9/11 and US Foreign Policy

1. 9/11 and US Foreign Policy Readings: Cox and Stokes CH 18 and 20 Lake, Pape, Bush, Obama (Optional Background: Skim Carter CH1)

2. Guiding Questions What is terrorism? What should states consider when responding to terrorist attacks? How has the US responded to the 9/11 attacks? How has 9/11 shaped US foreign policy?

3. US and Terrorism • Rogers 2008 • The US had a different experience with terrorism than other Western countries • Europe: Brigate Rossi (Italy), Action Direct (France), Baader Meinhof (Germany), Provisional IRA/Radical Loyalists (UK), ETA (Spain), etc. • Smaller scale equivalents within the US and on US embassies • First WTC attack 1993 • Oklahoma City bombing 1995 • Paramilitary attacks on US embassies in the Middle East and North Africa • Prior to 9/11, Bush II foreign policy predicated on reducing entanglement in international institutions to promote a “New American Century”

4. Terrorism: al-Qaeda and 9/11 • Rogers 2008 • September 11, 2001 • Attackers were mostly from Saudi Arabia. • Funding and training came from a variety of places, including Afghanistan. • Why? • According to Osama bin Laden: • Convince the United States to withdraw its military from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. • Middle East and surrounding regions considered sources of terrorist organization recruits. • Recent focus on Afghanistan/Pakistan • Inter-linkage of regional problems seen as exacerbating the problem

5. Defining Terrorism • Rogers 2008 • Common definition: • “the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention” • Another definition: • “Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group…when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear inducing effects in a target group…with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the demands of the perpetrators” (Wardlaw 1982)

6. Is Terrorism Irrational? • Lake 2002 • Defining terrorism: • “irregular use of violence by non-state groups against non-military targets and personnel for political ends” • Defining extremism: • 1) extremists hold preferences which are not widely shared • 2) extremists currently lack the means to achieve their goals. • Irrational? Not necessarily… • Pape 2003: Suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic • If suicide attackers are irrational the groups that lead them are not. • Lake 2002: Extremist terrorism can be rational and strategic

7. What Do Terrorists Want? • Lake 2002 • Terrorists seek to “shift the bargaining range” today to produce a better bargain in the future. • Shifting the bargaining range requires: • 1) Political jujitsu; using the strength of the target state against itself. • 2) Provoking a disproportionate response from the target to change the preferences of moderates in terrorist’s society. • Pape 2003 • Suicide terrorism is strategic and not random • Attacks occur in clusters.; intention is to show a credible threat of more pain to come • Designed to pressure democracies to make concessions (particularly territory). • Democracies are more vulnerable to these type of attacks.

8. How Should States Respond? • Lake 2002 • Possible target responses : • 1) Do nothing; increase internal security. • 2) Capture or eliminate terrorists; define these groups as criminals. • 3) Capture or eliminate terrorists; war on terror. • Stronger the response  increased likelihood of failure in the long-term. • Restrained responses are key; absolute security is not attainable. • Using international institutions can moderate responses. • Pape 2003 • Suicide terrorism “works” but there is a limit to what it can achieve • States will not sacrifice central goals. • Concessions are too risky; Border and internal security is key • Military action does not work against this threat.

9. Evaluating the “War on Terror” Bush II • Carter 2011 • 11 September 2001: 9/11 attacks occur. • 12 September 2001: Bush asks Congress to grant him sweeping powers to fight terror • Congress believed request was too broad. • But Bush’s popularity was over 90% • American public wanted a forceful response. • 14 September 2001: US Senate passes authorization to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those who perpetrated the attacks. • House passes this authorization on a vote of 420-1

10. Why Afghanistan? • Rogers 2008, Carter 2011 • 15-16 September: Administration meets to decide who to target. • Divisions within cabinet over whether or not to target Iraq first. • Eventually, decision made to target Al Qaeda. • Bin Laden was given sanctuary in Afghanistan. • 17 September 2001: Mullah Omar given an ultimatum: give up Bin Laden or face attack. • Western Europe initially supports this decision • 23 September 2001: CIA realizes Afghanistan will not comply. • US begins preparing for incursion; Oman, U.A.E., Pakistan, Uzbekistan agree to assist US troop staging. • 7 October 2001: Operation Enduring Freedom begins. • 7 December 2001: Taliban falls; loses Kandahar. • Most Al Qaeda operatives “melt away” into other parts of Afghanistan or into Pakistan • Others detained; some at Guantanamo

11. Expanding the “War on Terror”: Bush II • Rogers 2008 • Initial success lead to expansion of the ‘war on terror’ • State of the Union and West Point speeches expanded beyond retaliation against Al Qaeda • 1) ‘War on terror’ not limited to Al Qaeda, but to other radical Islamic organizations • Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad • Destroy training camps ‘wherever they might be’ • Legitimate states have a responsibility to act against these organizations • Or the US will do it for them (either ‘with us’ or ‘against us’) • 2) Global ‘war on terror’ extends beyond terrorist groups to rogue states which support or allow these groups • Rogue states also seeking WMD and must be stopped • “Axis of Evil” Iraq, Iran, North Korea • Extension welcomes domestically; not internationally

12. Iraq War Timeline • 2002: Powell posits “Pottery Barn” rule “you break it you bought it” • If US goes into Iraq, it must take responsibility for it. • 17 March 2003: Bush issues ultimatum • Hussein and his sons must leave in 48 hours. • 8-9 April 2003: Baghdad falls. • 1 May 2003: “Mission Accomplished” speech. • No WMD’S found; security difficult to maintain throughout the country. • 2003: Saddam Hussein and his sons captured/killed • 2004-2006: Situation deteriorates; security difficult to maintain. • Abu Ghraib complicates the mission. • December 2006: Debate over how to proceed results in the Iraq Study Group’s report. • Increase role in training Iraqi troops and push for political reforms. • Negotiate with Iraq’s neighbors (Iran and Syria). • No precipitous exit but begin winding mission down. • Military: Agreed; No quick increase in troops or pullout. • 10 January 2007: Bush announces a “surge” of more than 20,000 troops to be sent into Iraq.

13. Perspectives on Iraq and “The Surge” Short term: surge reversed an increasingly difficult and dangerous situation within Iraq. • Long term: Jury is out… • Simon 2008 • Surge bought short term stability at the cost of declining long-term viability of the Iraqi state. • Kahl 2008 • Surge should have been conditional on continued political reconciliation • Fearon 2007 • US cannot prevent the inevitable civil war; surge postponed inevitable conflict.

14. Bush Doctrine • 1) Freedom won the Cold War; US has a responsibility to extend democracy. • But in some case anti-democratic forces came to power. • 2) Nature of threat has changed; concept of preventive war rather than pre-emption. • May set a precedent that is worrisome. • 3) Regime change is a viable option to promote peace; states that harbor terrorists (rogue states) can be targeted. • Violates international norms of sovereignty. • 4) Intervention may be necessary; Coalitions of the willing more flexible than international institutions. • Appears to undercut international institutions; can spark balancing • Israeli-Palestine conflict is key; Spoke explicitly of a two state solution. • Strong involvement at end of Presidency.

15. A “Surge” For Afghanistan? • Conflict dislodged Al Qaeda and the Taliban but has not eliminated either • Military leaders contend they need a lot more troops to stabilize the country. • Counterinsurgency requires that more troops fight in a different way (i.e. more interaction with the Afghan people and less reliance on weaponry). • Allies have been reluctant to send more troops. • Public support for the war is declining. • 2009: Obama announces a surge in Afghanistan • Iraq war a distraction against the war that “matters” for US security • 2011: Obama follows Bush agreement to remove all combat troops from Iraq • Announces that he will send 30,000 extra troops to stabilize Afghanistan • Will begin to handover security detail to Afghan forces in 2013 • US/NATO forces aim to be out by 2014 • Many still wonder what the objective is in Afghanistan • Bush wanted to push for democracy; Obama jettisoned this idea. • Déjà vu? Soviets could not hold the territory. • Taliban strength in Pakistan raises questions about whether or not Afghanistan should continue to be the target. • Mutual suspicions plague US/Pakistani relations • 2011: Osama Bin Laden killed in Pakistan

16. Identifying an Obama Doctrine? • Global fight to eradicate Al Qaeda terrorist network • Must avoid military overreach: draw down Iraq, extend Afghanistan • 1) Maintain military edge to preserve international role • Rejects isolationism • 2) Democracy best method to ensure human security • Provide support/resources/infrastructure to developing systems • Does not support direct regime change to create democratic regimes • Libya • US should “model” appropriate behavior (soft power) • Prevent another Abu Ghraib/avoid use of torture • 3) Seeks a rule based international system • International institutions require all stakeholders (including rising powers) to assist in creating global stability • Non proliferation is key • Rogue states should be isolated internationally • Force can be used unilaterally as a last resort

17. Conclusions: Comparing Bush and Obama • Role of power: • Both “doctrines” emphasize the need to maintain American edge in military power • Both willing to use force if necessary • Role of institutions: • Bush’s concept of preventive war and reliance on “coalitions of the willing” not consistent with the cultivation of a “rules based system” • Obama’s emphasis on international institutions and burden sharing consistent with a liberal institutional approach • Multilateralism reduces the possibility of overreach and makes the US appear less threatening • BUT, use of drones arguably threatens to undermine US appearance as threatening • Role of ideas: • Both emphasize the need for democracy to ensure development • Differ on the extent to which US forces should be used to promote American ideals • Inter-linkage of Middle Eastern challenges critical • Peace process/nuclear non proliferation key for both

18. Next Unit • If You’re Interested… • Sanger. The Inheritance • Rashid. Descent into Chaos • Theme: US Foreign Policy and the Middle East • Readings: Cox and Stokes CH 11 • US-Israeli Foreign Policy • Beasley CH 9 • Walt and Mearsheimer • Dershowitz • US-Iranian Foreign Policy • Beasley CH 10 • Carter CH 4 • Edelman et al. • Lindsay and Takeyh