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An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model

An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model. Security. Hacking. Electronics. Elections. Transparency. Democracy. By Eitan Grundland. The System Goals. Integrity Privacy Transparency. Why Change to Digital ?. Computers are faster! Computers are more accurate!

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An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model

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  1. An Analysis of the Wombat Voting System Model Security Hacking Electronics Elections Transparency Democracy By Eitan Grundland

  2. The System Goals Integrity Privacy Transparency

  3. Why Change to Digital? Computers are faster! Computers are more accurate! As days go by, digital interfaces are more intuitive to the public! The evolution in inevitable!

  4. From Paper to Digital

  5. From Paper to Digital

  6. From Paper to Digital

  7. From Paper to Digital

  8. From Paper to Digital

  9. SecurityComponentsOverview

  10. Security Components A weak identification procedure can compromise the entire election process.

  11. Security Components • Live CD OS • Encryption • Randomness Generation • Zero Knowledge 1 of L

  12. Security Components • Voter's Receipt • Digital Signatures

  13. Security Components • Paper Ballots • Serial Number

  14. Security Components • Threshold Encryption • Hash for Tallying Verification

  15. Security Components Audit Ballot

  16. Security Components • Mixnet • Mixnet Zero Knowledge

  17. TheParticipating Parties

  18. The Participating Parties • Ballot Stuffing • Voter Exposure • Authentication Disabling • Smart Card Forgery

  19. The Participating Parties Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by a Single Party

  20. The Participating Parties • False Results Publishing

  21. The Participating Parties • False Accusation

  22. The Participating Parties • Registration Frauds

  23. The Participating Parties • Vote Buyers Motivation • Voter Exposure

  24. The Participating Parties Actions That Pose No Threat When Carried Out by a Single Party

  25. The Participating Parties • Voter Exposure • Printing Subliminal Channel • Booth Denial of Service

  26. The Participating Parties • Partial Voter Exposure

  27. The Participating Parties • Booth OS Built-in Backdoor • Altering Ballots • Subliminal Channel • Printing Subliminal Channel

  28. The Participating Parties • Collecting External Information

  29. Threats of Attackers Collaboration

  30. Attackers Collaboration Registration Frauds

  31. Attackers Collaboration Repeating

  32. Attackers Collaboration Booth's OS CD Manufacturers Capabilities Identity

  33. Attackers Collaboration • Partial Exposure Voter • Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

  34. Attackers Collaboration Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

  35. Attackers Collaboration Ballot Stuffing

  36. Attackers Collaboration Voter Exposure

  37. Attackers Collaboration Chain Voting

  38. Attackers Collaboration Chain Voting

  39. Attackers Collaboration Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

  40. Attackers Collaboration Subliminal Channel

  41. Attackers Collaboration Voter Exposure by the Ability to Decrypt the Votes

  42. Conclusion

  43. Identification Process • People can vote anywhere • Biometric identification • Limit each scanned vote to a single identification by software.

  44. Live OS CD The CD should be digitally signed

  45. Booth Machine The booth machine should be checked for suspicious components

  46. Physical Stamp Each stamp should contain poll's digital signature

  47. Bulletin Board A digitally signed list of all the cipher votes

  48. Booth Machine Auditing An audit every two hours in each booth

  49. Ballot Scanning AuthenticationsAuditing A special "authentication audit ballot"

  50. Conclusion An audit OCR program

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