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CLARKE & ROWE (pp. 22-32). IS A NECESSARY BEING REALLY NECESSARY?. Overview. 1. Clarke argues for the existence of a necessary being : an entity that depends on no other being, but itself alone, for its existence. ( necessary being = self-existent being = independent being)
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CLARKE & ROWE (pp. 22-32) IS A NECESSARY BEING REALLY NECESSARY?
Overview 1. Clarke argues for the existence of a necessary being: an entity that depends on no other being, but itself alone, for its existence. ( necessary being = self-existent being = independent being) 2. Rowe rebuts Clarke, rejecting the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 3. Other arguments, that God is the necessary being, are omitted here.
CLARKE & ROWE 1931 - 1675 - 1729
CLARKE’S ARGUMENT 1. Dilemma: Either there is a) an infinite series of dependent beings or b) a necessary being. 2. But a) is “plainly impossible and contradictory to itself.” i) It has “no cause from without,” since nothing else exists. ii) It has “no reason within itself,” since it contains no necessary being. 3. THEREFORE: b) is true: there is a necessary being.
ROWE’S ARGUMENT • Rowe begins by rebutting three traditional objections to Clarke’s sub-argument 2. 2. Rowe then accepts a fourth objection that requires denying the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
i) Fallacy of Composition Objection A series of dependent beings is not itself a dependent being. (Fallacy of Composition: a collection of stamps is not a stamp, a team of hockey players is not a hockey player, etc.) BUT: we may need an explanation for the series (collection, team) as well as for its members (stamps, players).
ii) Russell’s Objection Each member in the series has a cause, but this does not entail that the series has a cause. BUT: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) applies not only to the members of the series but to the series as well.
iii) Hume’s Objection Since each item of the series is explained by the previous item in the series, then the series itself is explained. BUT: we also need to know why any dependent beings exist at all.
ROWE’S ARGUMENT Rowe then accepts a fourth objection, to Clarke’s Dilemma 1: i) As Anselm said, there are three possibilities for an entity (26): a. it is explained by another, b. it is explained by nothing, or c. it is explained by itself. ii) Clarke’s first premise ignores option b): that the chain of dependent beings has no explanation. (Fallacy of False Dilemma)
Dangerous Implications? Accepting option b is to deny the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): a big mistake? i) Some [rationalists] argue that PSR is “intuitively known to be true.” BUT some deny this intuition, or claim PSR is false. ii) Some [Kant] say PSR is “a presupposition of reason.” BUT even if that is true, it would not show PSR to be true, since “Nature is not bound to satisfy our presuppositions.”
OBSERVATION As Hume remarked, PSR does not pass the test of a necessary truth: the inconceivability of its falsehood. For example, 1+1=2 is a necessary truth: we cannot even conceive how it could be false. By contrast, the fact that elephants are large is merely a contingent (non-necessary) truth: we can easily conceive of a small elephant. Hume observed that we can conceive of things popping into, or out of, existence for no reason. Thus PSR is not a necessary truth. So it is contingent, or possibly false.
