewanttoexplain • The confusionaround ”governance” • Functionalist definitions • Definitions thataredisconnected from normative theory

  13. Too broad definitions of QoG: • World Bank: “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” • “(1) the process by which government are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 3)

  14. Problems • If QoG is everything, thanmaybe it is nothing • If QoG is just ”gooddemocracy”, thenwhy do youneedanotherconcept • QoGcan not be just Democracybecause the curvebetween D & QoG is J-shaped • Wewould like toknowifdemocracyincreasesQoG and ifdemocracy is included in the definition this is not possilbe

  15. Shouldpolicies be included? • ”Sound policies”: Do wereallyknow? • ”Sound policies” – willthere by consensus? • Epistocracy: The Problem from Plato and Lenin • It is problablyeasierto get broad basedconcensusabout the proceduresthanaboutpolicies (substance)

  16. Definitions thataresimplywrong • Leading economists: Small government = HighQoG • Alberto Alesina: ”a largegovernmentincreasescorruption and rent-seeking” • Gary Becker: ”To Root out Corruption, Boot Out Big Government” • ButwhataboutNorthernEurope? • Data: Highcorruptionequals small governments • ”Big Government” is ”GoodGovernment”

  17. Functionalist definitions of QoG: • La Porta et al. (1999, 223): “good governance” = “good-for-economic-development” • The Economist (June 4th, 2005): • “What is required for growth? − Good governance. • And what counts as good governance? −That which promotes growth.” • But then what promites growth? • - Good governance • And so on….

  18. Relativisticdefinitions ofQoG • Absenceofcorruption, • But….Corruption in itselfdifficulttodefine • LowQoG not onlyaboutcorruption • Corruption = ”the abuse of public power for private gain” • Butwasshould be considered ”abuse”? • The problem with relativism • These definitions lack a normative baseline • Cannot be used for comparative research

  19. Definitions thatincludeswhatyouwanttoexplain • QoG as efficiency/effectiveness • But, wewanttoexplainefficiency/ effectiveness • QoG as efficiency lacks a normative baseline for how the stateshouldtreatcitizens

  20. Acemoglu & Robinson: Why Nations Fail • Whatis required is ”inclusive institutions” defined as system that“allow and encourage participation by the greatmassofpeople in economicactivitiesthat make best useoftheir talents and skill and enablethemto make the choicestheywish” + ruleoflaw etc. • Well, big news: The goodsocietyproduces the goodsociety

  21. Arguments for a normative definition ofQoG • Shouldwe accept a relativistic understandingofdemocracy, human rights , gender equality? • If not, whyshouldwe accept a relativistic def. ofQoG? • If we accept a relativistic definition, wecanforget the ambitions tomeauseretocompare • And wewill not be ableexplain variation in QoG by any general theory • The empirical arguments for a relatvistic definition ofQoGare not convincing?

  22. Is Africathat different?

  23. The Two Worlds ofGovernance • Governance 1 as understood by public adminstation & public policy scholarsstudying western liberal democracies • Non-normative, functionalistcritiqueofhierarchial and rule-of-law administration (Weberianism). • Focus on private-public partnerships, pseudo-market solutions, new public management, etc • Governance as a meta-concept for all typesof social co-ordination. • Weak on conceptual precision and operationalizations and therefore no measures.

  24. Governance mode two. • ”GoodGovernance” • Governanceas understood in development research • Normative (good) and empirical • State-centered, ruleoflaw, propertyrights, meritocracy, competence • Strong focus on operationalizationsand measurement • This ”same terminology for different things” has created a lotofconceptualconfusion

  25. Definitions thatare not relatedto modern politicalphilosophy • The ideathatonecouldspeakof GOOD governance or the QUALITY ofgovernmentwithout entering into a dialoquewith modern politicalphilosophy is …. unjustified • May result in utilitarian definitions ofQoGby whichindividualsaresacrificed for somenotionof ”the collectivegood” (”Leninism”)

  26. Requirements of definition of QoG • Universalism • Precision • Non-functionalism • Connectedtodemocratictheory (proceduralism) • Resonate with major works in modern politicalphilosophyaboutjustice, rights and equality • Resonate with central empiricalfindings

  27. Democratictheory and QoG • Input side: PoliticalEquality (Robert Dahl) • Output side: Impartiality (Rothstein & Teorell) • BASIC NORM = In bothcases, weshouldexpectconsiderable variation in the specificinstitutionalconfiguration • The oppositetojustice is ….. • …..favoritism

  28. QoG = Impartiality • When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law • QoG is about the exercise of power, not the access to power • Rules out corruption, but also other forms of favoritism such as clientelism, nepotism, patronage and discrimination

  29. Rawls twogreathopes • By arranging fair procedures for collective decision-making(= liberal democracy) the probabilityof just outcomeswillincrease • By arranging fair procedures for the implementation ofthesedecisions (= QoG), the probabilityof just outcomeswillincrease • In bothcases, therecan be no guarantee

  30. QoG and PoliticalLegitimacy • “it is notable that democratic rights, while certainly qualifying as one of the most important causes of legitimacy, turn out to be roughly on par with welfare gains, and both of these are far less important than good governance. This clashes with standard liberal treatments of legitimacy that give overall priority to democratic rights“ (Bruce Gilley)

  31. Politicallegitimacy, cont. • ”It is QualityofGovernment and the impartialtreatment on the output sideof the political system, and not electoraldemocracy, thatcreatesregimelegitimacy” (Torbjörn Gjefsen 2012)

  32. How to get it? What do we know? • AvnerGreif in HandbookofInstitutionalEconomics 2005: Efficient (i.e., QoG) institutions ”operate in a fewadvancedcontemporarycountries and only in recent times. Weknowsurprisinglylittle, however, regarding the institutionaldevelopmentthat led tothese modern successes”

  33. Twotheoreticalmisspecificationsof the problem • The principal-agent theory • Agents as rational utility maximizers • Problem can be fixed by incremental change of incentive structure • The public ethics theory • Agents aremotivated by social norms • Problem can be fixed by enlightenededucation

  34. QoG and the Human Nature • Reciprocity is the central motivethat drives human agency. • “if people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption and abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions” (Fehr and Fischbacher 2006).

  35. LowQoG/Corruption as a social trap • QoG as a problem of collective action • Actors strategies based on reciprocity • “What agents do, depends on what they think most other agents will do” • Corruption as a self-reinforcing equilibrium • Rationality is “strategic” or “interactive” • Equilibria about expectations must change • Requires as “big bang” change”

  36. QoG as a Social Trap • Everyoneknowsthatif all respect the impartialityof institutions, all willwin • But – if people cannot trust that “almost everyone else” will respect the impartial institutions they will be destroyed because the end is contingent on honest cooperation by “almost everyone else” • Thus, dishonest behavior may be rational when people do not trust that others will also be honest. • Conclusion: Efficient cooperation for establishing impartial institutions will only come about if people trust that most other people will respect them • Lacking this trust, the social trap is for real. That is, we end up in a state of affairs that is worse for everyone, even though everyone know that they would profit from impartial institutions

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