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Jim Payne Principal Security Relationship Manager Microsoft CSS Security. Neil Carpenter Principal Security Escalation Engineer Global Incident Response & Recovery. Determined Human Adversaries: Mitigations. Preference.
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Jim Payne Principal Security Relationship Manager Microsoft CSS Security Neil Carpenter Principal Security Escalation Engineer Global Incident Response & Recovery Determined Human Adversaries: Mitigations
Preference • Information is based on extensive experience by the CSS Security & Global Incident Response & Recovery teams working with customers who experienced a directed attack • In no way is this information to imply or insinuate that there is direct knowledge of what will occur, if anything.
Attackers & Attacks • Cyber Crime • Ideological Movements • OrganizedCrime • NationStates • Economic Espionage • Military Espionage
Commonly Reported • Distributed Denial of Service attack • Web Defacement • Determined Human Adversary / Directed Attack
Denial of Service • Mitigate the impact (usually with hardware for example, and usually in conjunction with your Internet provider) • Use a CDN to scale out • Move key properties to a more resilient platformexample - the cloud scenario • Customers should be ready with a strategy for handling a DDoS before it happens; otherwise, it’s a lot of downtime and a lot of panic.
Web Defacement • Develop secure code. SDL, SDL, SDL. • Likely the website is already deployed, it’s quite likely that SDL was not utilized to develop secure code. • Make sure that everything is up to date – not just the OS, but any deployed frameworks & applications. • Compromises via 3rd party frameworks, such as ColdFusion, have been common lately. • Ensure that you are gathering the right data in case something does happen. • IIS logs – We see far too many customers who turn off IIS logging or disable key fields to save disk space. Disks are cheap, security compromises are not. • If you’re using a reverse proxy, pass the real source IP addr to the IIS server and/or maintain easily accessible proxy logs with all the needed info. • Have a plan if something happens • Gather data before deleting/restoring content. • Preferably, plan to involve Microsoft CSS Sec as soon as possible
Overview of a Directed Attack • Attackers exploit a weakness to compromise a host (the initial attack vector), then: • Install malware for persistence and automate their tasks • Elevate their privileges • Mine for useful credentials • Exfiltrate or delete data
Initial Attack Vector • Mitigation: • Patching critical vulnerabilities is key. This needs to be done for all products – Microsoft infrastructure such as System Center Configuration Manager & WSUS can apply updates to Microsoft products but they do not cover 3rd party products, unless that 3rd Party has published a manifest. • User Education – Cannot place enough emphasis
Install Malware • Mitigation: • Monitor your anti-virus/anti-malware solution carefully. • Ensure it is running on all machines in the environment • Signatures are kept up-to-date • Use an application whitelisting approach such as AppLocker to help prevent the introduction of unwanted software.
Elevate Privileges • Mitigation: • Users should not run as local admin on workstations. • Domain admins should never logon to workstations or member servers in the domain. • Use a group policy to remove the Logon Locally rights for domain administrators from all machines except for domain controllers. • Use hardened workstation to perform necessary administrative tasks
Mine for Useful Credentials • Mitigation: • Use unique passwords for the local administrator account on every host in your enterprise. • Better yet, disable this account entirely and monitor for attempted usage of it. • Limit service account privilege and monitor usage of these accounts. • Never run a service account as domain administrator or other privileged accounts. • Service accounts should have least privilege (no logon locally or logon via network, for example). • Where possible, use LocalService and NetworkService accounts instead of LocalSystem
Copy or delete data • Mitigation: • Define business critical data and apply extra protections to that data in transit and in storage. • Implement a data classification scheme and introduce a policy so that all high business impact data is stored centrally and .. • Encrypt it at rest using rights management services • Segregate access to the data from domain administrators • Use IPsec to prevent network capture across the network • Back it up frequently; test restores; keep an offsite backup
Defender’s Dilemma • Patching • Limited Users • Domain Admins Logon To DCs Only • Application Control • Monitor & Respond To Anti-Malware • Protect Local Admin • Limit Service Privilege • Protect Data
Questions? • Defender’s Dilemma The defender must protect against everything. The attacker only has to succeed with one. • Neil Carpenter • Principal Security Escalation Engineer • neilcar@Microsoft.com • Jim Payne • Principal Security Relationship Manager • jpayne@Microsoft.com