EDM 9206 Foundation of EAP Lecture 3 Epistemological Foundation of EAP (II)

1. EDM 9206Foundation of EAPLecture 3Epistemological Foundation of EAP (II)

2. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry

3. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry (1916-2003) 1916-2003

4. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • “It is therefore misleading to say that understanding versus explanation marks the difference between two types of scientific intelligibility. But one could say that the intentional or nonintentional character of their objects marks the difference between two types of understanding and of explanation.” (von Wright, 1971, p.135)

5. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • Distinction between causal (nonintentional) and teleological (intentional) explanations • Causal explanation: It refers to the mode of explanation, which attempt to seek the sufficient and/or necessary conditions (i.e. explanans) which antecede the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. explanandum). Causal explanations normally point to the past. ‘This happened, because that had occued’ is the typical form in language.” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83) It seeks to verify the antecedental conditions for an observed natural phenomenon.

6. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • Causal explanation: … This mode of explanation can further be differentiated into • Deductive-nomological explanation • Inductive-probabilistic explanation

7. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • Causal explanation • Carl G Hempel’s assertion of methodological monism • Carl G. Hempel published the article The Function of General Law in History in Journal of Philosophy in 1942.

9. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • Distinction between causal (nonintentional) and teleological (intentional) explanations • Teleological explanation: It refers to the mode of explanation, which attempt to reveal the goals and/or intentions, which generate or motivate the explanadum (usually an action to be explained) to take place. “Teleological explanations point to the future. ‘This happened in order that that should occur.’” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83)

10. Georg H. von Wright’s Two Traditions of Inquiry • Distinction between causal (nonintentional) and teleological (intentional) explanations • Teleological explanation: This mode of explanation can be differentiated into • Intentional explanation • Rational-choice explanation • Functional explanation (Quasi-teleological explanation)

11. Distinctive features of causal and teleological explanations Causal explanation Antecedent Condition/ Cause Explanandum: An apple falls retrospective attribution Explanandum: A man acts prospective protention Desire/goal Means & belief Teleological explanation

12. (I)Patterns of Causal Explanations

13. Deductive-nomological explanation • This is the type of explanation commonly used in researches in natural sciences. It makes up of three parts: • The explanatory premises or the casual law (covering law), which is a universal statement of the sufficient and necessary conditions (explanans/cause) for the truth of the explanandum (effect). Accordingly, a causal law in natural science must comprises the following component • The factual truth of both the theexplanandum (i.e. the phenonmenon to be explained) and the explanans.

14. Deductive-Nomological Explanation • The explanatory premises or the casual law … • The conditionality between the explanandum and explanans • Sufficient conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality between the explanandum and explanans, in which the explanans can exhaustively but not universally explain the truth of the explanandum. • Necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality between the explanandum and explanans, in which the explanans can universally but not exhaustively explain the truth of the explanandum. • Sufficient and necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality between the explanandum and explanans, in which the explanans can both exhaustively and universally explain the truth of the explanandum.

15. Deductive-Nomological Explanation • The explanatory premises or the casual law … • The temporal order of the explanans must be in precedence to the explanandum

16. Deductive-Nomological Explanation • The explanatory premises or the casual law … • The initial condition, which defines the property of a specific case of the explanandum. • The conclusion, which state the exhaustive explanation of the specific explicandum by the explicans.

17. Deductive-Nomological Explanation • The components of deductive-nomologicalexplanation Nomological Premise/Covering Law Sufficient & necessary condition Explanadum Explanans/ Cause Explanandum/Effect/ Object of Explanation conditionality

18. Inductive-Probabilistic Explanation: • This is the type of explanation commonly use in quantitative researches in social sciences. It is also made up of three parts similar to those in nomological-deductive explanation. There are two differences in probabilistic explanation. One is that the explanatory premises is not in the form of law-like / nomological statement of the sufficient and necessary conditions of the truth of the explanandum but only a probabilistic statement specifying the likelihood of the causal relationship between the explanans and explanandum. The second difference is that in the conclusion, the specific explanandum under study cannot be exhaustive explained by the explanans but can only be explained in probabilistic terms.

19. (I)Patterns of Teleological Explanations

20. Intentional explanation • This type of explanation is the typical mode of explanation used in social sciences. In fact, as Jon Elster underlines, its feature "distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences." (Elster, 1983, p. 69) • By intentional explanation, it refers to providing explanation to mainly human actions by “pointing to the future”, i.e. rendering “in-order-to” explanations to human action. More specifically, it attempts to interpretively understand the intentions, meanings, desires, and believes underlying human actions.

21. Intentional explanation • Within the mode of intentional explanation, we may distinguish two branches. One is intentional explanation in phenomenological perspective, while the other is that in rational-choice perspective. I shall the former intentional explanation and as for the latter I shall adopt Elster’s terminology and call it rational-choice explanation.

22. Intentional explanation • Alfred Schutz in his book The Phenomenology of the Social World has offered a phenomenological solution to Weber Aporia, which stated that "Sociology is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with causal explanation of its course and consequence." (Weber, 1978, p.4)

24. Intentional explanation • The 1st layer of interpretation: The project and orientation of the action • “Now we are in a position to state that what distinguishes action from behavior is that action is the execution of a projected act. And we can immediately proceed to our next step: the meaning of any action is its corresponding projected act. In saying this we are giving clarity to Max Weber’s vague concept of the ‘orientation of the action.’ An action, we submit, is oriented toward its corresponding projected act.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 61)

25. Intentional explanation • The 1st layer of interpretation: The project and orientation of the action • That is, the first layer of frame of reference for making interpretive understanding to the subjective meaning endowed in an action is “its corresponding project” and “orientation of the action”. • Schutz’s conception of project and orientation of the action has to be comprehended via a number of constituent concepts of phenomenology. They are • Stream of consciousness and intentionality • Perception, retention and reproduction • Experience endowed with attitude and meaning, i.e. behavior • Protention, anticipation, project of fulfillment, i.e. action

26. Intentional explanation • The 2nd layer of interpretation: The meaning-context • Apart from the immediate context of project, Schutz suggests that the second layer of context which interpretation should make reference to, is the more general and consistent personal “meaning-context”, which is relevant to the human action under interpretation. • By “meaning-context”, it refers to a configuration of meanings and interpretive schemes, which structured in consistent, continuous, and unified format.

27. Intentional explanation • The 2nd layer of interpretation: The meaning-context • Schutz also suggests that individual will organize the various meaning-contexts that she has forged, in hierarchical form. • The meaning-context that an individual brings into play in an action situation, according to Schutz’s formulation, depends on the following three components • Actor’s own biographical experiences • Actor’s definition of the situation • Actor’s “interest at hand”

28. Intentional explanation • The 3rd layer of interpretation: Intersubjectivity in the situation of face-to-face interaction • The first two layers of interpretive contexts are at individual level, the third layer of interpretive context is operated at interpersonal level in face-to-face situations.

29. Intentional explanation • The 3rd layer of interpretation: Intersubjectivity in the situation of face-to-face interaction • This shared interpretive context is made possible, according to Schutz, by means of the following three assumptions • Assumption of simultaneous flows of consciousness of fellow human in face-to-face situation, • Assumption of common lived experiences derived from shared temporal, spatial, social and cultural contexts between face-to-face actors, • Externalization and objectivation of subjectivity via nonverbal or verbal (written or spoken), formal or informal, explicit or implicit expressions.

30. Intentional explanation • The 3rd layer of interpretation: Intersubjectivity in the situation of face-to-face interaction • More specifically, applying concepts such as externalization and objectivation, intersubjective meanings can then be empirically studied because these meanings have been externalized and objectivated. They can therefore be “experienced” empirically.

31. Intentional explanation • The 4th layer of interpretation: Institutionalization of meaning-context among contemporaries • The fourth layer of interpretive contexts, which Schutz and his followers (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann) formulates, is the institutionalized interpretive contexts underlying interactions among contemporaries, who may not have any chance to meet in face-to-face situations. • .

32. Intentional explanation • The 4th layer of interpretation: • These interactions and the underlying shared subjective meanings are made possible by means of the following conceptions in social phenomenology • Concept of ideal-typical role performance in institutional contexts, • Concept of definition of situation • Concept of typification • Concept of reciprocity of perspective • Concepts role and identity

33. Intentional explanation • The 4th layer of interpretation: • Built on the conceptual framework of institutionalization formulated by Berger and Luckmann and the perspective of sociological institutionalism, social actions and their subjective meanings can move beyond the mode of intentional explanation and be accounted for by means of cause explanation. • Subjective-meaningful and intentional action can be typified into institutionalized role performances. Accordingly, these actions can be construed in the form of social regularities. • Role-performing actions, which suppose to be pointing to the future and in in-order-to formats, are now can be located within the respective institutional context and be explained in antecedental-causal mode. • These forms of role-performing actions can therefore be construed in the format of predictable social regularities.

34. Intentional explanation • The 5th layer of interpretation: Historical-institutional meaning-context of predecessors • The 6th layer of interpretation: Comparative-institutional meaning-context of another language game and/or lifeworld.

35. Rational-choice explanation • Apart from the phenomenological perspective, another perspectives, namely rational-choice theory, has also formulate an approach to intentional explanation with its conceptual apparatus.

37. Rational-choice explanation • Intentional explanation: According to Jon Elster’s formulation, intentional explanation can analytically decompose intentional explanation into "a triadic relation between action, desire and belief." (Elster, 1983, 90) “A successful intentional explanation establishes the behavior as action and the performer as an agent. An explanation of this form amounts to demonstrating three place relation between the behavior (B), a set of cognitions (C) entertained by the individual and a set of desire (D) that can also be impute to him. (Eslter, 1994, P. 311)

38. Behaviour / Action Cognitions Desires

39. Rational-choice explanation • Intentional explanation: Given this basic schema, Elster formulated intentional explanation with the following three propositions: (1) Given C, B is the best means to realize D (2) C and D cause B (3) C and D cause B qua reasons

40. Rational-choice explanation • Rational-choice explanation: Accordingly, Elster asserts further that “rational-choice explanation goes beyond intentionality in several respects.” (Elster, 1994, P.313) The basic requirement is that the triadic schema must be consistent both internally and externally. • Internal consistency: In order to turn a subjective intentionality into a rational project of action, Elster suggests that it must comply with two propositions (4) The set of beliefs C is internally consistent (5) The set of desires D is internally consistent

41. Rational-choice explanation • Rational-choice explanation: • External consistency: Elster further asserts that “one might want to demand more rationality of the beliefs and desires than mere consistency. In particular, one might require that the beliefs be in some sense substantively well grounded, i.e. inductively justified by the available.” (Elster, 1994, P.314) As a result, there are three more conditions to be complied with: • (1b) The belief must be the best belief, given the available evidence • (2b) The belief must be caused by the available evidence • (3b) The evidence must cause the belief ‘in the right way’ • Accordingly, the triadic schema may then be reformulated as follow

42. Behaviour / Action Cognitions Desires Evidences Elster, 1994, P. 318

44. Functional Explanation • This type of explanation is most commonly used in biology. It "takes the form of indicating one or more functions (or even dysfunctions) that a unit performs in maintaining or realizing certain traits of the system to which the unit belongs." (Nagel, 1979, p. 23) For example, in explaining why human being has lung, the typical explanation in biology is that lung performs the function of breathing, i.e. provide oxygen to the of the proper maintenance of the system of a human body. Accordingly functional explanation consist of the followings • X perform the function of Y to the system of Z • Y therefore explains the existence of X or Z's possession of Y.

45. Functional Explanation • However, there is a basic logical setback in this functional-explanatory structure. That is, since X performs Y, therefore X must be an antecedent of Y. However in the cause-effect explanatory structure, the existence of an effect (Y) could not have anteceded that of its cause (X). Therefore, Y could not have been the cause of X.

46. Functional Explanation • Nevertheless, in biology this setback can be compensated by the mechanism of natural selection in the theory of evolution. That is the seemingly temporal ordering mismatch between X and Y can be explained away within the much longer timeline in the evolutionary process of species. G.A. Cohen has called this requirement in functional explanation "consequence law" (Cohen, 1978, p.250)

47. Functional Explanation • Debate on functional explanation in social sciences and education studies • The focal point of the debate is that there is no commonly accepted "consequence law" available for the functional explanation of the origin and existence of social phenomena, such as education, available in social sciences. Unless we accept the thesis of social Darwinism that there is natural selection principle at work in social world, otherwise we may have to accept Jon Ester suggestion that functional explanation is not applicable in social science.

48. Functional Explanation • Debate on functional explanation … • One resolution or qualification offered by Philip Pettit (2002) and Harold Kincaid (2007) is that instead to use functional explanation and trace to origins of species as biologists do, social scientists could restrain themselves to explain the origins of social institutions and instead simply applying functional explanation to account for the resilient patterns or persistent regularities in social world. Such a qualification or reservation can release social scientists of the burden of proof of tracing the history of actual selection and evolution of the resilience of a social institution. Instead social scientists can simply base on a "virtual selection" assumption and focus on the accounting for the persistence of a given phenomenon.

49. Functional Explanation • Another resolution to the debate is offered by the Analytical Marxists. In G.A. Cohen's two functional explanations in historical materialism, he offers more or less "a selection theory through class struggle" as the consequence law.

50. 1941-2009