Dual-Use Examples

1. Dual-Use Examples Lecture No. 15 Applied Version For further information and video link please click on the right buttons in the following slides Further Inf.

2. 1. Outline • The meaning of dual-use today • Slides 1-7 • Typical examples of dual-use research • Slides 8-11 • The Fink Report • Slides 12-20 • The NSABB 2007 Oversight proposals • Slides 21-22 • The 2008 Israeli Report • Slide 23 • University of Maryland project on ‘Controlling Dangerous Pathogens’ • Slides 24-26 • Emerging concept of dual-use research • Slides 27-30

3. 2. The meaning of dual-use today The term “dual-use technologies,” primarily applied to technologies with both military utility and viable commercial applications, has acquired a second meaning in the context of potential weapons development: the tools, skills, equipment, and knowledge critical to conducting legitimate research and development that could be subverted to malicious use. Rapid advances in biology, chemistry, and the information sciences will produce even more of these dual-use technologies, in both senses of the term, by 2020. Julie E. Fischer Senior Associate The Henry L. Stimson Center Further Inf.

4. 3. Scientist’s honor and destroyer’s dishonor Air pollution and the destruction of ozone layer （Oct 5, 2008 Yomiuri Newspaper) Who do you select in the context of “the scientist who damaged the earth most”? US scientist James Conant (1893 - 1978) • Took the initiative to produce poison gas in World War I • Became the president of the Harvard University at his age of forty • The chairperson of the National Defense Science Committee: Promoted the project of developing atomic bomb US chemist Thomas Midgley (1889 - 1944) • Invented leaded gasoline to suppress car knocking • Succeeded in synthesizing dichlorodifluoromethane: cooling media of refrigerators and air conditioners, abstergent of electronics, gas for sprays • Benevolent inventor may become the worst destroyer. • To what extent should scientists take responsibility to their discovery or invention? Further Inf.1 Further Inf.2

5. Dual use dilemmas 4. Start point of the problems Good research projects, Excellent results But … we cannot exclude the possibility of hostile misuse

6. 5. Why do the life scientists need to know the dual-use issue? • The development of science and technology, especially in life science such as biotechnology and recombinant DNA technology, is closely related to the development of “new generation” biological weapons. • Benevolent and civil research can be used for not only military purposes but also deliberate applications, and it could happen independently of researcher’s opinions. （Dual use dilemma） • Now is the age of high-speed internet and anyone can obtain the information of science and technology very easily from websites. Therefore, the scientists need to be responsible for the information that they provide also they have to foster their foresight about dual use research. • Regarding the publication of research results and new findings, researchers’ free and voluntary activity should be maintained. Governments or independent authorities are not the only responsible framework of this issue. Therefore, scientists themselves must tackle on the problems of dual use dilemma. • In the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, no reliable framework or methods to verify the compliance are established so far. That is the biggest problem in the Convention and simultaneously the life scientist can provide their knowledge to this issue. • If the life scientists themselves have an interest in the dual-use issue and participate in related frameworks, it will enhance the comprehensive resolution of this issue.

7. 6. Biosecurity is needed in the life science research Biosecurity • Prevention of unauthorized or risky use of microbes that could be used for the development of biological and toxin weapons or bioterrorism. • The process or countermeasures to suppress it. It is time to consider new measures for dealing with dual-use life science. • Current goals： • To strengthen the protection of Biosecurity • To recognize the importance of ‘dual-use’ issue

8. . 7. Dual-use concern is not an unrealistic issue but a real problem • The UK’s detailed science and technology review covered 23 separate topics • （ Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;The Fifth Review Conference of 2001-2002） • Genomics and proteomics • Bioinformatics • Human Genome Project and human diversity • Gene therapy • Virulence and pathogenicity • Vaccines and novel therapies • Recombinant protein expression • Toxins and other bioactive molecules • Detection and identification technologies • Human infectious disease patterns • Smallpox destruction • Drug resistance • Disease in agriculture • Pest control in agriculture • Global initiatives to tackle disease • Molecular biology applications and crops • Trends in protein production technologies • International co-operation and biosafety: activities under the Biodiversity Convention • Means of delivery of agents and toxins • Use of pathogens to control weeds and ‘criminal’ crops • Bioremediation: the destruction of material • Countering the threat of BW terrorism • Impact of the entry into force of the CWC Useful in protecting against disease and BW Many were seen as causes of concern Further Inf.

9. 8. Sign of dual-use problems in life science research - Concerns about hostile misuse of bioscience Examples of dual-use research (Papers in a gray zone) (1) Genetic manipulation of anthrax vaccine Pomerantsev, A.P., Staritsin, N.A., Mockov Yu, V. and Marinin, L.I. (1997) Expression of cereolysine AB genes in Bacillus anthracis vaccine strain ensures protection against experimental hemolytic anthrax infection. Vaccine, 15, 1846-1850. The title appears as if “An improvement in anthrax vaccine” But … the truth was the addition of toxin genes to the anthrax vaccine (2) b-endorphin production in Francisella tularensis Borzenkov, V.M., Pomerantsev, A.P. and Ashmarin, I.P. (1993) [The additive synthesis of a regulatory peptide in vivo: the administration of a vaccinal Francisella tularensis strain that produces beta-endorphin]. Biull Eksp Biol Med, 116, 151-153. Combination of biological agent and bioregulator The possibility of making a new bioweapon?

10. 9. A typical example of dual-use dilemma in scientific research Further Inf.

11. Unexpected toxicity • Inefficacy of present vaccine programme Genetically-manipulated mouse virus Analysis of the mechanism If similar technique were used, it stimulates the development of ultimate biological weapon? Dual-use research? Human smallpox virus 10. Genetically manipulated new virus showed unexpectedly strong virulence to kill the mice • Originally the virus was constructed for other purpose • (Contraceptive vaccine for mice) • The vaccine was developed to raise the antibody response to zona pellucida glycoprotein 3, and mousepox virus was used as a simple vehicle to carry it. Refer to Lecture 13: Dual-Use Example 1: Mousepox

12. 11. Problems in this paper from the viewpoints of dual-use • The purpose of this study was to improve antibody production by IL-4 gene insertion into ectromelia virus, but the recombinant virus suppressed cellular immunity very strongly. (Unexpected products for researchers) • The authors show the possibility of making a new pathogenic virus by manipulating the gene that directly involves in immune response. (The possibility of making new pathogenic viruses using similar concept) • The recombinant virus exerted strong immunosuppressive effect to the host that already has acquired immunity to the same virus strain. (Warning to the vaccine programme) • Novel vaccine research regarding cancers and other diseases may produce unexpected products such as killer viruses. (Similar research may produce harmful viruses?) • Research reports can be freely published in medical journals and anyone can read them. (Easy provision of information) • Simple gene manipulation may lead to the production of novel viruses. (No need of high technology and specialized knowledge)

13. 12. The Fink Report Further Inf.

14. 13. The Fink Report • The Committee’s 2004 report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, is usually referred to as the Fink Report. • The Fink Report contained seven recommendations to ensure responsible oversight for biotechnology research with potential bioterrorism applications. • One of these recommendations was to create a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense within the Department of Health and Human Services to provide advice, guidance, and leadership for a system of review and oversight of experiments of concern.

15. 14. Experiments of concern (Seven categories) －Fink Report (NAS 2004)－ “Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism”, http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10827.html • Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective. • This would apply to both human and animal vaccines. • 2.Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents. • This would apply to therapeutic agents that are used to control disease agents in humans, animals, or crops. Introduction of ciprofloxacin resistance in Bacillus anthracis would fall in this class. • 3.Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent. • This would apply to plant, animal, and human pathogens. Introduction of cereolysin toxin gene into Bacillus anthracis would fall into this class. • 4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen. • This would include enhancing transmission within or between species. Altering vector competence to enhance disease transmission would fall into this class. • 5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen. • This would include making nonzoonotics into zoonotic agents. Altering the tropism of viruses would fit into this class. • 6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities. • This could include microencapsulation to avoid antibody based detection and/or the alteration of gene sequences to avoid detection by established molecular methods. • 7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin. • This would include environmental stabilization of pathogens.

16. 15. Important points in the report are … • Ensure that Research is Not Limited • Educate the Scientific Community • Enhance the Review System for Experiments • Rely on Self-governance for Review of Publications • Create a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense • Improve Communication between Security, Law Enforcement, and Life Science Organizations • Review Physical Containment and Personnel Issues • Coordinate International Oversight

17. 16. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) Further Inf.

18. 17. NSABB ex officios

19. 18. NSABB Charge (1) Recommend: • Criteria for identifying dual use research • National guidelines for oversight of dual use research at both local (e.g., Institutional Biosafety Committees) and federal levels • 　　－Local review and approval processes • 　　－Criteria/processes for referral of issues to NSABB • Strategies for oversight of new classes of experiments and technologies

20. 19. NSABB Charge (2) • Advice on: • Program for biosecurity education and trainingfor all scientists and laboratory workers at federally funded institutions • A code of conductfor scientists and laboratory workers in life sciences research • Nationalguidelines on communication and disseminationof dual use research methodology and research results • Strategies forcoordinated international oversightof dual use research

21. 20. Points To Consider in Assessing the Risks and Benefits of Communicating Research Information with Dual Use Potential

22. 21. NSABB oversight proposals (1) Major steps in local oversight of dual use life science research Work conducted in accordance with risk management Dual-use research of concern identified No dual use potential identified

23. 22. NSABB oversight proposals (2) Examples of points of communication of dual use research during the research process ＊CRISP (Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects)

24. 23. The 2008 Israeli Report Mandatory education of life scientists about dual use research • The Israeli government recently passed a law regarding dual use life sciences research that enforces mandatory training. (Bill for the Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents, 2008. Israel.) • Charles Sturt University and the Australian National University recently passed legislation enforcing mandatory training. • Most recently, the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD Commission), entitled World at Risk, calls for mandatory education of life scientists about dual use research. The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (World at Risk) was released in December 2008. Israeli system may prove to be a better model for smaller countries

25. 24. University of Maryland project on ‘Controlling Dangerous Pathogens’ • The Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) • A proposed international biosecurity oversight system Further Inf.

26. 25. University of Maryland project on ‘Controlling Dangerous Pathogens’ Two key questions • What types of dual-use biotechnology research pose the greatest potential danger? • How can we manage the risks from such research without impeding scientific progress? Raise awareness on the dual-use issue and to obtain feedback on its ideas through a series of regional workshops

27. 26. University of Maryland project on ‘Controlling Dangerous Pathogens’ Two key elements 1. National licensing or registration of relevant personnel and research facilities • Technically qualified • Have undertaken biosecurity training • Have nothing in their background 2. Independent peer review of relevant researchactivities prior to their initiation • Any individual interested in conducting research covered by the oversight system would be required to provide information about their proposed project to an independent oversight body for review and approval • Consistent with a recommendation from a US National Academy of Sciences expert group, known as the Fink Committee

28. 27. Recent papers of typical dual-use life science research ①Research about anthrax genome (Read et al., 2003) ②Research about SARS genome (Marra et al., 2003) ③Analysis of hemagglutinin crystal of 1918 type Influenza virus (Gamblin et al., 2004; Stevens et al., 2004) ④Receptor of anthrax toxin(Santelli et al., 2004) ⑤Gene synthesis, synthetic biology (Ball, 2004; Breaker, 2004) ⑥Reconstitution of 1918 Spanish Flu viruses (Taubenberger et al., 2005; Tumpey et al., 2005) ⑦Botulinum toxin food supply (Wein and Liu, 2005) ⑧Genetic changes of Listeria, alter the host range of a pathogen (Wollert et al., 2007) • Published in popular journals such as Nature, Science, Cell, PNAS, etc. • Some research areas are beyond the category of Fink Report

29. 28. Emerging concept of dual-use research Seven categories of Fink and more

30. 29. Core responsibilities of life scientists regarding dual use research of concern Individuals involved in any stage of life sciences research have an ethical obligation to avoid or minimize the risks and harm that could result from malevolent use of research outcomes. • Toward that end, scientists should: • Assess their own research efforts for dual use potential and report as appropriate; • Seek to stay informed of literature, guidance, and requirements related to dual use research; • Train others to identify dual use research of concern, manage it appropriately, and communicate it responsibly; • Serve as role models of responsible behavior, especially when involved in research that meets the criteria for dual use research of concern; and • Be alert to potential misuse of research.

31. Options Decisions Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Complete Autonomy of Individual Scientist Institutional Control Institutional & Governmental Control Independent Authority Governmental Control Who are the Decision-makers regarding Im/permissible Research? Individual researcher • Scientists in University (collegial) • Corporation • Government Research Centre • Scientists in University (collegial) • Corporation • Government Research Centre Independent Authority Government Mandatory Physical Safety & Security Regulation No Yes Yes Yes Yes Is Licensing Dual-Use Technology Mandatory? No No Yes Yes Yes Is Education & Training Mandatory? No No Yes Yes Yes Is Personnel Security Regulation Mandatory? No No Yes Yes Yes Decision-makers regarding Censorship/Constraint of Material Proposed for Dissemination? Individual editor • Individual editor • Corporation • Government Research Centre • Individual editor • Corporation • Government Research Centre Independent Authority Government 30. Decision-making regarding dual-use dilemmas in the biological sciences By Professor Seumas Roderick Macdonald Miller, Professor of Philosophy (Charles Sturt University and the Australian National University) NB: the decision-making in question pertains only to dual-use research in the biological sciences identified as potentially problematic by virtue of coming under one of the pre-established headings of Experiments of Concern.

32. References References