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CAS AVEC Cm constant

Profit M. Surplus cons. = surplus social (profit = 0). +. Surplus cons. c, p. = surplus social. Perte sèche de monopole (dead-weight loss). Cm = CM. Rm. RM = p(q). q. p M > p cpp ; q M < q cpp ; π M > π cpp Surplus cons. M < surplus cons. cpp

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CAS AVEC Cm constant

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  1. Profit M Surplus cons. = surplus social (profit = 0) + Surplus cons. c, p = surplus social Perte sèche de monopole (dead-weight loss) Cm = CM Rm RM = p(q) q pM>pcpp ; qM<qcpp ; πM> πcpp Surplus cons. M< surplus cons. cpp Surplus social M< surplus social cpp = non compensation <=> perte sèche CAS AVEC Cm constant Monopole : cpp : pM CM pcpp = Cm = CM qM qcpp Monopole : q et p tels que Rm = Cm cpp : p = p(q) = Cm

  2. Cas standard Cm c, p CM RM = p(q) Rm q En monopole : p , q , π , surplus cons. , surplus social Coût pour la société perte sèche ? Cf POSNER, externalités < > Perte sèche (dead-weight loss) B pM C pcpp A CMcpp CMM qM qcpp Comparaison avec cpp :p (=RM) = Cm(tarification au coût marginal)

  3. Cm c, p CM RM = p(q) Rm q OPTIMUM DU MONOPOLEUR ET OPTIMUM SOCIAL Optimum du monopoleur (Rm = Cm) pM CMM qM Profit, mais pas d ’optimum social => on pourrait produire plus, à un CM inférieur et à un prix plus faible

  4. Cm c, p CM RM = p(q) Rm q Surplus con. => surplus social OPTIMUM DE 1er RANG Tarification au coût marginal (p = RM = Cm) CM CMtCm ptCm qtCm mais Profit < 0 => subvention et impôts ?

  5. Cm c, p CM RM = p(q) Rm q surplus cons. , surplus social OPTIMUM de SECOND RANG Tarification au coût moyen (p = RM = CM) PtCM = CM qtCM Profit nul <=> équilibre budgétaire

  6. Optimum Monopoleur (Rm = Cm) Tarification au coût moyen (p = CM) Tarification au coût marginal (p = Cm) p M q M π M (π max) surplus cons. M Surplus Social M > < > < < p tCM q tCM π tCM (= 0) surplus cons. tCM Surplus Social tCM > < > < < p tCm q tCm π tCm(< 0) surplus cons. tCm Surplus Social tCm Action de l ’Etat : « forcer » le système ==> optimum 1er ou second rang Monopole public, aménagement de la concurrence, régulation de monopole privé

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