Growing radicalization among youth in Somalia

1. Growing radicalization among youth in Somalia By Lilla Schumicky PhD Candidate/ University of Bradford/ Peace Studies Africa Conflict Monitoring Group Coordinator / University of Bradford UNDP Somalia Intern ACTED Area Coordinator / North-West Kenya

2. Hypothesis Radicalization among youth is currently increasing in Somalia, especially after the Ethiopian intervention in 2007. In order to mitigate the radicalization among youth, it is crucial to understand the motivations and contributing factors. Once they are deconstructed, community based, bottom up approach national interventions could decrease the level of radicalization, through prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration.

3. Introduction • The Islamic Court Union (ICU) took over control of South and middle Somalia in 2006 • Mass engagement of youth in fighting appeared, after the invasion of Somalia by the US supported Ethiopian troops, which have overthrown the ICU in 2007 • From both national and international environment youth joined various armed factions in order to defeat the invaders • From the diasporas in the US and Europe youth started to ‘disappear’ and moved back to Somalia. In 2007, 23 youth moved from Minneapolis to Somalia according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 8 persons were judged on court for recruitment of youth

4. Various armed factions • The ICU had a specially established youth wing that was under the command of a small group of people lead by Sheikh Muhtar Robow– al-Shabaab • ICU was commanded by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Hassan Dahir Awey • Sheikh Sharif is the current minister of the Transitional Federal Governement (TFG) • Hassan Dahir Aweys has formed the other main opposition group: Hizbul Islam • Most youth both locally and internationally joined al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam ICU TFG Ethiopians Hizbul Islam Al-Shabaab Ahlu Sunna AMISOM

5. The major groupsHizbul Islam & al-Shabaab Relations • Hijbul Islamiya and al-Shabaab are sharing common ideology and interests • Both are mainly supported by the diaspora and external actors such as Eritrea. However recent terrorist attacks such as the Shamo Hotel Graduation attack in December 2009 offset the support by the diaspora. • Both are fractions originating and a type of continuation of ICU however: • HI is militarily less organized • HI has a more centralized leadership • Al-S’s leadership and military officers are trained foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Chechnya linked to al-Qaeda • Al-S has different units operating separately

6. The major groupsHizbul Islam & al-Shabaab It is an increasingly feeble and unreliable alliance of various armed groupss Stated interests: • To fight the West’s puppet government the TFG, which is considered to be infidel • To fight all of its supporters such as Ahlu Sunna and AMISOM • To uproot all external / international interventions in any form such as humanitarian or development aid, military support etc • To introduce a strict version of Sharia law • To fight the Global jihad beyond the border of Somalia and spread it first to the neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia and than to Africa and the West • To support other jihadist movements in different Muslim countries such as Palestine Dufferences • HI and al-Shabaab is fighting each other in order to gain economical control over strategic points HI Hidden interests: • To control Mogadishu hence its leader – Awey belongs to Ayr clan, which is a sub-clan of Hawiye and one of the most powerful in the capital city • Personal bad feelings towards the current president – ‘Awey was left out of the deal’ while establishing the current TFG Al-Shabaab ‘s hidden intrests • To support farmers of the Rahanweyn clan and Leysan sub-clan from where Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansur – the leader is originating from by banning food aid distribution by aid agencies such as WFP

7. Causes and contributing factors 45 percent of the population is below 14 and years and the median age of the Somalia’s total population is 17.5 (CIA Factbook). A three level analysis is provided in order to capture the possible angles of the motivations of joining on individual, social and institutional levels. These three are interlinked and it is not possible to separate one from the other; however dominant causes can be identified on all three levels.

8. Causes and contributing factors Individual level engagement • Linked to the psychological status of the mind • The whole society, which has been impacted by the war became brutal and brutalized in the same time • Traumatisation is caused by the separation of family members, torture and rape, frequent displacements, lack of financial support and adaption of a new way of life from the nomadic society to the displaced and aid dependant society • These factors lead to depression and sadness that further acts as being the only solution for all problems. • Lack of hope: The sixteen failed peace-talks the two previous and the third currently failing government • Growing anger and bitterness towards the international community due to the lack of support encourages global jihad against the West • War caused the fragmentation of the nuclear family; child abuse became rampant • Feeling of Revenge (disappearance of the traditional xeer) • Participation is based on money, the promise of money and khaat According to the Kenya National Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse a daily $300 000 is paid by Somalis for the drug. • Guarantee from the various factions that they will have the freedom to loot, extort and rape. The looting is officially part of the salary and subsidizes the low wage which is not paid regularly.

9. Causes and contributing factors Social level engagement • High rate of unemployment - about 80 percent in Mogadishu according to SAACID • If the nuclear family has enough funds then they may buy a gun, most frequently AK47 machine gun • Families decide to dedicate one of the sons for a security job • Environmental destruction took considerable part of the lack of unemployment and lack of opportunities

10. Causes and contributing factors Institutional level engagement • Cheap human resource that is easy mobilize and recruit • Ideology, the Salafi-Wahabbism, which lies along Sayid Qutb’s philosophy that emphasizes the implementation of an extremely strict version of sharia law • al-Shabaab becomes the family of the youth where is relative security and order can be found • Proliferation and the extremely easy access to small arms – forms of currency • Radio game shows, which were run by the Shabaabs in Southern Somalia, AK 47s, hand grenades and anti tank landmines were the prizes for the winners if they could correctly answer questions related to the Quran. The host of the quiz show has said: “The reason the young men were rewarded with weapons is to encourage them to participate in the ongoing holy war against the enemies of Allah in Somalia,” AFP news agency quoted al-Shabab's Sheikh Abdullahi Alhaq on the prize-giving ceremony.

11. DDR in Mogadishu • Initiatives to decrease the number of participants in various armed groups have been taken since 2001 in the form of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. • Three DDR attempts took place solely in Mogadishu between 2001 and 2007. • It is traditionally comes along with Security Sector Reforms (SSR) after when a peace agreement is signed and major direct violence is ended. (Negative peace -> aiming toward positive peace decrease structural and cultural violence Galtung 2003)

12. DDR in Mogadishu First DDR in 2001 • Funded by the Italian Government through UNESCO it has demobilized and provided four months vocational training for 225 militiamen • It has not contained any of the elements of DDR such as disarmament, demobilization or reintegration and was in fact purely the remobilization of militiamen into the police and official military forces after vocational training. • The main desire of the militiamen was to find gainful employment after training where they were ready to participate

13. DDR in Mogadishu Second DDR 2003-2004 • Characters of the II. DDR: bottom-up grassroots programming, with strong international partnership • Three hundred participants 150 were from the civil society and half of them were women • The aim of the involvement of the women was to encourage them not to buy guns for their sons and make them understand that there are other ways of earning living but encouraging them to join • At least one, working automatic weapon had to be handed over, in order to be able to participate on the training

14. DDR in Mogadishu Third DDR 2005- 2006 • 512 freelance militiamen were provided with micro credit and vocational training • In 2008 when a Tracer survey was conducted forty percent of them were still employed despite the dire circumstances and extremely bad security situation (full-blown insurgency in the capital) • It had a long-term effect because participants were saying: “I gave up robbing people,” “I care about myself now and don’t like bad deeds,” “I have a free life and know between good and bad,” ”I have character to live with people,” • Community-based and community-owned approach of the entire DDR programme.

15. Arms Violence Reduction Project (AVRP) In spite of this success of the previous three DDR programmes the donor community is not committed of funding further DDR programmes in Somalia; yet UNDP has further developed it into Arms Violence Reduction Project (AVRP). The main justification of AVRP is that Somali people are prisoners of a cycle of armed violence from, which is extremely hard to break out of. The community is influenced by impunity and weak justice system – the sharia courts are no longer functioning in many places. • Prevention would be realized in non-violent conflict management and cure in rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-militiamen into the society. The project would consist of three phases: • 1) Security diagnosis where the type of violence, the nature of conflict and the endogenous resources will be identified. • 2) The set up of community security plan by consulting with community members on district levels. • 3) Execution of the activities by entrusted local NGOs • The plan has been prepared in 2008 but funding hasn’t yet arrived. Instead the financial support goes towards the extremely week Transitional Federal Government. However the TFG is not in the position to implement any kind of DDR in Somalia.

16. Conclusion Radicalization of youth is currently increasing due to the various individual, social and institutional external andinternal push factors. DDR in a form of bottom-up approach with community based ownership could be one of the possible solutions for the mitigation of radicalization of youth in Somalia by targeting each push factors on the various levels, and aiming towards prevention, demobilization and reintegration.

17. Thank you for your attention l.Schumicky@bradford.ac.uk Lilla.schumicky@acted.org