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Zombie Scan. Judy Novak Vern Stark David Heinbuch. June 12, 2002. SubSeven Incident. June 29, 2001 ~ 12:00 Shadow reveals massive scan Hundreds of hosts concurrently scan SubSeven port of Class B network Flood, DDoS, scan? Similar scan on July 2, 2001 ~ 16:00
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Zombie Scan Judy Novak Vern Stark David Heinbuch June 12, 2002
SubSeven Incident • June 29, 2001 ~ 12:00 Shadow reveals massive scan • Hundreds of hosts concurrently scan SubSeven port of Class B network • Flood, DDoS, scan? • Similar scan on July 2, 2001 ~ 16:00 • June 26, 2001 SANS reports of W32.leave.worm • Windows hosts • Spread via hosts listening on port 27374 • Zombies used in DDoS attacks • Scans @Home and Earthlink for port 27374
Sample tcpdump Output 12:16:31.150575 ool-18bd69bb.dyn.optonline.net.4333 > 192.168.112.44.27374: S 542724472:542724472(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 13444) 12:16:31.160575 ool-18bd69bb.dyn.optonline.net.4334 > 192.168.112.45.27374: S 542768141:542768141(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 13445) 12:16:31.170575 24.3.50.252.1757 > 192.168.19.178.27374: S 681372183:681372183(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 54912) 12:16:31.170575 24-240-136-48.hsacorp.net.4939 >192.168.11.19.27374: S 3019773591:3019773591(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 39621) 12:16:31.170575 ool-18bd69bb.dyn.optonline.net.4335 > 192.168.112.46.27374: S 542804226:542804226(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 13446) 12:16:31.170575 cc18270-a.essx1.md.home.com.4658 > 192.168.5.88.27374: S 55455482:55455482(0) win 8192 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 8953) 12:16:31.170575 24.3.50.252.1759 > 192.168.19.180.27374: S 681485650:681485650(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 54914) 12:16:31.170575 cc18270-a.essx1.md.home.com.4659 > 192.168.5.89.27374: S 55455483:55455483(0) win 8192 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 9209) 12:16:31.170575 24.3.50.252.1760 > 192.168.19.181.27374: S 681550782:681550782(0) win 16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 54915) 12:16:31.170575 cc18270-a.essx1.md.home.com.4660 > 192.168.5.90.27374: S 55455484:55455484(0) win 8192 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) (ttl 117, id 9465) 1 2 3 4
Source Hosts **Not spoofed source IP’s
Scanning Host Networks Cable/dial-in modem providers
Destination Hosts • Target network Class B: 65,535 possible IP addresses • June 29: 32,367 unique destination IP’s scanned • July 2 : 36,638 unique destination IP’s scanned • Prior reconnaissance of live destination hosts? • Missing Class C subnets • Different for both scans • Many IP numbers not live hosts • Zombies not active or responsive during scan
Scanning Rates • Sustained activity for 5 or 6 minutes • Peak activity for 2 minutes • June 29 scan: 7.2 Mbps maximum • July 02 scan: 8.6 Mbps maximum • Maximum volume not enough for DoS on our network
Packets Per Minute (hh:mm) (hh:mm)
Scanning Conclusions • Scanning hosts carefully synchronized • Waves of initial SYNs and TCP retries result in highly variable bandwidth consumption • SYN’s sent in waves 11.5 seconds apart • “Thoughtful” scan • Each source host assigned a range of destination hosts • Assigned time frame and frequency to scan
Scanning Hosts Operating Systems • Examine “passive” fingerprints • Arriving Time to Live (TTL) values • Scanning host TCP window size • Scanning host TCP options
Fingerprint Values by OS(courtesy Honeynet Project) OSVERSIONPLATFORMTTLWINDOW Windows 9x/NT Intel 32 5000-9000 AIX 4.3.x IBM/RS6000 60 16000-16100 AIX 4.2.x IBM/RS6000 60 16000-16100 Cisco 11.2 7507 60 65535 IRIX 6.x SGI 60 61320 Linux 2.2.x Intel 64 32120 OpenBSD 2.x Intel 64 17520 Solaris 8 Intel/Sparc 64 24820 Windows 9x/NT Intel 128 5000-9000 Windows 2000 Intel 128 17000-18000 Cisco 12.0 2514 255 3800-5000 Solaris 2.x Intel/Sparc 255 8760
June 29 Arriving TTL Values 10 – 22 hops 8 – 22 hops 8 – 25 hops
July 2 Arriving TTL Values 12 – 22 hops 12 – 21 hops 8 – 27 hops
Scanning Host TCP Window Size Windows 9X/NT Windows 2K Unknown Solaris
Scanning Host Maximum Segment Size Ethernet PPP/ISDN PPPOE(DSL)
SubSeven Scan Conclusions • Very efficient scan • Conducted by zombie hosts • Most are Windows • Other operating systems involved • Representative of normal distribution on Internet? • Thoughtful scan • Redundant scanners • Timing parameters • Ranges of destination hosts