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Military Thought and Development Between the Wars. Tactical and operational questions for the future . . . How is maneuver possible on the modern battlefield? What is the proper role of the tank? What is the proper role of the airplane?
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Tactical and operational questions for the future . . . • How is maneuver possible on the modern battlefield? • What is the proper role of the tank? • What is the proper role of the airplane? • All of these questions will be addressed in the 1920’s and 1930’s.
Britain • J.F.C. Fuller • Tanks could replace infantry and cavalry; • Future land battles would be similar to naval battles • B.H. Liddell Hart: • Argued conversion to a “New Model Army” • Balanced tank-infantry force
B. H. Liddell Hart: The “indirect approach” • First appeared in 1929 in The Decisive Wars of History • “Effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it.” • “In most campaigns the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow.”
France • Confrontation between visions of mobile warfare and static defense. • General Jean-Baptiste Estienne • Tanks should form a separate organization • Tanks would perform the role of cavalry • Marshal Philippe Petain • Reliance of static defense • Centralized command and control
1930’s: Proponents of mobility and mechanization take control • General Maxime Weygand • General Maurice Gamelin • Colonel Charles DeGaulle • Problems: • Financial weakness • Diminished recruit pool
Germany • Hans von Seeckt rebuilds the German army. • January 1927: • “Armored, quickly moving tanks most probably will become the operationally decisive weapon.” Werner von Fritsch
German General Staff’s “Young Turks” • Joachim von Stulpnagel • Werner von Blomberg • Heinz Guderian
Soviet Union • Soviet military thinking driven by the Red-White civil war, not the Western Front • Conflict between professionals and “Red Commanders”
Mikhail Tukhachevsky • Revolution could be exported on the bayonets of the army.
Boris Shaposhnikov • The army could not defend the nation alone • General staff was an extension of the political apparatus. • MozgArmii
Vladimir Triandifilov • Successive operations
Italy Giulio Douhet • Command of the Air (1921) • No distinction between combatants and non-combatants. • Successful ground offensive no longer possible. • Speed and altitude make it impossible to defense against air power. • True objectives government and population centers. • Nations need separate air forces built around long-range bombers.
United States • Billy Mitchell • His ideas were similar to Douhet’s but he stressed: • An autonomous air force • Centralized control of all air assets
Mitchell’s Court Martial • "There are those in Washington who should be severely taken to task and court-martialed for their deliberate neglect of aviation.” • He blamed Washington for: • "Incompetence, criminal negligence, and almost treasonable administration of the national defense"
Guilty • Suspended from rank, pay, and command for 5 years. • Resigned, died in 1935
LTC Pete Ellis, USMC • Advance Base Operations in Micronesia • War with the Japanese was likely. • The real function of the USMC was to seize operating bases for the Navy