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“I have done that,” says my memory. “I cannot have done that,” says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually, memory yields. — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. False Excuses and Moral Growth. Diana Mertz Hsieh diana@dianahsieh.com University of Colorado, Boulder.
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“I have done that,” says my memory. “I cannot have done that,” says my pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually, memory yields. — Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil False Excuses and Moral Growth Diana Mertz Hsieh diana@dianahsieh.com University of Colorado, Boulder 6th International CMU-UPitt Graduate Philosophy Conference 20 March 2003
Defending Dishonesty? • Shelley Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind (1989) • David Nyberg, The Varnished Truth (1993) • Charles Ford, Lies! Lies!! Lies!!! (1996) • Also: Jeremy Campbell, The Liar’s Tale (2001) & Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths (1985)
What Are False Excuses? • False excuses are deceptions of self or others disavowing wrongdoing so as to avoid harm to the self.
Concealing Wrongdoing from Others • We tell false excuses largely for fear that knowledge of our wrongdoings will damage the good opinion in which others hold us. • Three risks of false excuses to others: • The discovery of deception can damage the trust necessary to good relationships. • To remain plausible and concealed, the initial false excuse may need to be propped up with further lies. • False excuses can make our problems more difficult to resolve in the long run.
Concealing Wrongdoing from Oneself • Self-deceptive excuses are erroneous internal explanations of our actions that we know or suspect to be false. • Self-deceptive excuses promise an uneasy truce with our misdeeds by whitewashing our moral history.
The Necessity of Self-Deception? • Robert Solomon: In light of our “flaws and failings,” clearly understanding our thoughts, desires, and motivations can be “devastating to our self-image and sense of self.” • David Nyberg: “Given the distance between what we are and what we wish we were, some amount of other-deception and self-deception is an essential requisite for carrying on.” • However: • Self-deception is unlikely to fully insulate a person from disturbing reminders of the truth. • Self-deception cannot be contained and controlled to only the desired issues.
Trouble #1: Reminders of the Truth • Self-deception is unlikely to wholly insulate a person from disturbing reminders of the truth. • Nagging doubts, unexplained evidence, and confounding reminders will likely persist. • Others may not play along with the pretense of moral innocence. • The painful emotions of moral failure may be festering below the surface.
Trouble #2: Containing the Self-Deception • Self-deception cannot be contained and controlled to only the desired issues. • Attempting to regulate self-deception would bring the unpleasant facts too much and too often to mind. • Daniel Goleman on our need for “a skillful mean” between truth and falsehood. • The tension between truth and falsehood pressures the self-deceiver to either admit the lie or deceive himself further. • False excuses may precipitate a slippery slope of self-deception.
What Are Positive Illusions? • Positive illusions are mild but enduring forms of self-deception that bias the judgments of psychologically healthy people towards themselves. • 90% of drivers consider themselves above average • The “creative self-deception” of positive illusions is claimed to be so integral to mental health that its loss or absence is associated with mild depression. • The seminal article: Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown, “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,” Psychological Bulletin 103, no. 2 (1988).
Troubles with the Theory of Positive Illusions • A cognitive hypothesis of unintentional bias also explains overestimations of positive qualities. • We are well aware of our own aggravation with other drivers, but not theirs with us. • The errors of those who misjudge do not taint the accuracy of those who judge well. • Judgments of depressed people more negative, but not necessarily more accurate.
Judging the Theory of Positive Illusions • From a psychological perspective, Brown and Taylor’s data fails to demonstrate the thesis of widespread and beneficial illusion. • From a philosophical perspective, positive self-image is not an unconditional moral good; people who do wrong deserve to think less well of themselves.
False Excuses and Moral Growth • False excuses to self and others impede moral growth in two ways: • Blinding a person to his character flaws • Diminishing incentives for change
Identifying Character Defects • A person who refuses to acknowledge his individual moral failings through self-deceptive excuses will not see any general pattern of moral failings.
The Habit of False Excuses • Individual self-deceptive excuses can promote habits of self-deception by: • Honing the skills of self-deception • Setting the precedent that desires trump facts • Eroding “tendencies to… reflection and self-scrutiny” • Encouraging recklessness toward future bad acts • Atrophying the skills of moral courage, etc. • False excuses to others may indirectly promote self-deceptive excuses.
Emotional Motivations for Moral Change • False excuses insulate a person from the constellation of temporarily painful but motivating feelings naturally evoked by moral failure, e.g. guilt, shame, and remorse. • Self-deception dulls our feeling of having fallen short of our own moral standards. • Deception of others blinds us to having violated other people’s reasonable expectations of us.
Other Motivations for Moral Change • False excuses insulate a person from the external penalties often justly imposed by others for misdeeds. • By adopting a policy of honesty about our wrongdoings, we are motivated to act well from the outset – and doubly motivated against repetition. • False excuses keep us ignorant of the full nature and extent of harm caused and prevent us from benefiting from the insight and assistance of others.
Defending Honesty • Traditionally, the most common argument for honesty is that dishonesty endangers the trust that makes good relationships (and thus society) possible. • This argument loses its force when a deception is unlikely to be exposed and seems to benefit others, as with false excuses. • A sufficiently rich conception of egoism can provide a firm foundation for the virtue of honesty.