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Voice Security Interop 2009 Mark D. Collier SecureLogix Corporation www.securelogix.com mark.collier@securelogix.com. Voice Security Introduction. Voice security includes traditional and VoIP systems VoIP systems are vulnerable: The primary vendors are improving their systems, but..
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Voice Security Interop 2009 Mark D. Collier SecureLogix Corporation www.securelogix.com mark.collier@securelogix.com
Voice Security Introduction • Voice security includes traditional and VoIP systems • VoIP systems are vulnerable: • The primary vendors are improving their systems, but.. • Security is rarely a major a consideration during deployment • Platforms, network, and applications are vulnerable • Many available VoIP attack tools • Fortunately, the (mostly internal) threat is still moderate • VoIP deployment is growing • Greater integration with the data network • Application threats remain the biggest issue • SIP trunks will increase the threat
Traditional Voice Security TDMPhones PBX TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork Modem Fax InternetConnection Modem Internet Servers/PCs
Traditional Voice Security TDMPhones PBX TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork Modem Fax Internet Attacks Scanning/DoS Email SPAM Web Attacks InternetConnection Modem Internet Servers/PCs
Traditional Voice Security TDMPhones PBX TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork Modem Fax Internet Attacks Scanning/DoS Email SPAM Web Attacks InternetConnection Modem Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Traditional Voice Security Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones PBX TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork Modem Fax InternetConnection Modem Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Traditional Voice Security Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones PBX TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork Modem Voice Firewall Fax InternetConnection Modem Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Campus VoIP IP PBX TDMPhones TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Campus VoIP IP PBX Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Campus VoIP IP PBX Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones TDMTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Attacks Can Originate From The Internal Network Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
SIP Trunks IP PBX TDMPhones SIPTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
SIP Trunks IP PBX Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones SIPTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
SIP Trunks IP PBX Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones SIPTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Scanning Fuzzing Flood DoS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
SIP Trunks IP PBX Toll fraud Social engineering Harassing calls Modem issues TDMPhones SIPTrunks PublicVoiceNetwork CM VM CC Admin Modem Voice Firewall SIP Firewall Fax Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Scanning Fuzzing Flood DoS Voice VLAN IP Phones InternetConnection Data VLAN Internet Firewall/IDPS Email SPAM filter Web security Servers/PCs
Many Components in VoIP • IP PBX: • Server platforms • Various gateway cards • Adjunct systems • Network: • Switches, routers, firewalls • Shared links • VLAN configurations • Endpoints: • IP phones and softphones • Protocol Issues (SIP):
Vulnerabilities At Many Layers IP PBX Vulnerabilities Voice Application Poor ConfigurationWeak PasswordsInsecure Management Insecure Architecture TFTP Brute Force AttackSNMP EnumerationDHCP StarvationSQL Attacks VoIPProtocols ServicesTFTP, SNMP, DHCP, DB,Web Server Flood DoSFuzzingApplication Attacks Network Stack(IP, UDP, TCP) Trivial DoS AttacksMITM Attacks General PurposeOperating System Worms/VirusesTargeting TheOperating System
IP PBX DoSFloods FuzzingDoS UnauthorizedAccess CM VM CC Admin SPITPhishing Modems Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS TollFraud PhysicalAttacks ResourceStarvation Sniffing Eavesdropping IP PBX Vulnerabilities
IP PBX Underlying OS NetworkStacks ManagementInterfaces CM VM CC Admin TDM Interfaces WebServer Gateway DB TFTPDHCP DNS Signaling TFTP RTP SNMP Other CommonServices DHCPDNS SQL IP PBX Vulnerabilities
Network Vulnerabilities Network Vulnerabilities • The network can also be attacked: • Platform attacks • DoS • Shared link saturation • Eavesdropping • Incorrect VLAN configuration • Man-in-the-middle attacks
IP Phone Vulnerabilities IP Phone Vulnerabilities • IP phones can also be attacked: • Physical access • Poor passwords • Signaling/media • DoS • Unnecessary services
IP Phone Vulnerabilities Protocol Vulnerabilities (SIP) • Directory Scanning • Fuzzing • Flood-based Denial of Service (DoS) • Registration manipulation • Call termination • RTP manipulation
Directory Scanning 1. INVITE derek@tpti (spoofed source IP) Proxy Server Send INVITEs/OPTIONs/REGISTERS To Scan For IP Phones
Fuzzing Location Server Malformed SIP Malformed SIP Proxy Server Malformed SIP
Flood-based DoS 1. INVITE derek@tpti (spoofed source IP) Proxy Server Send 1000000 INVITEs Send enough INVITEs to Ring All Phones
Registration Manipulation Location Server 3. REGISTER sip:derek@tpti.com Contact < mugatu@11.5.6.8 > Expires: 1800 2. “To contact sip:derek@tpti.com Use sip:derek@11.5.6.7 for 60 minutes” 4. “To contact sip:derek@tpti.com Use sip:mugatu@11.5.6.8 for 30 minutes” 1. REGISTER sip:derek@tpti.com Contact <sip:derek@11.5.6.7> Expires: 3600 3. 200 OK Registrar derek’s Phone
Call Termination 6. INVITE derek@11.5.6.7 7. 200 OK 8. RTP Conversation 7. SIP CANCEL derek@11.5.6.7 9. SIP BYE derek@11.5.6.7
IP Phone Vulnerabilities Application Issues • Toll fraud • Minor misuse • Dial through fraud • Social engineering • Harassing callers • Various modem issues • Poorly secured modems used for remote access • ISP modems
IP Phone Vulnerabilities Best Practices • Develop a voice/VoIP security policy • Address application issues at the perimeter • Prioritize security during VoIP deployments • Consider a VoIP security assessment • Follow good basic data network security for internal network • Deploy SIP security when using SIP trunks
IP Phone Vulnerabilities Resources • www.voipsa.org • www.blueboxpadcast.com • www.securelogix.com • www.voipsecurityblog.com • Vendor sites