Accounting for Inter-Organizational Relations:

1. Accounting for Inter-Organizational Relations: the EU, the UN and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08) Spyros Blavoukos (sblavo@aueb.gr) and Dimitris Bourantonis (bouranto@aueb.gr) Paper for the GOSEM Summer School Rethymnon, Sep. 2013

2. Introduction • Inter-organizationalism in IR neglected; still large variety of insights from other disciplines (e.g. sociology and management) • Research question: which parameters condition relations between IOs? • Narrow down the focus: nested organizations (e.g. regional organizations in the UN system → EU in the UN) • Case study: EU-UN and the sanctions towards Iran (2003-8)

3. IOs and Interorganizationalism (I) • IOs strive for organizational autonomy; then why engage in a relationship with another IO? • Three causes: • resource scarcity→ performance distress • Contingencies: necessity, asymmetry-reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy • normative congruence: • ideological and normative attraction of cooperative engagement • existence of a powerful extra-organizational force: • induces or enforces joint activities between IOs, motivating ‘voluntary’ inter-organizational cooperation • in nested IOs, consider also differentiated membership and institutional format (e.g. veto right in the UNSC)

4. IOs and Interorganizationalism (II) • How do we chose the partner IO? • complementarity of resources: • to maximise benefits of cooperation • domain similarity: • similar, not identical; • potential of turf competition and eventual absorption • normative orientation of an IO vis-à-vis international cooperation: • embrace of multilateral and cooperative approaches to IR

5. Regionalism in the UN • Regionalism welcomed in the UN Charter (Art. 52-54): • ROs activities consistent with the UN purposes and principles • states encouraged to go first to ROs before UNSC • UNSC may use ROs for the settlement of regional conflicts • no enforcement action by ROs without the UNSC authorization. • UNSC should be kept fully informed for the activities of ROs • supremacy of universalism over regionalism undermined in practice • ‘ROs have imposed economic sanctions without UNSC authorization • UN gets from ROs: more material and personnel resources, better understanding of the political and cultural underpinnings of a regional crisis • ROs get from the UN: legitimacy

6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty System (NPT) • NPT (1968): NNWS will not acquire nuclear weapons and NWS will not proliferate them • balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the NWS-NNWS • Guarantees offered to NNWS by NWS: • NNWS not to be deprived of the potential benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear energy; in return, NNWS accept system of inspections by IAEA • security guarantees to NNWS

7. EU Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy • Basic documents: • Basic Principles for a Strategy against Proliferation of WMD (June 2003) • European Security Strategy (ESS) • EU Strategy against the Proliferation of the WMD (both December 2003) • Objectives of EU policy: • universalization and strengthening of the NPT • greater effectiveness and further improvement of inspection and verification practices and increased detectability of significant violations • improving export control and practices • EU stresses diplomatic containment: use of political and economic ‘sticks and carrots’; coercion (economic, not military) may follow after UN authorization

8. The EU and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08) (I) • Stage 1 (2003-5): EU takes the diplomatic lead • EU offers only economic ‘carrots’ unable to offer the security guarantees that might have sealed the deal or invoke credibly the option of ‘sticks’ to coerce Iran • Stage 2 (2005-8): negotiations break down, after the Iranian Presidential elections and full securitization of the issue • EU could have imposed sanctions unilaterally (like other ROs) • however, it takes the issue to the UN • to enhance effectiveness of any collective response • to legitimize possible enforcement action in concordance with its own normative adherence to multilateralism

9. The EU and the Iranian Nuclear Program (2003-08) (II) • from 2006 onwards, US, Russia and China increasingly involved ( ‘EU3+3’) • options: either more ‘carrots’ (especially the security guarantees that the EU was unable to offer initially) or ‘sticks’. • the US tipped the balance to the latter • the EU orchestrated the first round of economic sanctions in mid-2006, having to accommodate in the course of intra-UN negotiations the Russian and Chinese concerns (to avoid their veto) • in 2007, intra-EU cohesion in question; US intervention came in support of ‘hardliners’

10. Conclusions • functional and normative pillars of the EU-UN relationship as well as the US presence and the UNSC institutional set up (veto power of permanent members) account for the EU diplomatic role in the crisis and especially the path to the UN-imposed economic sanctions from 2003 to 2008

11. Resource scarcity: • delay in materialising the economic incentives of the 2004 Paris agreement, • incapacity to offer security guarantees • a priori exclusion of military intervention: no coercion potential (even as a threat) • Normative congruence: • EU in quest of political legitimization • this was a lacking resource, but its importance depends on the value it has for an international actor • decision to move the Iranian dossier to the UN rather than impose sanctions unilaterally reflects also the EU’s normative commitment to collective responses • US presence as well as the other two UNSC permanent members with veto right: • accommodation of American, Russian, and Chinese concerns