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Game Theory

Game Theory. Mike Shor Lecture 13. “ Necessity never made a good bargain. ”. - Benjamin Franklin. Economic Markets. Allocation of scarce resources Many buyers & many sellers  traditional markets Many buyers & one seller  auctions One buyer & one seller

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Game Theory

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  1. Game Theory Mike ShorLecture 13 “Necessity never made a good bargain.” - Benjamin Franklin

  2. Economic Markets • Allocation of scarce resources • Many buyers & many sellers  traditional markets • Many buyers & one seller  auctions • One buyer & one seller  bargaining

  3. Role of Game Theory • Design non-traditional markets

  4. The Move to Game-Theoretic Bargaining • Baseball • Each side submits an offer to an arbitrator who must chose one of the proposed results • Meet-in-the-Middle • Each side proposes its “worst acceptable offer” and a deal is struck in the middle, if possible • Forced Final • If an agreement is not reached by some deadline, one party makes a final take-it-or-leave-it offer

  5. Bargaining & Game Theory • Art: Negotiation • Science: Bargaining • Game theory’s contribution: • to the rules of the encounter CAVEAT: Limited Applicability

  6. Outline • Importance of rules: The rules of the game determine the outcome • Diminishing pies: The importance of patience • Estimating payoffs: Trust your intuition

  7. Take-it-or-leave-it Offers • Consider the following bargaining game (over a cake): • I name a take-it-or-leave-it split • If you accept, we trade • If you reject, no one eats! • Under perfect information, there is a simple rollback equilibrium

  8. Take-it-or-leave-it Offers 1-p , p accept • Second period: Accept if p > 0 • First period: Offer smallest possible p The “offerer” keeps all profits p reject 0 , 0

  9. Counteroffers and Diminishing Pies • In general, bargaining takes on a “take-it-or-counteroffer” procedure • If time has value, both parties prefer trade earlier to trade later • e.g., labor negotiations – Later agreements come at a price of strikes, work stoppages, etc. • Delays imply less surplus left to be shared among the parties

  10. Two Stage Bargaining • Bargaining over division of a cake • I offer a proportion, p, of the cake to you • If rejected, you may counteroffer (and  of the cake melts) • Payoffs: • In first period: 1-p , p • In second period: (1-)(1-p) , (1-)p

  11. 1-p, p accept p reject Rollback

  12. Rollback • Since period 2 is the final period, this is just like a take-it-or-leave-it offer: • You will offer me the smallest piece that I will accept, leaving you with all of 1- and leaving me with almost 0 • What do I do in the first period?

  13. Rollback • Give you at least as much surplus • Your surplus if you accept in the first period is p • Accept if: Your surplus in first period  Your surplus in second period p  1-

  14. Rollback • If there is a second stage, you get 1- and I get 0. • You will reject any offer in the first stage that does not offer you at least 1-. • In the first period, I offer you 1-. • Note: the more patient you are (the slower the cake melts) the more you receive now!

  15. First or Second Mover Advantage? • Are you better off being the first to make an offer, or the second?

  16. Example: Cold Day • If =1/5 (20% melts) • Period 2: You offer a division of 1,0 • You get all of remaining cake = 0.8 • I get 0 = 0 • In the first period, I offer 80% • You get 80% of whole cake = 0.8 • I get 20% of whole cake = 0.2

  17. Example: Hot Day • If =4/5 (80% melts) • Period 2: You offer a division of 1,0 • You get all of remaining cake = 0.2 • I get 0 = 0 • In the first period, I offer 20% • You get 20% of whole cake = 0.2 • I get 80% of whole cake = 0.8

  18. First or Second Mover Advantage? • When players are impatient (hot day) First mover is better off • Rejecting my offer is less credible since we both lose a lot • When players are patient (cold day) Second mover better off • Low cost to rejecting first offer • Either way – if both players think through it, deal struck in period 1

  19. Don’t Waste Cake • Why doesn’t this happen? • Reputation building • Lack of information COMMANDMENT In any bargaining setting, strike a deal as early as possible!

  20. Examples • British Pubs and American Bars • Civil Lawsuits • If both parties can predict the future jury award, can settle for same outcome and save litigation fees and time • If both parties are sufficiently optimistic, they do not envision gains from trade

  21. Uncertainty in Civil Trials • Plaintiff sues defendant for $1M • Legal fees cost each side $100,000 • If each agrees that the chance of the plaintiff winning is ½: • Plaintiff: $500K - $100K = $ 400K • Defendant: - $500K - $100K = $-600K • If simply agree on the expected winnings, $500K, each is better off

  22. Uncertainty in Civil Trials • What if both parties are too optimistic? • Each thinks that his or her side has a ¾ chance of winning: • Plaintiff: $750K - $100K = $ 650K • Defendant: - $250K - $100K = $-350K • No way to agree on a settlement!

  23. Non-Monetary Utility • How big is the cake? • Is something really better than nothing?

  24. Lessons • Rules of the bargaining game uniquely determine the bargaining outcome • Which rules are better for you depends on patience, information • What is the smallest acceptable piece? Trust your intuition • Delays are always less profitable: Someone must be wrong

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