Revenge of the Grassroots: the Transformation of the Orange Order since 1950

1. Revenge of the Grassroots: the Transformation of the Orange Order since 1950

2. Revenge of the Grassroots • A less hierarchical organisation: • Changes in social background of elites and masses in 20th c • Growth of populism/democracy within Orange Order since 1950 • Relationship to Unionist identity and DUP

3. From Deference to Defiance • Division between 'Rough' and 'Respectable' (Bryan 2000) • Division between 'Rebel' and 'Loyalist' traditions since the beginning • Modernisation shifts the balance

4. Rebels Loyalists Denomination Presbyterian, Methodist Church of Ireland Plantation Origin Scots-Irish Anglo-Irish Mass base Industrial Labour, Small freeholders Rural tenants North American Exemplars ‘Scotch-Irish’ Patriots in USA, c. 1776 Irish Orange Loyalists in Canada, c. 1837 Interpretation of Orangeism Uphold militant Protestantism Uphold traditional British-Protestant values View of Grand Lodge and Unionist leaders Skeptical Respectful Preferred Political Expression Direct Public Protest Informal elite channels Preferred Orange Principle Ulster-Protestant ethnic interest and reformed faith - as embodied in abstract principle and the sentiments of the mass membership Orange tradition - as embodied in Orange laws, ordinances, customs and history Leadership Evangelical clergy, petit-bourgeoisie Aristocracy, Large local businessmen Political Philosophy Lockean radical change, Populism Burkean evolution, Deference to elite consensus Attitudes to alcohol, band discipline and traditional social mores More permissive, with the exception of a small number of moral fundamentalists Conservative Stance toward paramilitaries and political violence More permissive Antagonistic Attitude toward British crown Conditionality Loyalty Interpretation of Protestantism Protestantism as dissent Protestantism as tradition National identity Ulstermen British Favoured N.I. party DUP UUP Regional base Antrim, N. Down, Belfast South and West

5. Orange/Non-Orange Differential in Support for the Agreement

6. (Post-)Modernisation and Nationalism • 'Rebel' side in better accord with modernity • Thus modernisation = populist ‘nationalism’ while tradition = support for UUP moderates • UUP/DUP support difference best predicted by age • Contradicts some post-modernisation theory that sees the decline of ethnic, religious or national identities (ie Giddens)

8. CentralCommittee as 'Cabinet'

9. Structural Change? • Informal power over policy concentrated within 30-40 member Central Committee ('Cabinet') and, to a lesser degree, Grand Lodge ('Parliament') • 'Influentials' dominate CC proceedings • Central Committee used to be more socially elite than the membership • Part of deferential culture no longer apparent

10. Social Change in the 20th Century • Class 'slippage' at elite level and mass level • Flattening of social hierarchy within Orangeism • Breaking of link between Unionist Party, Grand Lodge and Unionist social elite

11. 1954: Only 9 Untitled out of 35. 16 JPs; 5 OBEs; 1995: 31 untitled out of 41; 1 MBE; 5 JPs Central Committee Class 'Slippage', 1954-95

12. Occupations of Mid-Level Orange Elite, 1901

13. Status of Mid-Level Orange Elite, 2001 (MOSAIC)

14. Mass Class Slippage?: The Social Profile of the UUC and Orange Order by MOSAIC Classification, 2003 (99% sample) % Top 12 Rural 8 Bottom 7 Nonrural Top 12 Nonrural Bottom 7 N Freemason officebearers 67.8% 15.5% 8.0% 80.2% 9.4% 766 Orange bloc UUC delegates 45.7% 36.2% 12.4% 71.6% 19.4% 105 UUC delegates total 44.3% 35.9% 8.4% 69.0% 13.1% 879 Grand Orange Lodge officebearers 34.7% 44.4% 9.7% 62.5% 17.5% 144 Northern Ireland population average 32.5% 18.1% 22.9% 39.6% 27.9% 1.6m Orange Order (lodge) officebearers 32.4% 43.9% 12.4% 57.7% 22.1% 1429

15. Decline of Skilled-Worker Base in Belfast

16. Elite and Mass Class Slippage • Grand Lodge Elite of much humbler origins, unlike UUC (strength or weakness?) • Mid-level elite of private lodge masters/secs & district officers (top .5 to 5% of Orangemen) has slipped considerably in 20th c. • Flattened Orange social hierarchy • Total 22% non-manual membership in 1996 • Mass of membership retains 1950 socioeconomic profile while society changes

17. Consequences of Social Change • Does the social change matter? • NO – 1960s reforms drove a wedge between the Order and the UUP/Unionist elite that previously did not exist • YES – Social change made it easier for the Order’s elite to cut its ties to the Unionist party and its reform programme • Answer is that both matter

18. The Old Order Remains Intact,1950-65 • o1954 Dungiven (John Andrews suspends O & P rebels); • o1959-60 Dungiven (Sir G Clark concedes some territory to John Brown and Wm Douglas); • o1964 (Sir G Clark defends O’ Neill against Brown/Smyth); • o1965 (Sir G Clark defends O’Neill against LOL 1310);

19. The Turning of the Tide, 1966-69 • o1966 - (resolution of support to PM; but troubles over Easter Rising celebrations; Clark remarks re being ‘fobbed off’ by PM); • o1967 - Clark resigns • oNovember 1968, Sam Magowan defends the government • o Early 1969: Orange conditionally support • O’ Neill over ban on Civil Rights march • omid 1969 sacking of Wm Craig leads to open split o

20. The Separation of Party and Order, 1969-71 • oChichester-Clark quickly loses support with parade ban in latter half of 69 and latter 1970 • o7 July 1970 Order meets UK delegation • oLate 1970 - no confidence motion in the Govt • oBrown’s caustic remarks re PM, 1970 • oNov 1971: Douglas challenges Bryans’ leadership • oFaulkner’s inauguration, 1971: greetings sent, but major debate about whether to do so

21. Summary of Orange Realignment • Order’s elite once might have defied grassroots, but since mid-60s has been populist/democratic • From corporate ‘insider’ pillar to ‘outsider’ lobby group, so Orange leadership has no reason to defend UUP elite • Lobby for ethnic interests of Ulster-Protestants, especially the working/rural/petit-bourgeois base • No major change in elite-mass dynamics since mid 60s. Resists changes perceived to weaken Ulster-Protestant interest • Reflects grassroots, which reflects working-class base of Unionism • Difficult to discern a distinct Orange elite agenda

22. Post-1995 Period • Key Issues: Drumcree; Mass resignation of traditionalist Education Committee; Grand Lodge support for DUP • No change since mid-1960s: Template is to defend Ulster-Protestant ethnic interest against reforms which may threaten this • Tradition of anti-Paisleyism, but now attracted to post-Paisley DUP rather than anti-Agreement UUP • Spirit of Drumcree did have influence, but did not take over • Order broadly follows Unionist centre on Agreement and DUP/UUP • NB: DUP has become most popular party among Unionists

23. Conclusion • Major social change within the Order, 1950-present • Flattening of hierarchies, class slippage • Did social change matter: yes and no • From pillar of corporatism to outsider/lobby • 'Rebel‘ Unionism, DUP influence on the rise • Reflects broader social changes in Unionist community rather than any premeditated DUP takeover of Orange leadership