Migration and Disasters From the Great Fire of London to the Fukushima Disaster

1. Migration and DisastersFrom the Great Fire of London to the Fukushima Disaster Environment and Migration

2. The disaster – migration nexus “Disasters are very political events.” James Lee Witt, former director of FEMA, April 1996 • Disasters are the most obvious and most brutal form of environmental displacement • Also its most visible form • Often thought to induce only temporary displacement • Disaster management was also the first attempt to develop environmental policies • Number of displaced: Source: IDMC

3. The foundations of disasterresponses • Disasterswereinitiallythought to beacts of God • The roleof the state wasNoachian: rescue as manyvictims as possible • Initalpolicieswerereactive and national • Shift towardsDisasterRiskReduction • Shift towards increased international cooperation • Issues atstake • Resettlement – Permanent migration • HumanRights • Humanitarian assistance • Reconstruction

4. Resettlement and permanent migration:From the Great Fire of London to Katrina • The Great Fire of London 1666 • First case of people beingresettledafter a disaster • Started in a bakery shop • People trapped in Saint-Paul’sCathedral • People escapedthrough the 8 gates of city • Perceived as a divine revengeagainst the English

5. Evacuation procedureswerechaotic • Police closed the gates of the city sothat people wouldfight the fire • Mayor of London fled the dayafter the firestarted • Refugee camps were set up in the North of London • No emergency relief – provisions were for sale • Unrest in the camps – fear of a civil war if refugeeswere to return to London • Hencetheywereencouraged to resettle in the North

6. Hurricane Katrina 2005 • One of the worstdisasters in US history: • About 2,000 fatalities • 75 % of homes in New Orleansdestroyed • 1,200,000 people evacuated on the Gulf Coast • US$ 85 billion damage • Disastermainly due to the leveebreaches • One quarter of New Orleans population without car • Help didn’t arrive beforeSetember 3rd, four daysafter the disaster

8. Evacuation • Mandatoryevacuationordered by MayorNagin on August 28. • Overallquitesuccessful: 85 % evacuated • About 60,000 werestranded in the city • Becausetheyhad no car • Becausetheywereill, old, or disabled • Becausetheyhad pets • Becausetheydidn’t know where to go • Becausetheywereunwilling to leave • … Or simplybecausetheydidn’t have the money

9. A social disaster • Despitethe collective dimension of the tragedy, the evacuationprocesswas an individualprocess. • The mostvulnerablewere far lessoff • Manywerestranded in the city. • Thoseevacuatedhad no choice of their destination • This affectedtheirability to copewhileaway • A difficult return • Onlytwothirds of the population have returned to the city • Katrina Diaspora • Impact on race relations

11. Factorsdriving/hindering the return • Extent of the damage • Job prospects • Family, friends, neighbors • Crime • Fear of another hurricane • Love and optimism for the city • Uncertainty about city redevelopment • Race relations • City used to be 70% black, and isnow 60% white. • Issue of votingrights • Conspiration theories: • Leveesblown up • Return slowed down > City has dramaticallychanged.

12. Naming the victimsThe Refugeecontroversy • Victimswere all portrayed as black and poor. • Nunberg (2005): ‘Refugee’ twice more likely to beusedthan ‘evacuee’ when used in conjunctionwith ‘black’ and/or ‘poor’ • Wordingunanimouslyrebutted by the victims • « I can’t stand people calling me a refugee, I am an American and I love America » • No reallyappropriateterm: the controversy questions ourcapacity and legitimacy to categorise people

13. HumanRights and Humanitarian assistance • The IndianOcean Tsunami, 2004 • Killed230,000 people across 14 countries, includingmanytourists • An estimated 2 million weredisplaced – mostly in India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka (about 500,000 displacedeach) • Prompted a humanitarianresponsefrom UNHCR and IOM • Humanrights tend to belittleenforcedduringdisasters • Humanitarian assistance tend to beuneven, and focused on emergency relief • Trafficking issues, withwomenmostaffected.

14. Reconstruction • The HaitianEarthquake • Affected3 million people, left one million homeless. Deathtollunknown, couldbe up to 350,000. • Whichrole for migration policies in the reconstruction process? • Temporary visas and labour schemes • Temporary Protection Status • How to deal within-migration

15. An overview of disastersworldwide

18. A constant increase of vulnerability

20. Whichpolicyresponses?Fromcharity to solidarity • Growing importance of prevention • Paradigm changes • Technologicalscientismrejected in favour of risk management • Determinismrejected in favour of vulnerability • A top-downapproach to disasterriskreduction: resettlement • Mutualisation of risk • National emergency agencies • Damage compensation

21. Internationalisation of disaster management • In the aftermath of Lisbon, shipswereloadedwith supplies and sent fromEngland, Hamburg and Sicily • World War I: Relief Comission for Belgiumlaunched by Herbert Hoover • 1932: The International Relief Union • Founded by Italian Senator G. Ciraolo • Treatysigned by 42 countries • Civil equivalent of a military alliance • International assistance is no longer a matter of goodwill and charity, but rather of commonresponsibility

22. 1943: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) • Later split between UNICEF, UNHCR and WHO • 1994: Yokohama Strategy: disasterprevention and development more important thandisasterresponse • Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 • Global Facility for DisasterReduction and Recovery • Twoplatforms for coordination: • UNISDR • IASC

23. The role of international organisations • Interventions by UNHCR increasinglyfrequent • Justified by moral and practicalimperatives, but alsostrategicconsiderations • Remainunplanned (on a case-by-case basis) and outside of the agency’s mandate. • Interventions by IOM more formalised and systematic • Broader mandate • Complementarity or competitionwith UNHCR? • Operational guidelines on humanrights and disasters by IASC • Soft law, four types of protection: • Life and security • Rightsrelated to basic necessities • Othereconomic and social rights • Otherpolitical and civil rights.

24. Migration and industrial accidents The triple Fukushima disaster

25. The DEVAST Project DisasterEVAcuation and riSkpercepTion in democracies

26. Fieldwork sites Tohoku region Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Tokyo

27. The Catastrophe

28. A triple disaster • Earthquake of magnitude 9.0 • Followed by a tsunami withwaves up to 40 metres • Timelag of 40 minutes after the disaster • Most important tsunami in Japansince 16th century • Previousexperience of tsunamis proved a key factor of vulnerability • 15,000 direct casualties and 3,000 missing • The tsunami flooded the generators of the Fukushima-Daiichinuclear plant • In operationsince 1971, owned and managed by TEPCO • No ventilation system

29. Reactors of the plant. Source: TEPCO.

30. Reactors 3 and 4. Source: TEPCO.

31. Radiations related to the Fukushima accident Source: Prof. Hayakawa, University of Gunma, 18 June 2011

32. Contrastedevacuations

33. A step-by-stepevacuationprocess Iitate Minami-soma Katsurao Namie Futaba Tamura Ookuma Tomioka Kawauchi Naraha Hirono

34. Evacuation zones (22 Apr – 30 Sep 2011) (30 Sep 2011 - present) Deliberate Evacuation Area Deliberate Evacuation Area Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation Restricted Area Restricted Area Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation Evacuation-Prepared Area

35. Nuclear accident About 350,000 evacueesA tale of twoevacuations Tsunami Evacuation with warning Evacuation with a plan Evacuation with knowledge Evacuation to pre-fabricated houses Number decreasing with time • Privilegedevacuees • Improvised by local authorities • No information provided • ScatteredacrossJapan • Numberincreasingwith time

36. Tensions and discriminations • Evacuees from the tsunami and from the nuclear accident are not entitled to similar compensations. • Evacuees from the nuclear accident face discrimination across Japan • Doomed population • Self-evacuees • No compensation nor assistance • Tensions with the community • Divorces

37. Return and reconstruction

38. A highlypoliticised question • Tsunami evacuees have a clear perspective of return • Democraticprocessthat respects individualchoices • Re-invention of communities, innovativeprojects • For regionsthatwereirradiated, return has become a politicalproject • Uncertain perspectives of return • Attempts to decontaminate the territory • Controversies about the acceptable radiation levels, lack of trustworthy information • Collective choice, encouraged and politicised • Gloomeconomic prospects

39. In a nutshell

40. Data and researchmaterialsavailable to allhttp://www.devast-project.org

41. An issue overshadowed by climate change • The impacts of industrial accidents on migration are typically not considered. • They can be very important however • Ex: Chernobyl and the closing of an area situated withing a 50 sq km radius of the power plant • As a result, compensations are usually not paid, and populations at risk not protected • Exception: the Seveso directive in the EU