Event Causation

1. Event Causation Daniel von Wachter http://daniel.von-wachter.de

2. Today • Distinguish between the semantical and the metaphysical question. • Reconstruct and criticise the Humean line of thought. • Propose the tendency theory of causation.

3. What is the philosophical problem of causation? Paradigm cases of causation: • The earthquake in the sea caused the tidal wave. • The lightning caused the tree to catch fire. • John’s attempt to lighten his cigar in the kitchen, which was filled with gas, caused the explosion. • The rolling of billiard ball B was caused by billiard ball A rolling so-and-so.

4. Confusion • I shall argue that there are two different questions about causation: a semantical question, and a metaphysical question. • The semantical question: Can statements of the type “A caused B” be transformed into, or paraphrased by, other statements? Can causal talk be transformed into causation-free talk? • The metaphysical question: What makes causal claims true? Describe what is there where there is causation.

5. The Humean theory of causation • Disclaimer: exegets debate whether Hume really held this view. • A caused B iff A was followed by B and if events like A on all other occasions were and will be followed by events like B. • There are no causal connexions. • This theory seems false because, e.g., the falling of barometers is regularly followed by bad weather, but the falling of barometers usually does not cause bad weather.

6. The Humean line of thought • “The origin of ideas”: All our concepts are copies of sense impressions or are composed of such concepts. (HGC) • Hume’s philosophical method: for all philosophical terms we must ask “from what impression is that supposed idea derived” • We have no sense impressions of causal connexions. We never observe anything like “power, force, energy, or necessary connexion”. (HOC) (cf. Al-Ghazali; Malebranche) • If we could discover a connexion in a cause we could foresee the effect “with certainty” and just “by reasoning”.

7. Humean line of thought (cont) • It follows from HGC and HOC that “we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning” • So why do we apparently have the concept of a connexion? • It arises because when we observe A-events often being followed by B-events we become accustomed to expect A-events to be followed by B-events and we being to “feel a connexion between A-events and B-events”

8. Objection 1 contra Humeans • Hume uses the wrong method for finding the meaning of a term. • What one means with a certain expression is best discovered simply by thinking hard and by trying to spell out the thought more clearly using. • If one is not aware of the meaning of a term one cannot even begin to look for the corresponding sense impressions.

9. Objection 2 contra Hume • The transition from the claim that the idea of a connexion is not part of the idea of a cause to the claim that there are no causal connexions is illegitimate. • It may be that causal claims can be replaced by other claims, but that there causal connexions which make true the causal claims as well as their substitutes.

10. Objection 3 contra Hume • The Humean method is not the right one for finding out whether there are causal connexions. • In order to find out whether there are Xs one does not need a theory about our concept of an X. • In order to find out whether ther eare causal connexions we have to consider whether things are as we should expect them to be on the assumption that there are causal connexions, and how likely it is that things would be as they are on the assumption that there are no causal connexions.

11. Semantics vs metaphysics • Humeans are concerned with the concept of causation. • Semantic q: Can statements of the type be replaced by certain other statements? • Metaphysical q: What in reality makes causal claims true? What in reality do we refer to in causal claims? • Humean theories may have some plausibility if taken as theories about the concept of causation, but not as theories of causation.

12. Mellor and Davidson • Mellor says “causes are facts”, Davidson says “causes” are events. What do they mean?

13. David Lewis’s “counterfactual analysis of causation”

14. The tendency theory of causation • An answer to the metaphysical question. • Consider a universe, U, that is quite like ours but consists just of two rocks slowly moving away from each other at time t... • What will be after t, say at t2? • What could there be after t? • How is U likely to carry on after t? Are all possible ways of carrying on equally likely? • Why not?

15. Tendency theory (cont) • Al-Ghazali’s answer • There was at t a tendency towards there being at t2 two rocks at certain positions. • There are not only tendencies concerning a whole universe but also parts of it (states of affairs). (E.g. planets, gravity.) • What tendency there is at t depends on what is the case at t: that there are two stones, etc. • For the obtaining of a tendency certain things are relevant, others are not. A tendency is based on a state of affairs.

16. Tendency theory (cont) • State of affairs A at t1 was basis of tendency T towards B at t2. • The tendency was realized: the world carried on according to the tendency so that B occurred. The tendency led to B. • A causal process is a continuous series of states of affairs each of which is basis of a tendency towards a later one. • Two tendencies that are towards incompatible states of affairs are conflicting. Either one overrides the other, or they form together a resulting tendency. Processes can intersect. • Total tendency.

17. Tendencies and causation • State of affairs A(t1) caused B(t2) iff A was the basis (or a part thereof) of a tendency towards B (or a part thereof), and the tendency was realised. • Or: A caused B iff A was a constituent of a process of which B was a later constituent. • So where there is causation there are tendencies, but not every tendency gives rise to causation. “Cause” is a success-term.

18. Deterministic vs indeterministic • A deterministic tendency is one for which it is impossible that it is not realised unless something intervenes. • An indeterministic tendency is one for which it is possible that it is not realised even if nothing intervenes. • This diverges from the common understanding of “determinism” but yields a good conception of “deterministic laws”.

19. Newtonian forces • Forces are a kind of tendencies: tendencies that concern the spatial position of something. E.g. gravity. • This gives us the link between forces and causation, and it takes into account that forces may not yield actual results.

20. The tendency theory attempts to describe the truthmakers of causal claims. • I do not claim that there is a conceptual equivalence between “A caused B” and “A was basis of a tendency that led to B” • I only spoke about singular causation. We also say things like “Smoking causes cancer”, which is only true if some people’s smoking causes them to have cancer.