Diathesis Alternations and NP Semantics

1. Diathesis Alternations and NP Semantics Barbara H. Partee University of Massachusetts, Amherst

2. Acknowledgements • Thanks to the Fulbright Foundation for a Fellowship to teach in Moscow in 2005. • Thanks to many students in classes at RGGU and MGU for data and suggestions. • Thanks to Vladimir Borschev, Elena Paducheva, Ekaterina Rakhilina, and Yakov Testelets for ongoing discussion. • This material is based upon work supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. BCS-0418311 to B.H. Partee and V. Borschev.

3. Abstract • In this paper we examine the relationships among diathesis alternations, the semantics of verbs, and the referential status of NPs. • Some diathesis shifts are argued to involve changes in the semantic type of NP arguments, including possible alternations between ‘referential’ NPs and ‘property-type’ NPs. • We explore applications of this approach to alternations of Genitive and Accusative, both with intensional verbs like ždat’ and with the Genitive of Negation.

4. 1. Examples and issues. • For the purposes of this paper, I take the notion of diathesis alternation in a broad sense. I include not only familiar alternations of syntactic patterns as in examples (1a-b): (1) a. The farmers loaded the truck with (the) hay. b. The farmers loaded (the/some) hay on the truck. • but also alternations of case assignment, as in the next examples.

5. (2) a. On ždet podrugu.(Neidle 1988, p.31) He waits girlfriend-acc ‘He’s waiting for his girlfriend.’ b. On ždet otveta na vopros. He waits answer-gen to question ‘He’s waiting for an answer to the question.’ • (3)a.On ne polučil pis’mo. he NEG received letter-acc ‘He didn’t receive the letter.’ b. On ne polučil pis’ma. he NEG received letter-gen ‘He didn’t receive any letter.’

6. Examples and issues, continued. • Concern: the interaction between: • lexical semantic interpretation of the verb in its various diathesis frames and • the semantic interpretation of noun phrase (NP) arguments that appear in those frames. • Long-range goal: integration of lexical semantics with compositional semantics, (Borschev and Partee 1999, 2002, Partee and Borschev 2003).

7. Diatheses and referential differences (1a) The farmers loaded the truck with (*?the/*?some) hay. (1b) The farmers loaded (the/some) hay on the truck. In (1a-b) we see a preference for the direct object to be definite in either diathesis frame. The difference is most pronounced for the role which is ‘Means’ in (1a) (sredstvo -- Apresjan) and ‘Patient’ in (1b): hay is almost obligatorily non-specific in (1a) but may be indefinite or definite in (1b).

8. Intensional verbs and referential status • In (2a-b) there is a clear difference in referential status of the direct object argument in the two cases, and a correlated difference in the sense of the verb. • (2) a. On ždet podrugu-acc (Neidle 1988) ‘He’s waiting for his girlfriend.’ • b. On ždet otveta-gen na vopros. ‘He’s waiting for an answer to the question.’

9. Genitive of Negationand Referential Status • Similar difference in referential status of the object in (3a-b); in this case the verb itself does not seem different, but negation together with the verb creates a context somehow similar to the non-referential complement of ždat’. This possibility was raised by Neidle (1988), Partee and Borschev (2004), Kagan (2005). (More on this later.) • (3) a. On ne polučil pis’mo-acc. ‘He didn’t receive the letter.’ b. On ne polučil pis’ma-gen. ‘He didn’t receive any letter.’

10. The Issues • The questions of concern in this paper are to what extent the semantic interpretation of the NP is part of, or is affected by, the semantics connected with the diathesis alternations seen in such pairs, and how the semantics of the diatheses are connected with the lexical semantics of the verb.

11. Not only diathesis alternations … • Correlation between different senses of a verb and different interpretations of an NP argument: • (4) John is looking for a blue Volkswagen. • a. … He can’t remember where he parked it. • b. … If he finds one, he will buy it for his wife. • “Look for” in (4a) denotes a relation between two entities; in (4b) it denotes a relation between an entity (the agent) and some intensional object (Montague 1973), perhaps a property as argued by Zimmermann (1993). • (4a-b) are not normally classed as diathesis alternation, but the interaction of verb and NP interpretations is similar.

12. Filip: Verbal affixes, diathesis shift, and quantificational effects • Filip (In press) has explored some cases that were first discussed in Partee (1991, 1995), in which verbal affixes together with diathesis shifts can be used to express various kinds of quantificational and closely related meanings like measure, distributivity, totality, exclusivity or exhaustiveness.

13. Filip: Verbal affixes, diathesis shift, and quantificational effects, continued. • One example is the use of the Czech prefix po- , discussed in Partee (1991, 1995) and illustrated here by examples (5a-b) from Filip (In press): • (5) a. Maloval hesla (na sténu). Czech paint.past.impf.3sg slogan.acc (on wall) ‘He painted (the/some) slogans (on the wall).’ • b. PO-maloval sténu hesly. tot-paint.past. 3sg wall.acc slogans.inst ‘He covered the wall with slogans.’ • c. *PO-maloval hesla na sténu. tot-paint.past.pf.3sg slogan.pl.acc on wall.sg.acc *‘He covered (the/some) slogans on the wall.’

14. a. Maloval hesla-acc (na sténu). b. PO-maloval sténu-acc hesly-instr. • When po- is applied to an imperfective verb with a meaning like ‘write’, ‘draw’, etc., which takes an object of creation (5a), the resulting perfective verb in (5b) takes as its direct object the optional locative complement of the base verb, and the direct object of the base verb is demoted to an optional instrumental complement of the prefixed verb. • The meaning of the perfective verb pomaloval in (5b) is ‘he painted all over X’ or ‘he covered X with painting’. Hence, the prefix po- is in a certain sense quantificational but at a lexical rather than a syntactic level (Partee 1995). • Note the different interpretations of the bare NP hesla ‘the/some slogans’ as direct object of the imperfective verb in (5a), and in instrumental form in (5b). In (5b) it can only be indefinite, and in a sense is even ‘more indefinite’ than it can be in (5a).

15. Lines of investigation • Formal semanticists who have studyied connections between verb semantics and the semantics of NP arguments have emphasized quantificational properties, • relation between aspectual properties of verbs and the count/mass distinction • (Krifka, Bach, Dowty, Filip, Partee). • Paducheva: correlations between decreased assertiveness (snjataja utverditel’nost’) in sentences and decreased referential status in NPs. • Yanko: diathesis alternations correlating with Theme-Rheme structure (also in recent work of Levin and Rappaport Hovav, below).

16. Debates about semantics of diathesis alternations • Formal semanticists have recently begun seeking arguments to distinguish between diathesis alternations that carry genuine semantic distinctions and those that may carry only Theme-Rheme structure distinctions (Krifka 2004). • An example of the difficulty of sorting out such factors can be seen in debates concerning semantics and pragmatics of the Dative Alternation in English (6a-b). • (6) a. Ann sold the car to Beth NP0 V NP2 to NP1 b. Ann sold Beth the car NP0 V NP1 NP2 • The double object construction in (6b) is argued by Levin and Rappaport Hovav and by Bresnan to be motivated largely to make the “dative” argument the Theme. Rheme Theme

17. (6) a. Ann sold the car to Beth NP0 V NP2 to NP1 b. Ann sold Beth the car NP0 V NP1 NP2 • On Krifka’s analysis, the lexical semantics of many of the verbs that occur in both frames of (6a-b) is a manner of action. • The construction in (6a) contributes an entailment that NP0 caused NP2 to go to NP1. • The construction in (6b) contributes an entailment that NP0 caused NP1 to have NP2. • Some verbs, like give and sell, have so much information in their lexical semantics that the constructions contribute nothing new, and the sentences in the two frames end up truth-conditionally equivalent; in this case, it is especially likely that differences in Theme-Rheme structure will be the most salient differences. • But in other cases, as with different sorts of verbs of causation of motion, like throw vs. push, the semantic difference between the two frames may be quite noticeable.

18. (6) a. Ann sold the car to Beth NP0 V NP2 to NP1 b. Ann sold Beth the car NP0 V NP1 NP2 • Most relevant to this paper, we see the grounds for a prediction of a difference in referential status to arise in certain cases. • Consider the two subparts of the interpretations, • “NP2 to go to NP1” for (6a) vs. “NP1 to have NP2” for (6b) • In the first, NP2 must exist throughout the action; in the second, NP2 may come into existence as a result of the action. • Krifka shows cases where this results in only one of the two diatheses being possible with some NPs. (7) a. #The explanation gave a headache to Susan. b. The explanation gave Susan a headache. • The headache does not exist throughout the event, so only the (7b) frame (‘cause to have’) is appropriate for ‘less referential’ headache.

19. In the case of the Dative Alternation, we see the situation that the semantics of the two diatheses permits cases in which the referential status of NP2 differs, but does not require them to differ. A fully referential NP2 is possible in both frames, while non-referential NP2 is possible only in construction (6b).

20. Still to come: • In the second half of the paper, we look at the interaction of indefiniteness and ‘decreased referential status’ of NPs with diathesis alternations and verbal semantics.

21. Referential Status in formal semantics • In formal semantics there has been a great deal of work on NP interpretations, including much work on • quantification, • definiteness and indefiniteness • kind-denoting NPs • property-denoting NPs • type-shifting among different possible interpretations of NPs • and recently on semantic typology and different kinds of indefinite and quantificational NPs.

22. Generalized Quantifiers • Classic formal semantics adopted Montague’s proposal (Montague 1973) for the semantics of Noun Phrases (NPs). Every NP was interpreted as denoting a Generalized Quantifier, i.e. a set of sets, type <<e,t>,t> (strictly, a set of properties, type <<<s,<e,t>>,t>.)

23. NP interpretations: Montague Some NP interpretations on Montague’s analysis: • John λP[P(j)] (the set of all of John’s properties) • every student λPx[student(x) P(x)] (the set of all of properties that every student has) • a student λPx[student(x) & P(x)] (the set of properties that at least one student has) • the kingλP [x[king(x) & y( king(y) y = x) & P(x))] (the set of properties which the one and only king has)

24. Indefinites • What could “indefinite” mean in such a framework? The need for such a distinction first arose in discussions of the prohibition of “definite” NPs in English existential there-sentences: see the contrast between the acceptable sentences in (9) and the sentences in (10), which are anomalous without special contexts. (9) a. There is a new problem. b. There are three/many/several/few/no semantics textbooks. (10) a. #There is every/neither/the linguistics student. • b. #There are most/both/the three democratic governments.

25. No intuitive notion of “definite” vs. “indefinite” explains why some quantifiers, like three and many, pattern with indefinites while others, like every, most, and both, pattern with definites. Milsark (1974, 1977) provided the kernel of a semantic explanation, dividing determiners into “weak” and “strong”, which was further developed by Barwise and Cooper (1981) and by Keenan (1987).

26. Semantic explanation – Milsark, Barwise and Cooper, Keenan • Definition (Keenan 1987): A determiner D is a basic existential determiner if for all models M and all A,B  E, D(A)(B) = D(AB)(E). • English test: “Det CN VP” is true iff “Det CN which VP exist(s)” is true.

27. Examples • (i) Three is an existential determiner: Three cats are in the tree iff three cats which are in the tree exist. • (ii) Every is not existential: • Suppose there are 5 cats, and 3 are in the tree. Then: “Every cat is in the tree” is false but “Every cat which is in the tree exists” is true.

28. Existential = Symmetric • Basic existential determiners = symmetric determiners. • One can prove, given that all determiners are conservative (Barwise and Cooper 1981), that Keenan’s basic existential determiners are exactly the symmetric determiners. • Symmetry: A determiner D is symmetric iff for all A, B, D(A)(B) ≡ D(B)(A).

29. Weak and Strong Determiners • The determiners three, a, some, no, at least three, exactly three, at most three are all weak. • The determiners the, the three, every, both, most, neither are all strong. • These semantic definitions laid a successful groundwork for a great deal of further research on the semantics of weak and strong NPs and their distribution (Büring, de Hoop, Partee, Rullmann).

30. Property-type NP interpretations • While some properties of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ NPs can be accounted for within the theory of generalized quantifiers, as in the account above, it has been argued that in some cases, weak NPs are really of “property type” (Montague’s type <s,<e,t>>, functions from possible situations to sets of entities), rather than generalized quantifiers. • Property-type analyses of various “weak NPs” are becoming increasingly common in Western formal semantics, and they may have an important role to play in accounting for non-referential readings of NPs in various diatheses, possibly including the Russian Genitive of Negation (Partee and Borschev, Kagan)

31. Property-type interpretations • Zimmermann 1993: argues against Montague’s analysis of “intensional transitive verbs” like seek • Montague: object is intensional generalized quantifier, type <s,<s,<e,t>>,t>. • Zimmermann: object is property-type, type <s,<e,t>>.

32. Fundamental properties of intensional contexts (11) Caroline found a unicorn. (extensional, unambiguous) (12) Caroline sought a unicorn. (intensional, ambiguous) • Sentences with seek are ambiguous between a specific and a non-specific reading (or transparent vs. opaque reading). (11) is unambiguous, (12) is ambiguous. • On the opaque reading of (12), the existence of a unicorn is not entailed.

33. Fundamental properties of intensional contexts, continued • Substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions in an intensional context does not always preserve truth-value. • Caroline is looking for a unicorn • The set of unicorns = the set of 13-leaf clovers • Not entailed:Caroline is looking for a 13-leaf clover

34. Zimmermann’s account • (Montague’s account – see written text.) • Zimmermann: we can capture the relevant generalizations if we treat definite and indefinite arguments of intensional verbs, (but not generalized quantifiers) as properties, type <s,<e,t>>. • Zimmermann’s proposal is that a verb like seek1 denotes a relation between an individual and a property.

35. Zimmermann’s account, continued Zimmermann: seek a unicorn: • seek’(^unicorn’) ( ^ is Montague’s ‘intension operator’) • This is a case of NP type-shifting by coercion: seek demands a property-type argument. • We know that indefinite NPs easily shift into <s,<e,t>> readings, as was shown for predicate nominals in (Partee 1986). • transparent, or de re, reading: “quantify in” to e-type argument position of seek2.

36. (2) a. On ždet podrugu-acc ‘He’s waiting for his girlfriend.’ b. On ždet otveta-gen. ‘He’s waiting for an answer.’ • In the case of the potentially intensional verb ždat’ in (2a-b), we see that its intensional genitive-taking variant in (2b) has all the properties of English seek. • Its extensional accusative-taking variant, (2a), allows referential NPs and quantificational NPs. • We predict that genitive should be disallowed with essentially quantificational NPs such as those formed with každyj.

37. What about Genitive of Negation? • Hypothesis (Neidle, Partee & Borschev, Kagan) • Wherever we see Nom/Gen and Acc/Gen alternation (under negation, just as under intensional verbs): • Nom or Acc represents an ordinary e-type argument position (‘referential’; and may be quantified) • Gen NP is always interpreted as property-type: <e,t>, or <s,<e,t>>.

38. Russian Genitive of Negation, continued. • In the case of Genitive of Negation, the construction is not intensional. • But Russian linguists from Jakobson to Paducheva have argued that Genitive-marked NPs have reduced “referential status”, and Western linguists have generally claimed that they must be “indefinite”.

39. Kinds of reduced referentiality • Negation is not really intensional; there seem to be different kinds of ‘reduced referentiality’. • Intensional NPs: existence in possible worlds • Abstract NPs: peace, justice, trouble: may exist in actual world, but their existence is less “concrete”. • Quantificational NPs: many different kinds, some just as ‘real-world existent’ as a definite NP, some not (Paducheva, others) • Indefinites under negation: if non-presuppo-sitional, then non-existence may be implied. • Predicate NPs, Property-type NPs: less referential just as adjectives are less referential.

40. Genitive as a mark of reduced referentiality • A Genitive NP as an argument of a verb may always be “less referential” in some sense; competing theories may ‘all be right’: • There may well be more than one way for an NP to be ‘less referential’ (much as there are several different kinds of ‘imperfective’ meaning), including being ‘quantificational/partitive’, being ‘modalized/intensional (not necessarily actual), being property-type or kind-type or ‘abstract’

41. Are Gen Neg NPs property-denoting? • Evidence in favor: parallels to ждать. (a) Петя нашел ответ. (b)Петя не нашел ответ. (c)Петя не нашел ответа. Accusative implies actual-world existence, Genitive does not.

42. Parallels between Gen Neg and Subjunctive • From Kagan 2005 • 25 a. Ivan ne počuvstvoval, čto bylo xolodno Ivan NEG felt that be(past) cold Ivan didn’t feel that it was cold. b. Ivan ne počuvstvoval, čtoby bylo xolodno Ivan NEG felt that-subj be(past) cold • 26 a. Ivan ne počuvstvoval xolod. Ivan NEG felt cold(acc) Ivan didn’t feel the cold. b. Ivan ne počuvstvoval xoloda. Ivan NEG felt cold(gen) • Such parallels support a property-type analysis

43. Problems for property-type analysis • Evidence casting doubt on property analysis: (a) Я не видела Машу. (b)Я не видела Маши. The (b) case causes problems for all “quantificational” approaches to the Genitive of Negation, unless we suggest a meaning like “any trace of Masha”. (c)Ваня не решил все задачи. (d)Ваня не решил всех задач. Exs. (c-d) may differ in scope, but not in intensionality.

44. Possible non-uniform analysis • There may be more than one way that the ‘reduced referentiality’ of Gen Neg NPs comes about, licensed by different classes of verbs. (Cf. multiple kinds of ‘Imperfective’ meanings.) The property-type idea may be correct for a number of cases, but other ‘quantity’-based ideas may be better for other cases. • Work in progress!