Game Theory and Conservation

1. Game Theory and Conservation Class 11 Presentation 1

2. Outline • Introduction to game theory • Prisoners’ dilemma activity • Examples of successful conservation/poverty alleviation work • Use of game theory to evaluate conservation work

3. History of Game theory A beautiful mind: John Nash • Fairly long history • von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press • Qualitative opinion based analyses to quantification • Provides quantification of decisions and outcomes • Evaluation of simple rules that govern choice and complexity of outcomes

4. What is “Game” • Game = scientific metaphor for wide range of human (today any interaction) interactions in which the outcome depends on interactive strategies (interactions) of 2 or more people (or items such as atoms, organisms, populations) who have different (properties or adaptations) motives.

5. Why game theory? • Useful way to model interactions between organisms and people • Also used in many other disciplines and endeavours: economy, computer science, sociology, international trade, negotiations, evolutionary biology, physics, etc.

6. Game theory • Applies when: • 2 or more players • One player: decision • More than one outcome (e.g. someone wins while another loses) • Outcomes depend on the choices of all players • Players have choice, strategy matters

7. Where you cannot use game theory • Games of chance (e.g. lotteries: no strategy required) • Games without interaction between players (e.g. solitaire)

8. Elements of game theory • Must know the number of players • List and description of all possible actions by individual player • Information players have before decision • Description of payoff consequences to each player for every action • Description of players preferences

9. Elements of game theory • Players can have perfect information on other players decisions (e.g. chess) • Players can have imperfect information (e.g. sealed bids, prisoners’ dilemma) • Rules are known to all players • Players seek to maximize their payoff • Payoffs are known and fixed

10. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Two prisoners, each in a different cell • Must decide: • Confess • Do not confess • Both confess: 6 months jail each • Both do not confess: 1 month jail each • 1st confess, 2nd not: 2nd gets 9 months • 1st does not, 2nd does: 1st gets 9 months jail

11. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Assume that you are one of the prisoners • On a piece of paper write down if you would confess or not confess

12. Prisoners’ dilemma matrix

13. Note • Note that you thought about the decision the other person would make • Game theory allows us to analyze not only individual decisions within market conditions (for resource use) but also based on the strategies chosen by others

14. Prisoners’ dilemma • Is very simplistic (unrealistic) but it can provide insights into interactions • Other games that can be modelled • Applicable in: • Tragedy of the commons • Environmental pollution • Population growth, consumerism • Nuclear arms race • Others?

15. "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin, Science, 162(1968):1243-1248 • To read Hardin’s classic paper click on: http://www.constitution.org/cmt/tragcomm.htm • Commons: property such as land owned collectively

16. History of International Aid Post WWII

17. Keynesian Developmentalism (1940-1960) • Macro economics at global level • Sought to reduce gap between developing and developed nations • Aim: increase economic development through modernization, agro-exports, and primary exports of raw resources • Solutions: Donor countries • Focus: industrial, large landowner, export • E.g: agriculture and timber plantations,

18. Neoliberalism (1950–1970) • Similar to earlier programs • Focus: development, western technology, exports • No recognition of local knowledge • Replacement of indigenous flora and fauna with exotics • Some recognition of communal property

19. Popular Development (1970–present) • Recognized complexity of development • Started to involve local people • Solutions: local area • Use of local technology • Short term targets

20. Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Zimbabwe: in southern Africa • Used to be a British colony • Wildlife owned by state • Wildlife important for tourism • Direct worth: $250 million US/yr • Most habitat and wildlife outside parks

21. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Agriculture most important economic sector • Cattle ranching subsidized • Degraded arid lands • Game killed to control tse-tse fly • Law changed in 1961 Conservation Act allowed ranchers to ranch, kill and sell game

22. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Game ranching not profitable (cost of transport) • Safari-hunting profitable • 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act delegated control of safari hunting to large landowners • This program proved successful • CAMPFIRE sought to implement similar benefits on communal lands

23. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Dept of National Parks and Wildlife Management recognized that wildlife could be conserved only if communal and private landowners derived benefit • Project aim: transfer benefits to local communities • Caution: Recent decisions by Zim. Govt. not to protect property rights may undermine this programme

24. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Community membership defined with local groups • Defined household • Revenue sharing procedures • National office then devolved management and revenue to local groups for safari hunting in community

25. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • National govt benefited through higher tax revenue • Locals benefited: Z$ 200/household/yr • New school, grinding mill

26. Project (CAMPFIRE), Zimbabwe • Has not worked where benefits minimal to locals • E.g.:Nyaminyami District in the Zambezi Valley • Revenue sharing not satisfactory to all

27. Rural Development: WOTR Work of the Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) in Ahmendnagar Jan 10-14’01

28. Housing before Living quarters for 7 people Floor and walls: mud

29. Before Landscape denuded Local cattle

30. Before: Water & fuel Cow dung for fuel Wells run dry after January

31. Before • Several attempts on improving the conditions of these people • E.g. introduced high production cattle • New water pumps • Free education for girls to university • Free education for all in primary grades

32. What is done today Villagers agree to work together Experts provide advice and support

33. Water conservation Trees planted on ridges (survival up: from 5% to 95%) Grazing stopped Tree spp selected by villagers

34. Water conservation Dams Bunds Terraces 5 Cents/day

35. New house Old House

36. Fuel Biogas generation

37. Milk production Example: Kalamkarwadi: Before: 705 litres Today: 1969 litres

38. Agriculture E.g. Kalamkarwadi Summer: 19% Winter: 10% Vegs: 0 ha to 23 ha Sorghum Wheat

39. Agriculture Castor Drip irrigation Sweet lime

40. Income One shed to brick house with biogas & store

41. Education Equal number of boys and girls in school (Grade 1-4)

42. Social change Self-help groups Micro loans

43. Water Dry season crops Drinking water all year round

44. Discussion • Use the elements of game theory to: • Identify the players in the central India case • Describe the dominant strategy that led to the problem • Can you think of other solutions to the problem(s)?