Introduction to Computer Security: Key Management and Exchange

1. Nov 1, 2005 Introduction to Computer Security Lecture 8 Key Management IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

2. Issues • Authentication and distribution of keys • Session key • Key exchange protocols • Kerberos • Mechanisms to bind an identity to a key • Generation, maintenance and revoking of keys IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

3. Notation • XY : { Z || W } kX,Y • X sends Y the message produced by concatenating Z and W enciphered by key kX,Y, which is shared by users X and Y • AT : { Z } kA || { W } kA,T • A sends T a message consisting of the concatenation of Z enciphered using kA, A’s key, and W enciphered using kA,T, the key shared by A and T • r1, r2 nonces (nonrepeating random numbers) IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

4. Session, Interchange Keys • Alice wants to send a message m to Bob • Assume public key encryption • Alice generates a random cryptographic key ks and uses it to encipher m • To be used for this message only • Called a session key • She enciphers ks with Bob’s public key kB • kB enciphers all session keys Alice uses to communicate with Bob • Called an interchange key • Alice sends { m } ks{ ks} kB IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

5. Benefits • Limits amount of traffic enciphered with single key • Standard practice, to decrease the amount of traffic an attacker can obtain • Makes replay attack less effective • Prevents some attacks • Example: Alice will send Bob message that is either “BUY” or “SELL”. • Eve computes possible ciphertexts {“BUY”} kB and {“SELL”} kB. • Eve intercepts enciphered message, compares, and gets plaintext at once IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

6. Key Exchange Algorithms • Goal: Alice, Bob use a shared key to communicate secretly • Criteria • Key cannot be sent in clear • Attacker can listen in • Key can be sent enciphered, or derived from exchanged data plus data not known to an eavesdropper • Alice, Bob may trust third party • All cryptosystems, protocols publicly known • Only secret data is the keys, ancillary information known only to Alice and Bob needed to derive keys • Anything transmitted is assumed known to attacker IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

7. Classical Key Exchange • How do Alice, Bob begin? • Alice can’t send it to Bob in the clear! • Assume trusted third party, Cathy • Alice and Cathy share secret key kA • Bob and Cathy share secret key kB • Use this to exchange shared key ks IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

8. Simple Key Exchange Protocol { request for session key to Bob } kA Alice Cathy { ks }kA , { ks }kB Alice Cathy { ks } kB Alice Bob {m}ks Alice Bob Eve IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

9. Problems • How does Bob know he is talking to Alice? • Replay attack: Eve records message from Alice to Bob, later replays it; Bob may think he’s talking to Alice, but he isn’t • Session key reuse: Eve replays message from Alice to Bob, so Bob re-uses session key • Protocols must provide authentication and defense against replay IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

10. Needham-Schroeder Alice || Bob || r1 Alice Cathy { Alice || Bob || r1 || ks , { Alice || ks } kB } kA Alice Cathy { Alice || ks } kB Alice Bob { r2 } ks Alice Bob { r2 – 1 } ks Alice Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

11. Argument: Alice talking to Bob • Second message • Enciphered using key only she, Cathy know • So Cathy enciphered it • Response to first message • As r1 in it matches r1 in first message • Third message • Alice knows only Bob can read it • As only Bob can derive session key from message • Any messages enciphered with that key are from Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

12. Argument: Bob talking to Alice • Third message • Enciphered using key only he, Cathy know • So Cathy enciphered it • Names Alice, session key • Cathy provided session key, says Alice is other party • Fourth message • Uses session key to determine if it is replay from Eve • If not, Alice will respond correctly in fifth message • If so, Eve can’t decipher r2 and so can’t respond, or responds incorrectly IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

13. Problem withNeedham-Schroeder • Assumption: all keys are secret • Question: suppose Eve can obtain session key. How does that affect protocol? • In what follows, Eve knows ks { Alice || ks } kB [Replay] Eve Bob { r3 } ks [Eve intercepts] Eve Bob { r3 – 1 } ks Eve Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

14. Solution: Denning-Sacco Modification • In protocol above, Eve impersonates Alice • Problem: replay in third step • First in previous slide • Solution: use time stamp T to detect replay • Needs synchronized clocks • Weakness: if clocks not synchronized, may either reject valid messages or accept replays • Parties with either slow or fast clocks vulnerable to replay • Resetting clock does not eliminate vulnerability IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

15. Needham-Schroeder with Denning-Sacco Modification Alice || Bob || r1 Alice Cathy { Alice || Bob || r1 || ks || { Alice || T || ks } kB } kA Alice Cathy { Alice || T || ks } kB Alice Bob { r2 } ks Alice Bob { r2 – 1 } ks Alice Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

16. Otway-Rees Protocol • Corrects problem • That is, Eve replaying the third message in the protocol • Does not use timestamps • Not vulnerable to the problems that Denning-Sacco modification has • Uses integer n to associate all messages with a particular exchange IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

17. The Protocol n || Alice || Bob || { r1 || n || Alice || Bob } kA Alice Bob n || Alice || Bob || { r1 || n || Alice || Bob } kA || { r2 || n || Alice || Bob } kB Cathy Bob n || { r1 || ks } kA || { r2 || ks } kB Cathy Bob n || { r1 || ks } kA Alice Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

18. Argument: Alice talking to Bob • Fourth message • If n matches first message, Alice knows it is part of this protocol exchange • Cathy generated ks because only she, Alice know kA • Enciphered part belongs to exchange as r1 matches r1 in encrypted part of first message IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

19. Argument: Bob talking to Alice • Third message • If n matches second message, Bob knows it is part of this protocol exchange • Cathy generated ks because only she, Bob know kB • Enciphered part belongs to exchange as r2 matches r2 in encrypted part of second message IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

20. Replay Attack • Eve acquires old ks, message in third step • n || { r1 || ks } kA || { r2 || ks } kB • Eve forwards appropriate part to Alice • Alice has no ongoing key exchange with Bob: n matches nothing, so is rejected • Alice has ongoing key exchange with Bob: n does not match, so is again rejected • If replay is for the current key exchange, and Eve sent the relevant part before Bob did, Eve could simply listen to traffic; no replay involved IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

21. Kerberos • Authentication system • Based on Needham-Schroeder with Denning-Sacco modification • Central server plays role of trusted third party (“Cathy”) • Ticket (credential) • Issuer vouches for identity of requester of service • Authenticator • Identifies sender • Alice must • Authenticate herself to the system • Obtain ticket to use server S IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

22. IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

23. Overview • User u authenticates to Kerberos server • Obtains ticket Tu,TGS for ticket granting service (TGS) • User u wants to use service s: • User sends authenticator Au, ticket Tu,TGS to TGS asking for ticket for service • TGS sends ticket Tu,s to user • User sends Au, Tu,s to server as request to use s • Details follow IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

24. Ticket • Credential saying issuer has identified ticket requester • Example ticket issued to user u for service s Tu,s = s || { u || u’s address || valid time || ku,s } ks where: • ku,s is session key for user and service • Valid time is interval for which the ticket is valid • u’s address may be IP address or something else • Note: more fields, but not relevant here IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

25. Authenticator • Credential containing identity of sender of ticket • Used to confirm sender is entity to which ticket was issued • Example: authenticator user u generates for service s Au,s = { u || generation time || kt } ku,s where: • kt is alternate session key • Generation time is when authenticator generated • Note: more fields, not relevant here IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

26. Protocol Authentication server user || TGS user AS { ku,TGS } ku || Tu,TGS user AS service || Au,TGS || Tu,TGS user TGS user || { ku,s } ku,TGS || Tu,s user TGS Au,s || Tu,s user service { t + 1 } ku,s user service IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

27. Analysis • First two steps get user ticket to use TGS • User u can obtain session key only if u knows key shared with Cathy • Next four steps show how u gets and uses ticket for service s • Service s validates request by checking sender (using Au,s) is same as entity ticket issued to • Step 6 optional; used when u requests confirmation IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

28. Problems • Relies on synchronized clocks • If not synchronized and old tickets, authenticators not cached, replay is possible • Tickets have some fixed fields • Dictionary attacks possible • Kerberos 4 session keys weak (had much less than 56 bits of randomness); researchers at Purdue found them from tickets in minutes IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

29. Public Key Key Exchange • Here interchange keys known • eA, eB Alice and Bob’s public keys known to all • dA, dB Alice and Bob’s private keys known only to owner • Simple protocol • ks is desired session key { ks } eB Alice Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

30. Problem and Solution • Vulnerable to forgery or replay • Because eB known to anyone, Bob has no assurance that Alice sent message • Simple fix uses Alice’s private key • ks is desired session key { { ks } dA } eB Alice Bob IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

31. Notes • Can include message enciphered with ks • Assumes Bob has Alice’s public key, and vice versa • If not, each must get it from public server • If keys not bound to identity of owner, attacker Eve can launch a man-in-the-middle attack (next slide; Peter is public server providing public keys) IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

32. Man-in-the-Middle Attack send me Bob’s public key Eve intercepts request Alice Peter send me Bob’s public key Peter Eve eB Peter Eve eE Eve Alice { ks } eE Eve intercepts message Bob Alice { ks } eB Bob Eve IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

33. Key Generation • Goal: generate difficult to guess keys • Problem statement: given a set of K potential keys, choose one randomly • Equivalent to selecting a random number between 0 and K–1 inclusive • Why is this hard: generating random numbers • Actually, numbers are usually pseudo-random, that is, generated by an algorithm IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

34. What is “Random”? • Sequence of cryptographically random numbers: a sequence of numbers n1, n2, … such that for any integer k > 0, an observer cannot predict nk even if all of n1, …, nk–1 are known • Best: physical source of randomness • Electromagnetic phenomena • Characteristics of computing environment such as disk latency • Ambient background noise IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

35. What is “Pseudorandom”? • Sequence of cryptographically pseudorandom numbers: sequence of numbers intended to simulate a sequence of cryptographically random numbers but generated by an algorithm • Very difficult to do this well • Linear congruential generators [nk = (ank–1 + b) mod n] broken (a, b and n are relatively prime) • Polynomial congruential generators [nk = (ajnk–1j + … + a1nk–1 a0) mod n] broken too • Here, “broken” means next number in sequence can be determined IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

36. Best Pseudorandom Numbers • Strong mixing function: function of 2 or more inputs with each bit of output depending on some nonlinear function of all input bits • Examples: DES, MD5, SHA-1 • Use on UNIX-based systems: (date; ps gaux) | md5 where “ps gaux” lists all information about all processes on system IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

37. Cryptographic Key Infrastructure • Goal: bind identity to key • Classical Crypto: • Not possible as all keys are shared • Public key Crypto: • Bind identity to public key • Crucial as people will use key to communicate with principal whose identity is bound to key • Erroneous binding means no secrecy between principals • Assume principal identified by an acceptable name IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

38. Certificates • Create token (message) containing • Identity of principal (here, Alice) • Corresponding public key • Timestamp (when issued) • Other information (perhaps identity of signer) signed by trusted authority (here, Cathy) CA = { eA || Alice || T } dC CA is A’s certificate IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

39. Use • Bob gets Alice’s certificate • If he knows Cathy’s public key, he can decipher the certificate • When was certificate issued? • Is the principal Alice? • Now Bob has Alice’s public key • Problem: Bob needs Cathy’s public key to validate certificate • Problem pushed “up” a level • Two approaches: Merkle’s tree, signature chains IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

40. Merkle’s Tree Scheme • Keep certificates in a file • Changing any certificate changes the file • Use crypto hash functions to detect this (data integrity) • Define hashes recursively • h is hash function • Yi is certificate I (identity, Public key) • Hash of file (h(1,4) in example) known to all h(1,4) h(1,2) h(3,4) h(1,1) h(2,2) h(3,3) h(4,4) Y1Y2Y3Y4 IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

41. Details • f: DDD maps bit strings to bit strings • h: NND maps integers to bit strings • if i ≥ j, h(i, j) = f(Yi, Yj) • if i < j, h(i, j) = f(h(i, (i+j)/2),h((i+j)/2+1, j)) IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

42. Validation • To validate Y1: • Compute h(1, 1) • Obtain h(2, 2) • Compute h(1, 2) • Obtain h(3, 4) • Compute h(1,4) • Compare to known h(1, 4) • Need to know hashes of children of nodes on path that are not computed h(1,4) h(1,2) h(3,4) h(1,1) h(2,2) h(3,3) h(4,4) Y1Y2Y3Y4 IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

43. Problem • File must be available for validation • Otherwise, can’t recompute hash at root of tree • Intermediate hashes would do • Not practical in most circumstances • Too many certificates and users • Users and certificates distributed over widely separated systems IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

44. Certificate Signature Chains • Create certificate • Generate hash of certificate • Encipher hash with issuer’s private key • Validate • Obtain issuer’s public key • Decipher enciphered hash • Recompute hash from certificate and compare • Problem: • Validating the certificate of the issuer and getting issuer’s public key IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

45. X.509 Chains • Key certificate fields in X.509v3: • Version • Serial number (unique) • Signature algorithm identifier • Issuer’s name; uniquely identifies issuer • Interval of validity • Subject’s name; uniquely identifies subject • Subject’s public key • Signature: • Identifies algorithm used to sign the certificate • Signature (enciphered hash) IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

46. X.509 Certificate Validation • Obtain issuer’s public key • The one for the particular signature algorithm • Decipher signature • Gives hash of certificate • Recompute hash from certificate and compare • If they differ, there’s a problem • Check interval of validity • This confirms that certificate is current IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

47. Issuers • Certification Authority (CA): entity that issues certificates • Multiple issuers pose validation problem • Alice’s CA is Cathy; Bob’s CA is Dan; how can Alice validate Bob’s certificate? • Have Cathy and Don cross-certify • Each issues certificate for the other IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

48. Validation and Cross-Certifying • Certificates: • Cathy<<Alice>> • represents the certificate that C has generated for A • Dan<<Bob> • Cathy<<Dan>> • Dan<<Cathy>> • Alice validates Bob’s certificate • Alice obtains Cathy<<Dan>> • Alice uses (known) public key of Cathy to validate Cathy<<Dan>> • Alice uses Cathy<<Dan>> to validate Dan<<Bob>> • Cathy<<Dan>> Dan<<Bob>> is a signature chain • How about Bob validating Alice? IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

49. PGP Chains • Pretty Good Privacy: • Widely used to provide privacy for electronic mail • Sign files digitally • OpenPGP certificates structured into packets • One public key packet • Zero or more signature packets • Public key packet: • Version (3 or 4; 3 compatible with all versions of PGP, 4 not compatible with older versions of PGP) • Creation time • Validity period (not present in version 3) • Public key algorithm, associated parameters • Public key IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security

50. OpenPGP Signature Packet • Version 3 signature packet • Version (3) • Signature type (level of trust) • Creation time (when next fields hashed) • Signer’s key identifier (identifies key to encipher hash) • Public key algorithm (used to encipher hash) • Hash algorithm • Part of signed hash (used for quick check) • Signature (enciphered hash using signer’s private key) • Version 4 packet more complex IS2150/TEL2810: Introduction to Computer Security