Navy/USMC Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Clearance Process

1. Navy/USMC Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Clearance Process Presented to: sUAS Certification Working Group 26 June 2008 Dr. Steve Cook Navy/USMC Airworthiness Office (301) 757-2473 stephen.cook@navy.mil FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. USN/USMC Airworthiness Office Mission The Navy’s Airworthiness Office (AIR-4.0P) is responsible for the independent engineering assessment of all aircraft (manned and unmanned) and airborne weapon systems to ensure these air vehicles can be operated safely within defined operating limits. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. USN/USMC Flight Clearances for UAS • A flight clearance is required for any Navy/USMC-owned or Navy/USMC-leased UAS or aerial target IAW OPNAVINST 3710.7T • Not all UAS have to be airworthy, but all must be safe for flight! • If UAS is deemed expendable by the owner/sponsor, a flight clearance may be issued on the assurance of safety to people and property on the ground (Safety of Flight IFC). • Engineering requirements are tailored based on system complexity, risk to third parties, desired usage, expendability, etc. External mitigations (e.g., airspace restrictions) are typically added to the IFC to limit risk to third parties. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. MQ-9 Reaper ScanEagle MQ-8 FireScout AquaPuma RQ-7 Shadow Silver Fox The Wide Spectrum of NavyUAS IFCs Issued • Since 2004, Over 140 UAS Airworthiness IFCs and over 100 Safety of Flight IFCs issued • Currently supporting 24 Platforms • No reported flight-related injuries or damage to non-program property to date N-UCAS Future COST RQ-1 Predator A RQ-15A Neptune Wasp Not to scale WEIGHT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. ACC/ARC/ NAT IPT/EDT ENGINEERING OWNER PROGRAM INITIATED The Navy Flight Clearance Process FLEET REQUIREMENT IDENTIFIED INFORMED OF PROGRAM FLT CLNC REQUIRED? NO YES FACILITATE PLANNING MEETING ATTENDEE LIST and AGENDA ESTABLISH REVIEWERS PLANNING MEETING NO ESTABLISH ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS CONCURRENCE NAVAIRINST 13034.1C YES ENGINEERING/DATA REQUIREMENT AGREEMENT PLAN ANALYSIS TEST & EVAL NO YES OWNER CONCUR CLEARANCE REQUEST REQUIREMENTS MET? REQUEST ASSIGNED AND LOGGED IN DRAFT CLEARANCE REVIEW OF CLEARANCE AND SUPPORTING DATA YES REQUIREMENTS MET? NO QUALITY ASSURANCE & RISK ASSESSED NO NO MODIFIED CLEARANCE ACCEPTABLE FLIGHT CLEARANCE OPT YES BACK TO Planning Meeting YES PROBABILITY OF LOSS FLIGHT CLEARANCE REVISED CLEARANCE INCREASED RISK CLEARANCE DENIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6. Thermal Hydraulics Navy/USMC Systems Engineering Review System Safety Weight and Balance Materials Mechanical Systems Class Desk Avionics Fuel Containment Core Avionics Aviation/Ship Integration Software E3 Store Integration Target Controls Loads and Dynamics Store Separation Landing Gear Flying Qualities/Stab & Cntl Strength Performance Wiring Instrumentation APU & Drive Systems Human Systems Radar & Antenna Systems Flight Controls Electrical Power Propulsion Safe Escape FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7. Partnerships and Ongoing Efforts • US Army and Air Force • Tri-Service MOA for cross-Service certification support (e.g., Shadow, Raven, Predator, ScanEagle) • MIL-HDBK-516 updates for UAS • OSD Task Force • Standards and Interoperability sub-group • Airspace Integration Joint IPT • FAA, Universities, OSD, Services working to identify and close gaps in airworthiness standards for UAS • NATO FINAS (Flight in non-segregated airspace) • STANAG 4671: CS-23 based airworthiness standard for fixed-wing military UAVs • Standards for rotary-wing and light UAS in work FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8. Demonstrating Software Airworthiness in UAS via Assurance Based Cert Methodology University of Virginia Dr. John Knight Challenges • “Off the shelf” UAS with proprietary software difficult to certify • Many UAS produced by non-traditional aerospace manufacturers that have little/no experience with producing flight-critical software • Many international partners are legally bound to produce safety cases for their military aircraft Objective • Develop assurance-based certification processes and templates for software-intensive UAS Goal Structuring Notation for Software-Intensive System Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Key Deliverables • Track 1: Assurance-based methodology provides a structured argument to prove and document that software is safe within a given context for temporary approvals to fly Navy/USMC UAS in the NAS • Track 2: Application of assurance-based methodology will inform critical airworthiness criteria, processes and standards needed to account for software-intensive nature of UAS • Goal Structuring Notation methodology • Structured Safety Case Templates • Methodology of implementing into NAVAIR flight clearance processes Timeline • Phase 1 Complete pending deliverable • Phase 2 ECD: November 2009 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. Evidence-Based Approach to Improved Small UAV Reliability Virginia Tech University Dr. Jim Marchman and Dr. Craig Woolsey Challenges • Many small UAS lack the reliability to safely fly over densely populated areas • Non-traditional aviation manufacturers use components of questionable reliability, making fault tree analysis difficult • Cost and capability impacts of “designing-in” reliability into a small UAS are unknown Objective • Develop methodologies/tools to identify cost-wise improvements to small UAS reliability VULTURE highly reliable small UAV Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Key Deliverables • Track 1: Application of Dempster-Shafer methodologies as part of fault tree analysis provide a means of identifying reliability improvements for “off-the-shelf” UAS to enhance incremental access to airspace • Track 2: Identification of cost-wise component level reliability improvements will inform airworthiness standards for incorporation into MIL-HDBK-516 • Dempster-Shafer Theory based methodology for incorporating reliability into small UAS design • MATLAB toolboxes to inform trades of potential investments into UAS reliability • Case study of impacts of designing in reliability into the VULTURE UAS Timeline • Phase 1 Complete (31 May 2008) • Phase 2 ECD: 31 May 2009 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10. Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme North Carolina State University Dr. Chuck Hall Challenges • Airworthiness standards for small UAS do not yet exist in many disciplines • Lack of systematic method for substantiating the airworthiness of small UAS • Documentation of safety considerations for small UAS including lethality scaling for small UAS, mitigation factors, and target level of safety Objective • Develop quantitative scheme to assess airworthiness of small UAS Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme Closing UAS Airspace Integration Gaps Key Deliverables • Track 1: Application of QAS provides a means to substantiate COA statements of airworthiness for small UAS that intend to fly over populated areas • Track 2: Identification of airworthiness standards gaps for small UAS and development of best practices to fill those gaps • Report on Failure Modes and Functional Hazards for small UAS • Lethality Scaling Factor for small UAS • Documented Quantitative Airworthiness Scheme with user’s guide Timeline • Phase 1 ECD: November 2008 • Phase 2 ECD: November 2009 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

11. Conclusions • Navy/USMC UAS require a flight clearances per OPNAVINST 3710.7T • Flight clearances for “expendable” UAS can be issued on the basis of safety-of-flight • Flight clearance requirements for UAS can be tailored based on weight, complexity, usage spectrum, autonomy, and cost • Partnering with DoD, FAA, NATO, industry and academia to tackle UAS certification challenges FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

12. BACKUP FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. Definition: Airworthiness B-17 • The property of an air system configuration to: • safely attain, sustain and terminate flight • IAWapproved usage limits. • Usage limits include: flight limits, fatigue life, maintenance, etc. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14. Definition: Safety of Flight The property of an air system configuration to safely attain, sustain and terminate flight within: Prescribed and accepted limits for injury/death to personnel and damage to equipment, propertyand/or environment. Safety of Flight identifies risks associated with use of aircraft systems and are normally identified by a Hazard Risk Analyses. These risks can be conveyed by NOTES, CAUTIONS and/or WARNINGS. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

15. Sample Engineering Data Requirements Agreement Plan (EDRAP) AIRWORTHINESS: BASED ONMIL-HDBK-516 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

16. Typical Navy UAS SoF IFC Data Requirements Toolset SAFETY-OF-FLIGHT:SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO RCC 323-99 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY