DEMIFER: DEmographic and MIgratory Flows affecting European Regions and cities

1. DEMIFER: DEmographic and MIgratory Flows affecting European Regions and cities Johanna Roto on behalf of the DEMIFER team ESPON Liege, 18 November 2010

2. Demographic State • At present more than one quarter of the NUTS2 regions in the ESPON area experiences population decline • Main demographic changes across Europe: • slowing of population growth • Ageing of the population • Migration • Not sufficient to compensate decline • May lead to an increase in regional disparities • Affects also age structures of populations & labour force resources • Increasing importance of intra- and extra-Europe migration

3. Demographic State • The size of the working age population declined in 25% of all NUTS2 regions in 2000-2007; at the same time there are more than 50 regions where the working age population has increased by more than one per cent per year • decline in the growth rate of the working age population • Main cause of change: cohort turnove • Big cities attract labour migrants

4. Regional differentiation Therefore there is not one unambiguous effect of migration and demography on the competitiveness of European regions and thus Policy strategies Different types of regions face different challenges -> Policies stimulating i.e. mobility may have different impacts on different types of regions Different challenges ask for different mix of policies Bundles of policies -> need for cross-sectoral thinking Case studies More spatial detail (NUTS 3 – NUTS5) Focus on internal and international migration and the linkages with regional socio-economic dynamics TYPOLOGY OF REGIONS

5. Typology of the Demographic Status in 2005 • Based on: share of both young adults and elder population, natural population change and net migration rate. • Retaining favourable trends: • 'Euro Standard' • 'Family Potentials types' • Dealing with population decline: • 'Challenge of Labour Force' • 'Challenge of Decline' • Challenging disparities: • 'Challenge of Ageing' • 'Young Potentials‘ • Overseas

6. Type 1 & 3  favourable demographic & socio-economic trends Above average: GDP level, share of migrants, share of highly educated, labour force participation Below average:GDP growth, unemployment

7. Type 2 & 5  population decline & “lagging behind” Below average: GDP level, share of migrants, share of highly educated, labour force participation Above average: GDP growth, unemployment

8. Type 4 & 6  demographic growth & socio-economic disparities Above average: GDP level, share of migrants Around average: Labour force participation Type 4 (-), Type 6 (+): GDP growth, share of highly educated, unemployment

9. Policy Options Retaining favourable trends: Euro Standard (Type 1) and Family Potentials (Type 3) Retain the favourable trends -> Continued pursuance of the Lisbon agenda goals and “smart growth” Need for greater social inclusion (immigrants, youth, women in labour markets) Dealing with population decline: Challenge of Labour Force (Type 2) and Challenge of Decline (Type 5) Making this regions attractive places to live and work Boost natural population growth, attract immigrants and increase opportunities for the labour force. Challenged by population growth: Challenge of Ageing (Type 4) and Young Potentials (Type 6) Not onlymore, but better jobs for growing/changingpopulation Integration of migrants & family-friendly policies

10. The impact of migration on population change • 75% of NUTS2 regions gain population due to migration • Migration, both intra-Europe and especially extra-Europe, have and will have a significant impact on demographic and labour force development of regions. • It will benefit affluent regions, whereas poor regions will loose population due to migration. Similarly, migration will reduce ageing in affluent regions and increase in poor ones. • Most regions experiencing population decrease do so mainly due to natural change. Most regions gaining populations do so mainly due to extra-Europe migration.

11. The impact of migration on population change • Under the Status Quo scenario the population declines by 40 million over the 45 years. • Over 75% of the regions are gainers of migration, and in 1/4 of the regions the 2050 population size will be 30% higher. • Without changes in demographic and migratory flows, 1/3 of the regions will face considerable population decline (> 20% by 2050).

12. Future trends in the labour force • The age pattern of female labour force participation differs considerably across types of regions • Regional disparities in activity rates depend on economic developments • If the rates would not change, the size of the labour force in the ESPON area will decline by 17% until 2050 • In 23 regions the labour force would shrink by > 50%. • Only in 1/4 of the regions the labour force would increase. • In 90 percent of the European regions the labour force would be smaller without extra- European migration.

13. Policy scenarios

14. Policy scenarios • Population scenarios are important devices for thinking about alternative futures, taking into account both the mutual relationship between demography & economy and the linkages between economic & social policies and demographic & migratory developments • Policy scenario implications for: • Mortality: expected to decline but not in all regions to the same degree • Fertility: expected to increase or to be maintained at the current level -> vital to pursue family-friendly social welfare policies • Migration: constant internal migration; international migration is assumed to increase • Population ageing remains the most important demographic challenge in all scenarios • Both the old-age dependency ratios and the very old-age dependency ratios rise steadily, but slightly more in the social scenarios than in the market scenarios. The gap between the ODR and VODR is larger in the ‘successful’ scenarios (GSE and EME) than in the ‘unsuccessful’ scenarios (LSE and CME).

15. Population Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios • GSE: most likely to come true when economy-environment policies result in sustainable growth and effective cohesion policies. Large decreases in mortality, large increases in fertility. Migration levels and regional inequalities increase significantly. • EME: sustainable economic growth and strong competitive goals. Less favorable developments in mortality and fertility, large increases in migration • LSE: relatively small decreases in mortality, constant fertility patterns and declining migration levels. • CME: low economic growth, environmental challenges are not met, and strong competitive goals. Decreasing mortality & fertility, constant migration levels. Least favourable scenario

16. Labour Force Change in 2005-2050 - Scenarios • The growth of the labour force does not just depend on the size of the working age population but also on the level of labour force participation rates • GSE and EME: high economic growth will lead to an increasing trend in labour force participation rates. • LSE: the poor economic and environmental developments lead to falling activity rates everywhere • CME: activity rates are falling due to a sustained economic downturn. Disparities are growing • In the future a lot of regions will be struck by a shrinking labour force. The LSE scenario sketches the most dramatic setback. Least dramatic is the setback in the EME.

17. Population & Labour Force Change in 2005-2050 • Increased competition of labour force

18. Some conclusion • We believe policy and demography are linked. • Different policy bundles will influence the direction of change in future population of Europe, its countries and regions. • If the status quo holds for the next forty years, Europe’s population will decline and age . • If successful policies stimulate economic growth and solve environmental/resource problems, Europe’s population could grow by ~20%. • If policies are not so successful, then Europe’s population will hover around its current level of 500 million. • No matter what scenario comes to fruition, life expectancies will increase substantially and the populations of European regions will age dramatically. • Many regions will lose population through out-migration but the net welfare of today’s population will be improved because millions will have moved to new lives in more successful regions.

19. Policy Bundles/Combinations - Migration • Immigration • May be an answer in many regions and help narrow the gap between Eastern/Southern regions and Northern Central Europe. But these policies must be complemented by policies to help the integration of newcomers (language, skills). • Inter-regional migration • Policies aimed at increasing mobility between European regions may reduce cohesion, not increase it. Thus policies aimed to stimulate migration are only effective as part of policy bundles to improve living condition in poor regions (jobs, housing, schools). • Extra-European migration • Immigration policies to facilitate economic migration must be coupled with successful integration policies to attract higher skilled migrants

20. Policy Bundles/Combinations - Labour Markets and economy • Increasing number of persons and years on labour market • Policies aimed at increasing the age of retirement should be combined with policies stimulating healthy behaviour • Raising labour force participation results in decreasing disparities only if the labour market performs well. Thus policies to reduce gender equalities and improve work/child care balance and integration of immigrants are needed for this. • Economic growth/labour supply • Growth in labour productivity can be raised by technology, capacity building and investments in education and training, but to be effective these measures need to be complemented by measures to compensate the effects of ageing

21. In conclusion… • Policies aimed at affecting demographic and migratory flows should not be considered in isolation from other policies, such as housing, labour market, integration of migrants, education, innovation and environmental quality

22. The DEMIFER project team NIDI (The Hague, Netherlands) – Lead Partner, state of the art Joop de Beer, Nicole van der Gaag, Rob van der Erf, Peter Ekamper UNIVIE (Vienna, Austria) – Demographical typology Heinz Fassmann, Ramon Bauer IOM/CEFMR (Warsaw, Poland) – Multipoles Projection Marek Kupiszewski, Dorota Kupiszewska Nordregio (Stockholm, Sweden) – Policy & Dissemination Daniel Rauhut, Johanna Roto, Lisa van Well University of Leeds (Leeds, United Kingdom) – Scenarios & population change Phil Rees, Peter Boden, Adam Dennett, John Stillwell PBL (The Hague, Netherlands) – Scenarios & labour force change Andries de Jong, Mark ter Veer CNR (Rome, Italy) – Case studies Frank Heins, Corrado Bonafazi, Giuseppe Gesano Thank You!