Cognition and Foreign Policy

1. Cognition and Foreign Policy

2. Cognition • The Mind is a functioning organ that produces cognition or thinking • Thinking seems to be a set of processes • Perception • Memory • Reasoning • There are very real limits on these skills/capacities

3. Perception • We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive. • A corollary of this principle is that it takes more information, and more unambiguous information, to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected on. • (Heuer, http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/art5.html)

4. Cognition • Humans are information processors • We process information according to some basic underlying cognitive algorithms. • These algorithms help us process large chunks of information. • For example:

6. Perception and Complex Systems • We process information according to cognitive algorithms • We speed information processing by various shorthand algorithms such as • Encoding • Mind-sets

7. Mind-sets • A mind-set is an expected pattern • They are both necessary and problematic • A mind set is a lens or perceptual filter that classifies perceptions efficiently for rapid cognition. • As a result, when information lies outside the bounds of the mind-set, one of three things happens: • It is misinterpreted • It is discarded • It bogs down the cognitive process

8. Mind-sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change.

9. Image persistence

11. Perception is a learned skill • Our mind learns to see with stereoscopic vision • It does so by approximately 2 years of age • Not everyone acquires this ability

13. Cognitive Dissonance • Cognitive Dissonance is routinely encountered in thinking • It is when information counter to the beliefs or expectations of the perceiver is is encountered, it is either discarded, ignored or treated as false.

14. The dot puzzle

15. The solution to the dot puzzle

16. A more creative solution to the dot puzzle

17. Break that cognitive mold!

18. Types of sensory input • Cognition and perception • information processing is accomplishes with sensory input as the raw data • we obtain all of our knowledge of the world from our senses • Primitive concepts • Sight • length • Color • 3D – Depth perception • Hearing • Tone • Pitch • loudness (amplitude) • Touch • texture (rough‑smooth) • temperature • Taste • bitter • sweet • salt • sour

19. Types of sensory input (cont.) • Smell • Champhoraceus • Musky • Floral • Pepperminty • Ethereal • Pungent • Putrid • Others • balance • weight • Kinesthetic • time

20. Memory • Memory is complex and not well understood yetr • One simple model contain 3 different stores: • The Sensory Information Store (SIS) • The Short-Term Store (STS) • The Long-Term Store (LTS) • And 3 processes • Encoding (putting information into a store) • Maintenance (keeping it "alive") • Retrieval (finding encoded information)

21. Perceptions and Foreign Policy • Leaders make decisions based on • their perception of power capabilities, not the actual reality of those capabilities. • Their perceptions of other leaders intentions, not the reality of those intentions.

22. Perceptions & Vietnam • Perceptual problems concerning Vietnam • The importance of the objectives to the US electorate • The importance of the complementary objectives (resolve) for the Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. • Key perceptual events • Gulf of Tonkin • Tet offensive

23. Perceptions and Iraq • Start with a belief: • Iraq is an aggressive, imperialistic totalitarian dictatorship • The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait shifts beliefs to the position that Iraq is a threat to all Western interests • The known corroborated evidence on Iraqi WMD programs and the Iraqi intransigence in complying with UNSCOM inspectors reinforces the belief that Iraq is concealing its WMD activities

24. Iraq (cont) • Therefore data received must be assimilated according to one’s belief system and processed by one’s cognitive processing capabilities • The absence of data can mean two very different things • There are no weapons… • Saddam is a master of concealment • A chemical tank truck can indicate • A chemical/nerve agent production/distribution capability • A pesticide production/transportation/disposal capability

25. WMD Schema • If you believe that Saddam has WMD, then: • No evidence supports concealment • Lack of cooperation with UN means further efforts to conceal • If you believe that Saddam probably doesn’t have WMD, then • No evidence supports no WMD • Lack of cooperation with UN means he is defending Iraqi sovereignty in the face of considerable pressure and power – a sign of courage and ‘patriotism’ to the Iraqi people. • What you believe conditions what you see

26. Now play President Bush • Bush (41) failed to perceive Saddam accurately in 1990, and he invaded Kuwait. • An attempt to assassinate Bush (41) during the Clinton Administration bolsters the believe that Saddam seeks revenge. • Failure to perceive renewed threats from a Saddam emboldened by 9/11 means that if you underestimate him, the toll can be high – even catastrophic • WMD might mean orders of magnitude greater than 9/11 • What are the costs of a mistake?

27. US-SU Mirror Imaging • People generally saw the world of US‑Soviet relations as one of: • Ideology ‑ Soviets seek to export communism • US is ideologically opposed to expansion of communism • Mutual antagonism ‑ distrust • Misperception • We and the Soviets saw each other in “mirror image” • “they” are aggressors... • “they” arm for war, “we” arm for peace • “they” intervene, “we” preserve and protect • “they” are good people, their govt. is bad • “they” cannot be trusted • “they” are irrational

28. Other Models • “Satisficing” • Muddling through • Problems associated with decision‑making • Selective perception • Cognitive dissonance

29. Decision‑Making • Models of Decision Making • Rational Actor • Organizational Processes • Bureaucratic Politics