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Afghanistan Part II the Road to ISAF

Afghanistan Part II the Road to ISAF. Sources : National Security Archive David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All , Oxford U.P., 2009 nato.int. Taliban regime.

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Afghanistan Part II the Road to ISAF

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  1. Afghanistan Part IIthe Road to ISAF Sources: National Security Archive David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, Oxford U.P., 2009 nato.int

  2. Taliban regime • The Taliban was initially a mixture of Mujahedin who fought against the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, and a group of Pashtun tribesmen • They gained an initial territorial foothold in the southern city of Kandahar, and over the next two years expanded their influence through a mixture of force, negotiation, and payoffs • In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and took control of the national government

  3. …Taliban regime • Prior to September 11, 2001, Western dealings with the Taliban involved a mix of diplomacy and soft power • In its final years in power, the Taliban became increasingly isolated and faced severe UN Security Council sanctions • The administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton held direct talks with the group, though Washington never recognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan

  4. …Taliban regime • The U.S. government pressed the Taliban to expel Osama bin Laden over 30 times between 1996 and the summer of 2001 • A series of Security Council resolutions urged the Taliban to end its abusive treatment of women • In August 1997, the U.S. State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington closed • In October 1999, the Security Council imposed sanctions against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, freezing funds and restricting travel of the groups' members

  5. UN and 9/11 • 9/12: SC Res. 1368: • SC condemns attacks • recalls right of self-defense • pledges to take all necessary steps to fight terrorism • makes clear that those who aided and supported terrorism could be legitimate targets

  6. A pragmatic dimension of the SC’s efficiency • SC’s efficiency derived from genuine shock and outrage at the attacks • However, a second element was pragmatism: • A-Aggressive US response was certain • B-Other SC members wanted to ensure that US worked with international institutions as it struck back

  7. US seems eager to comply • DoS, assisted by UK, immediately began drafting a comprehensive resolution to require all states to prevent, combat, and punish terrorism • Draft presented to SC in a few days • US draft well received by SC • SC Res. 1373 approved 9/28

  8. SC Resolution 1373 • States required to cut off funds flowing to terrorists, punish or extradite terrorists on their soils, and share the information needed to investigate terrorist activities. Counterterrorism committee established to supervise the effort and all member states asked to submit reports detailing their compliance

  9. A real common purpose? • Political unity ended when it came to military operations • US totally unwilling to be restrained by SC deliberations or additional resolutions • 10/7: Operation Enduring Freedom launched by US in Afghanistan to oust Taliban regime

  10. Preserving the forms • 10/9: letter to SC announcing that “the US has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent rights of individual and collective self-defense following armed attacks that were carried out against the US on Sept. 11, 2001” • US urged to appear before SC • The Bush administration did not want to give the impression that it needed permission • US finally agreed to discuss letter and incipient operations before SC

  11. Operations against the Taliban • There was no deliberation, consultation was only formalistic, but at least the form was preserved • The world’s attention shifted from NY to Afghanistan • War against terrorism generally seen as joint struggle • O. bin Laden reinforced impression with message: “Those who want to solve our problems at the UN are hypocrites who try to deceive God, his prophet and believers, because our sufferings are caused by UN”

  12. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) • UN becomes active in plans on what and who would replace Taliban • End of December, SC unanimously approved Res. 1386: • International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established under British command to secure Kabul and surroundings • Little thought given to sending traditional UN peacekeepers • Pattern of delegating to coalitions of willing countries prevailed

  13. …ISAF • On 11 August 2003 NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, ending the six-month national rotations • NATO became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan

  14. …ISAF • ISAF’s mandate was initially limited to providing security in and around Kabul • In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country • http://www.isaf.nato.int/

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